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ABSTRACT
We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who
regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. This dissertation
is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. A covenant-breaker typically
believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool would act in any other way.
Would it not be disturbing if this were true?
My central claim will be that adherence to the precepts of justice is a rational strategy for
a self-interested actor. I intend to demonstrate that con men and covenant-breakers do not act
rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of justice as it evolves through
philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice changes as the underlying
concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in favor of the rationality of just
behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical interpretation will advance some form of
the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative agreements is a rational strategy, and at
each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that these interlocutors are mistaken.
My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of
cooperative agreements, is rational. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters and other
skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right, and
justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying an
unnecessary cost.

iv

INTRODUCTION
On April 29, 1938, a baby boy was born to young working-class parents in Queens, New
York. The boy grew into a bright young man and graduated from Hofstra University. He briefly
attended law school, but dropped out in 1960 to found his own Wall Street investment firm,
which he financed with money he had saved from working as a lifeguard and lawn sprinkler
installer. His firm was a pioneer in the use of information technology in the trading of securities,
and it quickly grew to become one of the largest market makers on Wall Street.
In the 1970s, his firm opened a wealth management division, which also enjoyed
tremendous success. He was described as a “master marketer,” and he generated most of the
firm’s clients himself through relationships he cultivated at exclusive country clubs in New York
and Palm Beach. His investment returns were remarkably consistent in both up and down
markets, and by 2008 his wealth management division had grown to $17 billion in assets under
management.

His clients adored him and they routinely referred their friends and family

members to his firm, hoping they would also be granted the privilege of having him manage their
money.
Then, on December 11, 2008, the man from Queens was arrested for securities fraud. In
the ensuing days it became clear that this man, Bernard Madoff, had been operating the largest
financial scam in the history of the United States. The consistent returns he had been reporting
to his clients were completely fabricated, and the complaint filed by U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York on March 10, 2009 alleged that Madoff had defrauded his clients
of nearly $65 billion in assets. As of the time of this writing, Madoff is serving a 150-year
1

prison sentence, and an ongoing effort to recover his clients’ assets has so far yielded less than
$12 billion.
We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who
regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. Bernie Madoff is
the most famous case, mostly because he got caught. But we all see less dramatic examples
every day: A politician reneges on promises she made to her constituents, confident in her ability
to survive the backlash and win re-election. A businessman makes a comfortable profit by
financing a project with borrowed money and defaulting on the loan, secure in the protection of
bankruptcy laws. A married man has a one-night affair with another woman while on a business
trip, certain that his wife will never know. A patron at a restaurant notices that the waiter forgot
to charge her for the second round of drinks, yet she pays the bill as if it were accurate. “That is
their problem,” she thinks to herself.
This dissertation is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. It
addresses con men, cheaters, dishonest restaurant patrons, and anyone who has ever taken
advantage of others by breaking an agreement. To varying degrees, it addresses all of us. When
an individual elects to behave in an unjust manner by violating an agreement, she typically does
so with the belief that she is acting rationally and in her own best interest. What if the covenantbreakers are right? Is justice a farce? Are those among us who consistently behave in a just
manner merely suckers to be taken advantage of by more clever individuals who recognize that
justice is not in one’s own best interest? A covenant-breaker, whether he is Bernie Madoff or
some less-harmful agent, believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool
would act in any other way. Would it not be disturbing if this were true?
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The central claim of this dissertation will be that adherence to the precepts of justice is a
rational strategy for a self-interested actor. That is, I intend to demonstrate that con men and
covenant-breakers do not act rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of
justice as it evolves through philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice
changes as the underlying concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in
favor of the rationality of just behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical
interpretation will advance some form of the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative
agreements is a rational strategy, and at each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that
these interlocutors are mistaken.
My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of
cooperative agreements, is rational despite its costs. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters
and other skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right,
and justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying
an unnecessary cost. Those of us who advocate justice have agreed to constrain our behavior in
the belief that to do so is in our own self-interest; we believe the cost of this constraint is
outweighed by the benefits of just cooperation. If it turns out that clandestine cheating is a
superior strategy, then justice is not in our self-interest, justice has negative instrumental value,
and those among us who are observing the precepts of justice are acting irrationally from an
instrumental standpoint. In some respects, this is a battle between our moral intuitions and the
claims of a moral skeptic.1 I want to lend credence to our intuitions by showing that following

1

Haidt might claim that all I am doing here is attempting to find a rational justification for an ethical intuition that I,
and most other individuals, already have. I address Haidt’s ideas briefly in Ch2 and Ch 5. See Haidt, Jonathan.
“The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail.” in The Righteous Mind, 27-51. New York: Pantheon, 2012.
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these intuitions is indeed in our best interests, and that the Madoffs of the world are acting
irrationally.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the philosophical debate concerning justice as it appears in
Plato’s The Republic. The original moral skeptic, Thrasymachus, denounces justice and Socrates
offers a spirited defense. While Socrates’ argument is ultimately unsatisfying, he introduces
three themes related to justice that will reappear throughout the dissertation: He claims that
justice is a non-zero-sum game, he illustrates the distinction between the instrumental and
intrinsic value of justice, and he shows that any concept of justice must be based upon an
underlying concept of human nature.
Chapter 2 addresses justice as it is interpreted in the philosophy of Hobbes and Hume.
They advance many of the same themes as Socrates, and they each provide a more satisfying
account of human nature than the one given in The Republic. Since my goal is to show that
justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is rational despite its
costs, I conclude that Hobbes’s contractarian account of justice provides the better framework for
the advancement of this thesis.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I present the core of my argument with assistance from Gauthier and
several other contemporary contractarian philosophers. Gauthier’s brilliant insight is that, when
an individual adopts a strategy of just behavior, she is operating on the level of metachoice. That
is, she is making a choice about how to make choices. Additionally, Gauthier claims that we
adopt certain “deliberative procedures” that define how we have chosen to make these choices.
Yet the moral skeptic remains unconvinced. The skeptic, most notably in the form of
Hobbes’s Fool, claims that it is in his best interest not to adopt a deliberative procedure in
accordance with justice, but instead to opt for the opportunistic violation of covenants. It is at
4

this point that I introduce my most significant contribution to the debate, which I refer to as the
imperfect reason argument. I will demonstrate that the Fool is indeed foolish, as he is almost
certainly overestimating his own ability to determine in advance which violations of which
covenants will be to his advantage. I will use behavioral economics to expose some noteworthy
aspects of human nature and their corresponding effects on the rationality of justice. I will show
that we humans tend to reason in a flawed manner, and that this flaw in our reasoning ability
ultimately leads to the conclusion that a self-interested individual is best-served by adopting a
policy of just behavior.
Finally, Chapter 5 attempts to finish the project that Socrates started. I consider whether
or not justice, in addition to having instrumental value, has intrinsic value as well. Our moral
intuitions encourage us to believe that there are “loftier” reasons for just behavior above and
beyond the avoidance of the downside of cheating, yet it remains to be seen whether these
benefits are intrinsic to justice or if they are just another form of instrumental benefit.
Before moving on, a brief aside regarding the use of terms is in order. The term “justice”
is used in many different contexts throughout the historical philosophical discourse, and it carries
with it a wide variety of connotations. Hobbes defines justice as the performance of covenants,
and for Gauthier justice is the rational disposition to agree to forego the opportunity for free
ridership or parasitism in return for others foregoing the same. In keeping with this contractarian
tradition, I will be using the term “justice” throughout this dissertation in the sense of “the
consistent observance of cooperative agreements.” I will assume non-coercion and approximate
equality (in the Hobbesean sense) between the cooperating parties.
At various points along the way, the reader may have a spontaneous and negative
reaction to what I have not said about justice. I ask the reader to keep in mind that the topic
5

under consideration involves a very narrow definition of justice. I am not using the term
“justice” to cover the whole of morality. I am not making claims about justice in any political
context, nor am I addressing the Rawlsian justice of social institutions. I have omitted these
aspects of the wider definition of justice not because they are unimportant, but because each of
them could occupy a separate dissertation in its own right. In the Conclusion section of the
dissertation, I will briefly address the justice of social institutions and justice in situations of
unequal power, but until then I ask the reader to keep in mind that “justice” will refer specifically
to the consistent observance of cooperative agreements.

6

CHAPTER 1: JUSTICE AND RATIONALITY IN ANCIENT GREECE
The enquiry into the rationality of justice begins in Athens in the opening pages of
Plato’s The Republic. Socrates and various interlocutors attempt to define justice, and Socrates is
challenged to defend the position that a just life is superior to an unjust life. He claims that
justice is desirable not only because of the instrumentally valuable consequences of just
behavior, but also because possessing a just soul provides us with intrinsic benefits as well.
Simply put, Socrates proposes that we have a motivation to be just.
I will not attempt to definitively resolve the dispute between Socrates and his
interlocutors, as this would occupy a separate book in itself. I will, however, use arguments
suggested by The Republic to frame the ongoing debate regarding the rationality and intrinsic
value of justice. Before embarking on a study of the rationality of just behavior, it is necessary to
understand how the particular idea of justice that is being considered relates to our underlying
human nature. I will therefore begin this chapter with a description of human nature and a
corresponding definition of justice drawn from The Republic. I will then turn to an analysis of
Socrates’ argument in favor of the rationality of justice, first as a refutation of the egoistic
argument of Thrasymachus and second as a response to the challenge of Glaucon and
Adeimantus regarding the instrumental versus intrinsic value of justice. Next, I will investigate
the relationship between Socrates’ definition of the just soul and the rationality of just acts. I will
show that Socrates’ failure to emphasize the importance of just acts leads to an inadequate
account of human psychology and represents a major weakness in his argument in favor of the
rationality of justice. In the concluding section, I hope to show that, while Socrates’
7

characterization of justice in The Republic leaves much to be desired, it does introduce several
concepts which are helpful in supporting the argument that just behavior is rationally required.
It is important to note at the outset that I will not assume that the Platonic character
Socrates speaks for Plato or that the doctrines that are often attributed to Plato by scholars
actually represent Plato’s own views. Plato explicitly chooses to remain anonymous in his
dialogues and we must therefore consider the very real possibility that he chose to write
dialogues for philosophical reasons and that his own personal views may have been quite
different from those espoused by the character Socrates. I will therefore attribute the claims
made by Socrates to Socrates and not to Plato, and when addressing scholarly commentary on
Plato, I will be referring to a specific scholar’s interpretation of Plato’s dialogues, always bearing
in mind that the doctrines being addressed cannot be definitively attributed to Plato himself.

Socrates’ Concept of Human Nature and the Definition of Justice
The ongoing debate over the rationality of justice in the Western philosophical tradition
is rooted in Socrates’ description of human nature and psychology in The Republic.2 For
Socrates, the primary driving force behind human motivation in a properly adjusted soul is
reason. Reason is what separates us from lower animals; it is the dominant trait in the best
individuals among us and it allows us access to knowledge of the Forms.
In addition to being driven by reason, Socrates claims that human beings are also driven
by certain needs. We come together to form cities because we are not self-sufficient; we need
help from each other in the form of protection, economic sustenance and mutual aid, and we can
2

Plato. “The Republic.” in Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, translated by G.M.A. Grube and
C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
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only realize our full nature in the context of a community of other humans. That is, humans have
an emotional and physical need for contact with other humans and we are, by nature, social
animals.
Given our nature as rational, needy creatures, how should we understand the workings of
human psychology as it relates to justice? For Socrates, human psychology is best described
through an analysis of the proper structure of the human soul. Rather than address the structure
of the soul directly, he famously begins with the use of an analogy in which he will claim that the
defining characteristics of a just city are also the defining characteristics of a just soul.
He begins with the “principle of specialization.”3 As individuals come together to form
societies and cities, reason informs them that each individual possesses unique natural talents and
abilities. Some individuals are talented farmers, some are good at commerce, others are built for
combat and still others have intellectual gifts that will make them talented philosophers. It soon
becomes obvious that the needs of everyone in the community are best-served when each
individual performs the function for which he is best-suited by nature.4 This principle of
specialization will dictate that each individual in the city will focus on certain tasks, which will
in turn benefit the overall flourishing of the city as a whole and the individuals within it.
Specifically, the populace will be divided into craftsmen, who tend to be dominated by
desire and who will conduct the business of the city, auxiliaries, who possess a high degree of
courage and spirit and who will be the defenders of the city, and guardians, who, being educated
in reason and philosophy, will be the rulers of the city. A just city is one in which the four
cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance and justice) are fostered via the proper interaction
of these three types of citizens. The rulers exercise wisdom, the guardians exercise courage,
3
4

“The Republic,” 370a-c, p. 1009
It is important to note here that Socrates finds this unproblematically true, yet it is highly problematic.
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temperance is fostered via the craftsmen and auxiliaries acquiescing to the rule of the guardians,
and justice is the result of a harmony in the proper functioning between the three parts.
Having described his just city, Socrates completes the analogy by likening the just city to
the just soul of an individual. As with the city, the soul has three components; the reason, the
spirited part (what we might refer to as a sense of honor or pride) and the desires or passions. In
an individual, wisdom arises from the exercise of reason and courage arises from the exercise of
pride and spirit. When the individual knows when to obey each element of the soul he is
displaying temperance, and justice results when the rational part of the soul rules and all of the
aspects work together in a harmonious fashion to foster the soul’s love of knowledge. In other
words, justice is merely the harmony of a soul driven by reason.
Through this attempt at a definition of justice, Socrates has established the idea that the
concept of justice is preceded by, and inextricably tied to, an understanding of human nature and
human psychology. But is his depiction of human nature, and his subsequent definition of
justice, convincing? While it is very tempting to simply answer this question in the negative and
move on, it will be helpful to the central themes of this essay to understand exactly where
Socrates’ deficiencies lie.
The most obvious problem with Socrates’ description of human psychology is that he
does not place enough emphasis on the value of experience; he relies almost entirely on a priori
rational enquiry. Rather than observing the psychology of those around him and generating ideas
based upon those observations, Socrates seems to want to make the facts of human psychology
fit his claims about the workings of the just city. He neglects many important aspects of
psychology such as dispositions, motivation and psychological dissonance, which renders his
version of psychology incomplete. Various commentators have attempted to save Socrates’
10

notion of human psychology, but as we shall see, they cannot overcome his failure to simply
observe human behavior as we find it. I will address Cooper’s defense of human psychology as
presented in The Republic here, and I will return to the topic again in the final section of this
chapter.
Cooper focuses his defense of “Platonic psychology” on Socrates’ account of the spirited
part of the soul. Cooper wants to argue that, contrary to popular belief, Socrates is not
conveniently and arbitrarily dividing human psychology into a tripartite soul just to correspond
to his conception of the city; he instead argues that Socrates’ tripartite soul is prior to his
tripartite city and that it has a basis in facts about individual human motivation.5
For Cooper, Socrates’ tripartite theory is merely the idea that there are three
psychological determinants of choice and voluntary action, each of which has its own distinct
type of pleasure and motivation. Reason is clearly present in the human psyche, and reason is
motivated to rule. Appetites are clearly present as well, and they are obviously distinct from
reason. Thus, the only element of Socrates’ argument that may seem arbitrary is spirit. Socrates
includes many different things under the heading of spirit, such as honor, pride, anger, shame,
outrage and a desire to assert oneself, and it is this vagueness and lack of a unifying factor that
makes spirit appear to be an arbitrary addition to the picture.
Cooper claims that there is, in fact, a unifying factor in the Socratic idea of spirit;
something we would call “competitiveness” or the desire for self-esteem and the esteem of
others. He argues that the psychological importance of competitiveness is evidenced by the fact
that reason and competitiveness are often in conflict, causing us to feel differently that we think,6

5

Cooper, John M. “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 1 (January,
1984): p. 4
6
Cooper, p. 15
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and that competitiveness is therefore a third source of human motivation of the same importance
as reason and appetite. He concludes that spirit (understood as competitiveness and the desire for
esteem and self-esteem) is “an innate form of human motivation, distinct from the appetites and
reason itself and equally as basic as they are to human nature.”7
Cooper’s attempt at salvaging Plato’s version of human psychology falls short on two
levels.8 First, if he wants to argue that the Socratic concept of the tripartite soul is based in facts
about human motivation, Cooper needs to show that there are three and only three elements of
the soul, as Socrates claims. While Cooper goes to considerable effort to show that spirit is as
much an essential element of human motivation as reason and appetite are, he ignores the
possibility that there are other sources of motivation as well. That is, Cooper makes no attempt to
argue that these three elements constitute a comprehensive list of the elements of the soul, and
without demonstrating this he cannot plausibly claim that Socrates is giving an accurate account
of the facts of human psychology.
Second, even if Cooper’s claims about the composition of human motivation turn out to
be a reasonable account of the facts, his claims about the nature of spirit simply do not
correspond to Socrates’ arguments in The Republic.

That is, Socrates is not making the

argument that Cooper attributes to him. The only reasonable conclusion is that Socrates produces
a theory of human psychology that is incomplete, arbitrary and inconsistent with everyday
human experience. However, while Socrates’ description of human psychology certainly has its
flaws, it is still useful in that it sets the stage for the more important question at hand, namely,
whether or not just behavior is rational.

7

Cooper, p. 17
Recall that I am not attributing a specific account of human psychology to Plato here; I am addressing the account
that Cooper attributes to Plato, while recognizing that this may not have been Plato’s actual view.

8

12

Thrasymachus on the Rationality of Justice
Socrates’ main ambition in the later books of The Republic will be to convince us that it
is rational to be just. To this end, he will offer various arguments and proofs in response to the
challenges of Glaucon and Adeimantus. However, before embarking on his more intricate
defense of justice, Socrates must address a more primitive argument raised by Thrasymachus in
Book I.
Thrasymachus is the original protagonist of the “justice is irrational” argument in The
Republic. Socrates begins Book I by asking Cephalus and some others for a definition of justice.
Soon after, Thrasymachus interrupts the conversation, and Socrates’ description of him provides
a hint regarding Thrasymachus’ views on justice: “He coiled himself up like a wild beast about
to spring, and he hurled himself at us as if to tear us to pieces.”9
In keeping with his demeanor, the definition of justice that Thrasymachus offers is far
different from justice as it is commonly understood. He says that justice means being concerned
with one’s own good, while injustice means being concerned with the good of another. He
characterizes justice as “the advantage of the stronger,”10 by which he means to argue that those
in power establish laws to serve their own interest, and justice is nothing more than the
acquiescence of weaker individuals to the oppressive laws of the stronger. While this is certainly
a controversial definition, the question of its coherence is not relevant; in fact, Thrasymachus is
not genuinely attempting to provide a definition of justice at all. His intent is to indicate his
contempt for justice as it is commonly defined, and with this in mind he turns to a presentation of
his own arguments on the rationality of justice after Socrates confounds his attempt at a clear
definition of the term.
9

“The Republic,” 336b 3-5, p. 981
“The Republic,” 338c 1-2, p. 983
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Thrasymachus is arguing that adhering to the principles of justice as they are commonly
understood is foolish. For him, any concept of justice is temporal; it derives its meaning and
validity from the prevailing public opinion of the time and it is not based upon any enduring
truth. Under this characterization, the only reason people obey the rules of justice is that they are
afraid of the legal consequences or social stigma of getting caught behaving in what is currently
considered to be an unjust way, so, to the extent that one can get away with unjust behavior, one
should do so. Those fools who obey the rules of justice out of respect for justice itself are placing
an unnecessary and unreasonable restraint on themselves, and they will inevitably be taken
advantage of by more clever, enterprising individuals who ignore the rules, behave in an egoistic
fashion and get away with it. The sophist Antiphon11 argued that a wise person treats law as
important in the presence of witnesses and nature as important when there are no witnesses, and
Thrasymachus would certainly agree with him. While Thrasymachus may concede that having a
system of justice in place is beneficial for society as a whole, he believes that an individual who
always adheres to that system of justice is simply foolish. For Thrasymachus, in many situations
being unjust is preferable to being just, and an individual who has an inclination to observe
justice on every occasion is irrational.
Socrates responds to Thrasymachus’ challenge with three arguments in favor of justice.
While these arguments as a whole are far from satisfying, Socrates does raise one important
point here that we can build upon. He recognizes that all cooperative human behavior, even
among unjust persons, requires some element of justice:
…for when we speak of a powerful achievement of unjust men acting together, what
we say isn’t altogether true. They would never have been able to keep their hands off
each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have been some sort

11

Antiphon, Diels-Krans 87 B44
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of justice in them that at least prevented them from doing injustice among themselves
at the same time they were doing it to others.12
Socrates recognizes that all human group activity is, at its most basic level, dependent
upon just behavior. If any of us are to accomplish anything above the level of basic physical
survival, we will need the assistance of other individuals and we will need some assurance that
we will not be exploited by those individuals. Even if the individual participants in a given
venture are unjust persons who are striving for an unjust purpose, they still require some element
of justice among themselves in order to successfully accomplish their goal. The fact that Socrates
does not pursue this line of argument further is unfortunate. The sarcastic disengagement of
Thrasymachus at this point of the discussion leads Socrates to abandon the entire argument thus
far and start afresh with Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II.
If we wish to engage Thrasymachus at the point where Socrates disengages, our own
response to Thrasymachus must be made on two levels. As Reeve indicates,13 Thrasymachus is
arguing not only that just actions are irrational, but that the acquisition of a just character is
irrational as well. That is, Thrasymachus believes that just actions are irrational because they
directly prohibit one from acquiring the things that one desires, and a just character is irrational
because it subjects one to the whim of the rulers in power. Thrasymachus must be addressed on
both accounts.
The refutation of Thrasymachus’ argument against just actions is not particularly
difficult. Thrasymachus seems to view the natural state of human relations as a perennial freefor-all in which each individual is fighting with other individuals in an effort to acquire for
himself the maximum amount of wealth and power. However, as Socrates indicates in his own
12
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description of human nature, humans are social animals. We naturally come together to form
societies because we need help from each other and because we can only realize our full
potential in the context of a community of other humans. If we did not share a common
understanding of just behavior, we would not be able to thrive as a species and it is likely that we
would devolve into a Hobbesean state of war with each other. Socrates recognizes this (albeit in
a cavalier fashion) when he shows that some element of justice even exists within groups of
unjust individuals. While this “honor among thieves” may not be true justice in the robust sense
that Socrates is seeking, it does illustrate one very important aspect of justice: Despite the fact
that each individual in such a group has an unjust character, they all benefit from the mutual
observance of rules or norms in their relations with one another.
The driving force behind this phenomenon is the fact that human interaction is not a zerosum game.14 That is, the practice of justice is not analogous to a poker game where one
individual’s gain is dependent upon and is equal to another individual’s loss. Justice is, instead, a
value-producing practice in its own right. While Thrasymachus appears to believe that humans
are involved in a struggle to obtain the largest possible share of a fixed amount of “goods” such
as wealth and security, a cursory examination of actual human interaction will demonstrate that
this is absolutely not a zero-sum game. The most essential reason that humans choose to interact
and cooperate is their mutual desire to increase the total amount of wealth and security available
to the human species as a whole. The practice of just actions does not benefit some individuals at
the expense of others; it allows every individual to have more than she otherwise would.15
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Thrasymachus also wants us to believe that humans are driven by an insatiable pleonexia,
or the drive to have as much wealth and power as possible, always at the expense of others in a
zero-sum world.16 Yet, as our own experience tells us, our motivation to acquire more wealth and
power is reduced by the law of diminishing marginal utility. It is a fact of human psychology
that, as we acquire more and more of a particular asset, our desire for another unit of that asset
diminishes.17 Although some individuals are content with very little of a given asset while others
will require much more of the same asset before becoming satiated, nearly all individuals reach a
point where more of the same brings very little additional utility. Yet, while we may reach a
level of material wealth and security where our motivation to acquire more of the same
diminishes, we will still likely be interested in acquiring goods such as friendship, clear
conscience and the esteem of oneself and of others; goods that cannot be had by unjust means.
Where an unjust individual seeks to obtain a larger piece of a fixed basket of goods, a just
individual realizes that, by cooperating, she can increase the overall size of the basket of goods
for everyone, increase her own odds of obtaining a larger absolute amount (although not
necessarily a larger relative amount) of those goods than she otherwise would have had, and
increase her ability to secure possession of her own goods, all without having to deprive others
of theirs. When individuals deal with each other in a just fashion, fear is reduced, trust is
fostered, commerce is made more efficient and the overall opportunity set of each individual is
improved. Thrasymachus’ claim that just behavior is irrational simply does not survive this basic
observation.
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It should also be noted that the “non-zero sum game” argument could be used to illustrate
why a group of unjust individuals (as described by Socrates in 352c) would be better-served if
they were to behave in a just fashion towards non-members as they have towards members of the
group. That is, if this unjust group chooses to behave in a just fashion to outside individuals or
other groups, it will be able to achieve more, both for the group and for the individuals within the
group, than it did by acting in an unjust manner.18
As mentioned above, in Book I Thrasymachus is arguing against the rationality of having
a just character as well as the rationality of just actions. We have overcome Thrasymachus’
claims about just actions, but the refutation of his argument against the acquisition of a just
character will prove more difficult. Socrates’ attempt at this refutation is the central point in his
conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus in the later Books of The Republic. I will therefore
postpone a detailed analysis of this argument until the next section, but a few general points
against the argument of Thrasymachus in Book I will be a useful prelude.
The main flaw in Thrasymachus’ rejection of a just character is that the benefits that may
accrue to an individual as a result of performing acts of injustice are not necessarily the proper
yardsticks with which to judge whether a course of action is rational or even desirable. When
Thrasymachus claims that justice is “the advantage of the stronger,”19 by “advantage,” he means
“that which leads to the accrual of wealth, power and influence over others.” But, it is not
necessarily rational to pursue these things at all costs. That is, while it may be true that these
advantages do sometimes accrue to individuals who practice injustice, it does not necessarily
follow that it is rational to pursue these advantages.20
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In his account of injustice, Thrasymachus is pretending that wealth and power are the
only rewards available to us. By doing so, he is failing to recognize the psychological
opportunity cost of unjust behavior. Injustice may reap great material rewards for its
practitioners, but benefits such as friendship, family relationships and clear conscience will
evade the unjust individual. While such psychological benefits lack the tangible value of the
goods Thrasymachus is after, it is still rational to pursue these benefits, and, as we will see later,
the intrinsic value of the psychological benefits of justice make these goods preferable to
Thrasymachus’ material goods. Thrasymachus is simply ignoring the value of many of the best
things in life, and he is unintentionally making the false claim that happiness is a zero-sum game.
In the remainder of The Republic, Socrates’ main project will be to argue against
Thrasymachus’ character-based version of “egoistic eudaimonism”21 and to demonstrate just
how much human psychology and human happiness Thrasymachus has left out of his own
account. In order to make his case, Socrates is forced to abandon the conventional understanding
of justice and to start afresh. He needs to show that justice is in our own best interest, not only
for the material benefits that just actions provide, but for the intrinsic value of a just character as
well. That is, he needs to demonstrate that it is rational for us to prefer a life of actual justice to a
life of apparent justice. Socrates’ subsequent conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus will
serve this purpose.

Glaucon: The Intrinsic Value of Justice
Book II of The Republic begins with Glaucon’s taxonomy of the different types of goods.
He characterizes goods as either being good in themselves only (goods such as simple pleasures),
21
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good for themselves and for the sake of other things (goods such as health and the senses), or
good only for the sake of the related benefits they bring (goods such as money and exercise).
Glaucon and Adeimantus are willing to concede that justice is one of these three types of goods,
but the debate with Socrates will center upon which of the three types it is. Glaucon will argue
that justice is a good of the third type; it is beneficial to us only because of the instrumental
benefits it provides. Socrates, however, wants to argue that justice is a good of the second type;
that it is good in itself as well as being good for its outward benefits. Socrates’ efforts in the
reminder of The Republic will be focused on his attempt to prove to Glaucon and Adeimantus
that, while behaving in a just manner and giving an outward appearance of justice is in an
individual’s rational self-interest because of the instrumental benefits it conveys, it is also in
one’s self interest to develop a just character and to actually be a just person because justice
brings intrinsic benefits as well. That is, Socrates is claiming that there are both moral and nonmoral reasons for being just, and that justice is its own reward.
Glaucon is arguing against justice from two separate but related angles. First, he claims
that it is better to be unjust than just. The unjust individual, he claims, is able to satisfy all of her
physical desires and to secure all of the wealth she wants, while the just individual will be
deficient in these areas. Glaucon therefore concludes that it is better to appear just and to act
unjust than to actually behave in a just manner and to develop a just character. This is a similar
but more sophisticated version of the second part of Thrasymachus’ argument addressed above.
Glaucon’s second argument is that justice is valuable only instrumentally. He
acknowledges that, because justice is instrumentally valuable, it is in one’s own self-interest to
behave in a just manner. However, because justice is valuable only instrumentally (and not
intrinsically), we behave in a just manner only for non-moral reasons. That is, he is calling our
20

motives into question and arguing that our motivation for observing the conventions of justice is
not a moral motivation, but a selfish one. When we behave in a just manner, we only do so
because of the social benefits that such behavior brings, and because we fear the consequences of
getting caught if we behave unjustly. He uses the example of The Ring of Gyges to make his
point: If I were able to avoid detection by others, I would have no reason behave in a just manner
because such behavior would no longer bring me any instrumental benefits.
Socrates attempts to refute Glaucon’s two-pronged argument via a series of proofs in
Book IX. In the first proof, Socrates argues that justice is superior to injustice because the just
person is the happier person. He contrasts the tyrannical person (and eventually the tyrannical
ruler) with the aristocratic person, arguing that the injustice of the tyrant leads her to be fearful,
unable to satisfy her desires and, consequently, unhappy, whereas the justice of the aristocratic
person allows her to fulfill her more lofty desires and to attain happiness. This proof is loosely
related to a proof from Book IV in which Socrates compares justice to health by arguing that the
healthy body, like the just soul, derives its virtue from the fact that its component parts are
properly arranged and in correct relation with each other. He is arguing, in response to Glaucon,
that justice, like health, is good in itself and for the sake of something else. Socrates believes
both of these proofs demonstrate that justice leads to psychological health and is therefore a
rational course of action for a self-interested individual.
In the second proof, Socrates separates people into three categories: those who love
pleasure and money, those who love honor, and those who love truth. He views these three
objects of love as a hierarchy with pleasure and money at the bottom and truth at the top. The
philosopher (the lover of truth) is the only type of person who has experienced all three of these
pleasures, and is therefore the only one qualified to judge which type of life is best. The fact that
21

the philosopher has chosen the life of truth serves as proof that the life of truth (and justice)
brings the best kind of pleasure. It follows from this that it is more rational to be just than unjust.
The third proof makes use of pleasure as well, claiming that the pleasure of the
philosopher is the only real, permanent pleasure which does not have a corresponding pain. The
lower, bodily pleasures can never be completely satisfied and are merely a temporary removal of
pain. Clearly the real pleasure of the philosopher is superior to the other types of pleasures, and it
is shown once again that it is rational to be just.
The argument that Socrates is making is similar to the Epicurean notion that fear is the
enemy of happiness.22 He is trying to convince us that justice, as the chief legislator of a
balanced psychology, allows us to lead a life of fulfillment, self-confidence, social acceptance,
serenity, clear conscience and freedom from fear. Injustice, on the other hand, is a state of
constant fear, strife and inability to fulfill one’s desires. In other words, the just life is the
pleasant life, and we act in our own rational best interest when we behave in a just way.
It should be noted that each of these proofs attempts to demonstrate (with various levels
of success) that justice is better than injustice because it results in happiness or a lofty type of
pleasure. The problem for Socrates is that the challenge posed by Glaucon still has not been
completely overcome. Recall that Glaucon’s argument is two-fold: First, he claims that it is
better to appear just and to act unjustly because such a strategy will allow one to reap all of the
material benefits of just behavior and to exploit other individuals for one’s own gain. Socrates
has, to an extent, shown that Glaucon is wrong on this point because Glaucon is using an
incomplete notion of human good. That is, by emphasizing only the material benefits of unjust
behavior, Glaucon is misrepresenting human nature and ignoring the greatest benefits of having a
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just character. Justice is worthwhile not only for the material benefits that can also be had by
pretending to be just, but also for loftier benefits such as philosophical happiness which cannot
be attained by someone who is merely faking it. Socrates has shown that, because of the
psychological benefits of justice, it is in one’s rational self-interest to behave in a just manner.
However, Glaucon also claims that justice is a type-three good, that is, justice is only
beneficial because it leads to other valuable goods. Unfortunately for Socrates, none of his proofs
convincingly overcomes this claim by demonstrating that justice is good in itself. Happiness is
certainly a more worthwhile benefit of justice than the material rewards cited by Glaucon (and
Thrasymachus before him), however, happiness is still a “by-product” of justice, not an inherent
part of it. While this does not diminish the point that it is rational to behave in a just manner and
to have a just character, it leaves Socrates open to Glaucon’s contention that justice is good only
because it leads to other, greater goods.
Recent scholars have attempted to save Socrates’ argument in various ways. Shields
claims that the difficulty Socrates faces in satisfying the challenges of Glaucon and Adeimantus
is partially due to the fact that the challenges themselves are internally problematic.23 Glaucon
begins his challenge by describing three types of goods: those that are good in themselves (typeone), those that are good in themselves and for the sake of something else (type-two) and those
that are good only for the sake of something else (type-three). However, as noted by Shields,
Glaucon’s taxonomy of goods does not seem to be exhaustive. Glaucon argues that type-two
goods are the best of the three because they are good in themselves and good for the sake of
something else. But why does he favor these type-two goods over type-one goods that are simply
good in themselves? That is, what reason should we have for preferring an intrinsic good that
23
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leads us to another intrinsic good over an intrinsic good alone? Should we not prefer the direct
route? Glaucon and Adeimantus themselves even seem to be confused about what they are
asking: “I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has when it’s
by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account their rewards and what comes from each of
them.”24 Yet, they also want Socrates to “…praise justice as a good of that kind, explain how –
because of its very self – it benefits its possessors and how injustice harms them.”25
Shields’ solution to this dilemma is that there is a higher type of good that lies behind this
whole picture. The “simple pleasures” described by Glaucon as comprising the type-one goods
are not of the same kind as the intrinsic goods that type-two goods lead us to. That is, there is a
higher “type-four” good that stands behind the three types enumerated by Glaucon, and the typetwo goods are of interest because they combine the simple pleasures of type-one goods with the
added utility that they lead us to more important type-four goods, whatever those may be. Our
initial impression that the type-one goods are of the same importance as the goods that are the
object of the type-two goods is mistaken.
While the claim made by Shields does help Socrates somewhat by highlighting the
inconsistency of Glaucon’s line of questioning, it does not add any positive force to Socrates’
own argument. A cleverer attempt at responding to Glaucon’s claim that justice is only superior
because of the benefits it provides is proposed by Reeve.26 He begins with the observation that
most scholars tend to argue that Socrates’ reply to Glaucon’s challenge needs to be a
deontological one. That is, scholars believe that if we are to claim that justice is good for reasons
other than the reputation it brings, we should not attempt to make this claim via a
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consequentialist argument. It therefore seems odd that both the challenge and Socrates’ response
are leveled on consequentialist grounds (612d 3-8).
Reeve claims that we do not need to make a deontological argument after all. A
consequentialist defense of Socrates’ position will suffice, but it needs to be a consequentialist
argument of a distinct type. According to Reeve, when Glaucon claims that justice is beneficial
only for its consequences, he is not making a claim about justice at all; he is making a claim
about reputed justice. That is, all of the benefits of justice that Glaucon is interested in can just as
easily be attained via a simulation of just behavior. If I merely pretend to be just, I can gain all
of the reputational benefits that Glaucon claims are the driving force behind the motivation to
justice. However, the same is not true of the loftier benefits of justice that Socrates is concerned
with; these are not attainable via a mere simulation of justice. In Reeve’s terms, the class of
consequences of actual justice is larger than the class of “simulator accessible” consequences,
and since Glaucon is only interested in the simulator accessible consequences, he is making a
claim about simulated justice instead of the real thing.
Reeve concludes that a consequentialist defense of Socrates’ argument is perfectly
acceptable, as long as the defense is made using non-simulator accessible consequences. The
consequences that Socrates mentions when he offers his three proofs in Book IX are of the nonsimulator accessible type, so we can accept his consequentialist argument that actual justice is
preferable to apparent justice. However, we have still come up short. While Reeve’s formulation
of Socrates’ argument has lent some additional credence to the claim that justice is superior to
injustice, it has not definitively shown that justice is good in itself. That is, Reeve has shown that
justice is good independent of the rewards of having a reputation for justice, but this is different
from pure intrinsic goodness.
25

All of this leaves us in a somewhat unsatisfying position. Some of the questions posed
by Glaucon have been shown to be internally problematic, but Socrates’ response leaves
unproven his claim that justice is intrinsically valuable. Rather than attempt to resolve this
shortcoming in the context of Socrates’ argument, it is preferable to take the insights we have
gained from The Republic and move on. Socrates has introduced the concept of the intrinsic
versus instrumental benefits of justice and he has shown how difficult it is to define and
distinguish between them. The recognition of this distinction will be of central importance to the
conversation about the rationality of justice in the early modern period, as will the recognition of
the importance of actions to an evaluation of justice.

The Importance of Actions and Their Influence on Psychology
Before moving away from ancient Greece, it will be helpful to pause and recognize one
more shortcoming of Socrates’ account of justice in The Republic that will play a major role in
the account of justice given in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, namely, his apparent
belief that actions are of little importance to an account of justice. For Socrates, justice is an
internal psychological state of the soul that results from the proper education of desire, and the
benefits of justice are based almost entirely on this internal psychological state. While he does
believe that just actions will necessarily result from the development of a just soul, he does not
believe that actions are the primary source of the benefits of justice, that actions play a
significant role in the formation of a just character, or that actions should be the focal point for
the evaluation of justice.
The linking of justice to a psychological state of the soul instead of actions creates two
difficulties for Socrates. First, it prevents him from recognizing one of the most fundamental
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aspects of our commonsense notion of justice, namely, outward-directed behavior that regards
the welfare of others. Second, it influences him to give a questionable account of human
psychology that ignores the impact of actions and dispositions on the development of a just
character.
The claim that Socrates makes regarding virtuous action is this:

If you have true

knowledge of what virtue is, you will behave in a virtuous way because your reason will compel
you to do so. When he speaks of knowledge in this context, Socrates is not referring to
knowledge in the sense of “knowing that Tallahassee is the capital of Florida” or “knowing how
to swim.” He is referring to knowledge in the sense of knowing what to do in a given situation
or knowing why A is more important than B. Knowledge of virtue in this sense is a state of the
soul, and any individual who possesses this knowledge will necessarily be driven by reason to
live in accordance with virtue through a consistent outward application of this virtuous inner
state.
The problem here is that Socrates fails to account for justice in what most of us would
consider the everyday sense of the term, namely, actions that take into account the interests of
others. That is, under Socrates’ characterization of justice, knowing what is important and how to
act is a sufficient condition for virtue. But how can we be sure that an individual with a proper
state of the soul will necessarily refrain from performing unjust actions towards others?
While Socrates does not explicitly address this concern, we can infer from his
characterization of human nature that Socrates’ just individual will behave in a just way towards
others because of her desire to be connected with other people. Socrates recognizes that human
beings are needy. We come together to form cities because we are not self-sufficient and we can
only realize our full nature in the context of a community of other humans. Social connections
27

and unity with others are prerequisites of our own happiness and survival, and in order to make
these connections we need to behave in a just manner towards others.
Singpurwalla argues along these lines27 and invokes the unhappy tyrant as an example of
the irrational nature of unjust behavior. As Socrates indicates, “someone with a tyrannical nature
lives his whole life without being friends with anyone, always a master to one man or a slave to
another and never getting a taste of either freedom or true friendship.”28 The tyrant is wealthy
and powerful, but his disregard for just behavior prevents him from attaining happiness. Socrates
wants to contrast this individual with the just individual, whose knowledge of the good allows
her to recognize that her own good is intertwined with the good of others, and who will therefore
necessarily behave in a just way towards others in order to attain this good for everyone.
While Singpurwalla is able to assist Socrates by inferring an account of other-regarding
actions from his account of justice, Socrates’ failure to give an adequate account of human
psychology and his failure to emphasize the importance of actions in the development of a just
character are far more damaging to his project. Aristotle recognizes these two shortcomings in
Socrates’ account of justice, and we can use Aristotle’s own account of justice to see just how
significant these shortcomings are.
These shortcomings in Socrates’ account of justice are primarily due to the method that
he uses. Where he employs rational enquiry alone, Aristotle’s use of a posteriori practical
experience allows him to give an account that more closely resembles the facts as we find them
in everyday human life. Cooper suggests that there is a gradual progression from the Socratic
argument presented in Protagoras, to the Platonic argument in The Republic, and finally to
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Aristotle’s argument in Nichomachean Ethics. The movement is from an account of virtue as
pure rationalism to virtue as an “interfusion of reason and desire.”29 This is a plausible account
of the arguments as presented, and it provides support to the observation that the movement from
the Platonic Socrates to Aristotle is a movement from a rational approach which emphasizes
mental states to an observational approach which emphasizes virtuous action.
Aristotle’s emphasis of the importance of dispositions is critical.

He explicitly

emphasizes that a person’s progress to a state of virtue involves not just a change in his
knowledge, but a change in his psychology as well. Not only does he recognize that having the
proper disposition is a prerequisite for an action to be virtuous, but more importantly, he
understands that there are instances where having the proper disposition is not enough to lead a
person to perform virtuous action. In other words, Aristotle recognizes that psychological
dissonance can be present in a just person.

This is a fact that is entirely obvious from

observation, and one that Socrates unfortunately fails to emphasize.
It should be noted that Socrates does recognize some notion of dispositions, but he
understates their importance. According to Joseph,30 Socrates is referring to dispositions when
he discusses the harmony that results when a person “puts himself in order” (Republic, 443c8 –
444a1). Joseph also attempts to draw an analogy between Aristotle’s dispositions and Socrates’
emphasis of courage in the virtuous soul.31 While there may be some similarity here, this analogy
is far from perfect. Aristotle is making an explicit claim about the psychological state of a
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person when that person is involved in action of an ethical nature, whereas Socrates is not
directly concerned with action or observational evidence.
The importance of Aristotle’s methodology is even more evident in his emphasis of the
importance of action in the development of a virtuous character. Like Socrates, Aristotle does
believe that knowledge of virtue is a necessary condition for the development of a virtuous
character, but for Aristotle it is not a sufficient condition: “intellect itself moves nothing.”32
Aristotle believes that for an individual to be virtuous, knowledge of virtue must be combined
with a long-standing habit of performing virtuous actions which results in a disposition to behave
in the correct way in a variety of situations. He realizes that there are no hard, fast rules that can
be universally applied to the ethical decision-making process. Instead, He emphasizes the
importance of action and the use of correct deliberative judgment in particular ethical instances.
In real life no two ethical situations are exactly alike and it is therefore necessary for one to have
a good deal of practical experience in order to ensure that one is trained to properly analyze the
situation within an ethical framework and to take the correct action based upon that analysis.
Aristotle’s characterization of virtue explicitly accounts for this fact of life, whereas Socrates’
does not.
London is quite helpful in this regard when he stresses the point that “actions are in the
particulars.”33 That is, knowledge of universals is a helpful tool in making correct ethical
judgments, but since ethical situations are varied and unique, knowledge of the particulars is
more important. Only experience in the actions of daily life can lead to knowledge of the
particulars involved in virtuous choice, and this experience is therefore essential to the
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development of the ability to deliberate correctly: “Nor is practical wisdom concerned with
universals only – it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is
concerned with particulars.”34 Aristotle recognizes that experience in real ethical situations is a
necessary condition of the development of a virtuous character. That fact that Socrates
underemphasizes this point diminishes the force of his argument.
Aristotle’s experience-based approach, his superior account of human psychology, and
his emphasis on deliberation and action expose serious flaws in the account of justice offered by
Socrates. However, the exposure of these flaws raises three points that will be quite helpful in the
development of the central argument of this essay. First, a proper account of justice needs to be
based upon an observational investigation of the facts as we find them in everyday life, and not
upon an other-worldy rational enquiry. Second, in order to give a coherent account of justice we
must first have an understanding of human nature and human psychology; dispositions and
psychological dissonance are important in this regard. Third, when constructing an argument in
favor of the rationality of justice, the emphasis should be placed on just actions rather than
justice as a virtue or state of the soul.

Conclusion
The account of justice given by Socrates in The Republic may be incomplete and
unsatisfying, but it does succeed in several ways. Socrates is successful in refuting the primitive
argument against justice posed by Thrasymachus. By recognizing that the benefits of justice are
not limited to material goods, he allows us to focus on the loftier benefits of justice and to
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recognize that these benefits are not gained in the context of a zero-sum game. Also, the mere
presence of Thrasymachus introduces us to the literary method of the “amoral interlocutor,”
which will recur in the 17th century in the person of Hobbes’s Fool.
Also, he raises the critical distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental benefits of
justice. More will be said on this topic as the essay progresses, but two ideas should be briefly
recognized here. First, Socrates has shown us that demonstrating the intrinsic value of justice is a
far more difficult task than demonstrating its instrumental value. He is able to quickly dispense
of the instrumental-based argument made by Thrasymachus, but his attempt to satisfy Glaucon’s
request for a poof of intrinsic value is ultimately unsuccessful. Second, Socrates has
demonstrated that justice can be a rational strategy even if it is only instrumentally valuable. That
is, the intrinsic benefits of justice, if they can be proven, may provide a nice bonus to the benefits
of just behavior, but the instrumental benefits alone are sufficient for the advancement of an
argument in favor of the rationality of justice.
Finally, and most importantly, Socrates has shown us that any concept of justice that we
advance must be based upon an underlying concept of human nature and psychology. He assists
us further by demonstrating that if the underlying concept of human nature and psychology is
flawed (as his is), the resulting formulation of justice will be flawed as well. As we will see when
examining the 17th century debate over justice, as the underlying concept of human nature
evolves over time, the resulting concept of justice will evolve with it. The various views of the
natural state of humans advanced by Hobbes, Hume and others of their era, as well as Hobbes’s
emphasis on actions rather than virtues or states of the soul, will have major ramifications for the
direction of the debate over the rationality of justice. To this we will now turn.
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CHAPTER 2: HOBBES, HUME AND THE EARLY MODERN CONCEPT OF JUSTICE
The preceding chapter was meant to demonstrate that many of the recurring themes
relating to justice can trace their origins all the way back to the very foundation of western
philosophy. In this chapter, I will address these same themes as they reappear in the early
modern period. Many philosophers of the early modern period address the topic of justice from
various perspectives, but the two accounts that have had the most impact and generated the most
commentary are those of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. These two figures will be the
primary emphasis of this chapter.
One of the distinguishing features of the moral philosophy of this period is the explicit
recognition of the importance of human nature and psychology to the formulation of a moral
system. Where Socrates proposes an unsatisfying rationalistic account of human nature in an
attempt to support the theory of justice he is promoting, Hobbes and Hume each offer a detailed
account of human nature and psychology upon which they subsequently build their theories of
morality in general and justice in particular. Hobbes views the establishment of the rules of
justice as a rational response to the fear of the predations of others. Hume, in contrast,
characterizes justice as a feeling of sympathy with public utility that we experience when we
observe the performance of an act of justice. While these two accounts of justice differ
dramatically from one-another, they are both distinguished from the earlier account offered by
Socrates in that they are based on plausible accounts of human nature and the human
psychological constitution.
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Although Socrates’ moral psychology is abandoned in the early modern period, his
implicit argument that justice is not a zero-sum game is embraced. Both Hobbes and Hume (and
other philosophers of this period) recognize that those who adhere to the rules of justice will
receive benefits that they could not attain if they operated outside these rules. This concept is the
driving force behind Socrates’ instrumental refutation of Thrasymachus and, as we will see, it
will serve as the motivation to exit Hobbes’s state of nature as well as the reason for an
individual’s willingness to adopt the conventions of justice as proposed by Hume.
One aspect of Socrates’ account of justice that is neglected in the early modern period is
the distinction between the instrumental and intrinsic value of justice. Hobbes, in particular,
views justice solely instrumentally.35 For him, justice is merely the self-interested establishment
of a covenant as a form of protection from others; he is not concerned with the “loftier” benefits
of justice espoused by Socrates. For the time being, we can move forward without making
significant reference to the intrinsic value of justice because the primary goal of this essay is to
demonstrate that adherence to the rules of justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor,
and this can be demonstrated by referencing the instrumental benefits of justice alone. However,
I will return to the question of intrinsic value in later chapters.
The chapter will proceed as follows: I will interpret the theories of justice proposed by
Hobbes and Hume, with particular emphasis on their contrasting descriptions of human nature
and psychology. Next, I will argue that Hobbes’s account of justice is more satisfying because
his act-based instrumental approach is better-suited to a defense of the rationality of justice than
Hume’s virtue-ethical approach is. Finally, I will briefly address Adam Smith’s moral
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psychology, both as an improvement to Hume’s account and as a prelude to some important
concepts to be presented in later chapters.

Hobbes: Justice as a Rational Response to Fear
The philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and the contractarian philosophers who followed him
will hold a place of central importance in the remainder of this essay. I will therefore dedicate a
significant amount of effort to an exegesis of his philosophy in order to point out several relevant
themes that have their origins in his work. Hobbes’s ideas on justice, and morality in general, are
found mostly in Human Nature and Leviathan, so my commentary will focus on these two
sources.
Hobbes does believe that there is such a thing as human nature, that certain traits are
common to all humans, and that we are capable of understanding what these traits and this nature
are. However, his account of our human nature departs from the Greeks in several respects. First,
Hobbes’s account is not teleological. That is, unlike Aristotle before him, Hobbes does not
believe that humankind is forever striving towards some ultimate good or purpose. In fact,
Hobbes is a moral relativist. He denies that there are any moral facts in nature at all and instead
claims that terms such as “good” and “evil” are agent-relative. “Good” is merely what an agent
desires and “evil” is merely what an agent dislikes. Despite his relativism, however, Hobbes will
claim that as a matter of observational fact there are some goods upon which we will all agree,
such as the preservation of our own lives. This general agreement is what eventually leads to the
formation of a covenant.
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Second, Hobbes does not believe that humans are political animals. Where Socrates and
Aristotle believe that humans always find themselves in some familial or societal situation and
that humankind cannot be conceived of without making reference to society or politics, Hobbes
believes that society is merely a contingent construct created among individuals through the use
of reason in order to advance their own interests. Hobbes believes that humans, in their natural
state, are both anti-social and anti-political. Third, and most importantly, Hobbes, unlike
Socrates and Aristotle, does not believe that humans are driven primarily by reason. As we will
see, Hobbes views humans as being moved by appetites (such as avidity and a lust for power)
and aversions (such as fear) rather than by reason. His concept of human nature can therefore be
fairly summarized as a mechanistic string of appetites and aversions. Human action takes place
when this string of appetites and aversions (known as deliberation) comes to an end; the last
appetite or aversion is what we call the will, and the will is directed towards the promotion of
one’s own self-interest or preservation.36 Thus, Hobbes sees human nature as a selfish pursuit of
appetites that we find desirable and a selfish avoidance of aversions that we find undesirable.
This does not mean, however, that reason will play no part in Hobbes’s account; in fact, Hobbes
will argue that we use the faculty of reason when forming covenants and adhering to the rules of
justice. The point is merely that Hobbes does not believe that reason is the primary driver behind
the actions of humans in their natural state.
What exactly are these appetites that we find so desirable and these aversions that we
strive to hard to avoid? According to Hobbes, the primary object of human appetite is power.
Because we are self-interested creatures, every action we perform is done with a view to our own
preservation. We strive to attain and retain as much power as possible in order to secure our
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comfort and continue our own existence. This quest for power never stops because, due to the
potential rapaciousness of our fellow humans, we can never attain enough power to completely
ensure our own security. As Hobbes puts it:
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual
and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause
of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has
already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but
because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present,
without the acquisition of more.37
It should be noted that this quest for power is not necessarily the result of a lust for
competitiveness or competition in themselves. That is, humans pursue power as a means to
secure their own interest, and competition is the inevitable result of such pursuit in a world of
scarce resources. The conflicts that result from this competition are not the object of this
appetite, but they are nevertheless an unavoidable side-effect.38
As the lust for power drives an individual into competition with his fellows, fear, an even
more compelling aversion, restrains him. Fear played a major role in Hobbes’s moral philosophy
and his life,39 and fear is the primary force behind humankind’s eventual move out of the state of
nature and into a society governed by the rules of justice. It may seem ironic that a creature
driven by self-interest and a lust for power is even more forcefully driven by fear, but these two
forces are actually self-reinforcing. As we observe the potential for rapacious power-seeking
behavior in our neighbors, the fear of violent death at their hands compels us to engage in
rapacious power-seeking behavior of our own. It is not even necessary for each of us to
postulate that all other people are aggressive and violent; the fact that some individuals may be
aggressive and violent is enough to stoke the fear of violent death in one’s heart and cause even a
37
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moderate person to behave in an aggressive, uncooperative and violent way in order to defend
her own interests. It is because we find ourselves in this constant state of fear that Hobbes
claims that humankind cannot be driven by reason as Aristotle and Socrates would have us
believe. Fear encourages us to ignore the advice of reason and to instead act according to our
fickle emotions, which keeps us mired in an endless cycle of movement towards power and away
from dangerous interactions with other individuals.
Hobbes refers to life in a world characterized by this endless cycle of power juxtaposed
with fear as humankind’s “state of nature.” He will eventually claim that entering into a
covenant with an all-powerful sovereign is the only way to exit the state of nature, but he first
wants to describe the state of nature in detail in order to show us just how awful life would be in
the absence of a sovereign power. It is important to note that the state of nature Hobbes
describes is not necessarily a state that humanity experienced in the past; it is sufficient for his
purposes that the state of nature is merely a potential state that we could inhabit in the absence of
a sovereign power or in a condition of civil war. Hobbes wants to show the state of nature as a
potentiality that we are afraid of; it is what drives our fear.
Because Hobbes’s human nature is a mechanistic succession of appetites and fear, when
conflicts inevitably arise during the competition for scarce resources, the only possible result is
all-out war. Hobbes famously describes his state of nature as a war “of every man against every
man,” and human life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”40 This unfortunate situation is
characterized by two concepts that will be critical to the theory of justice that Hobbes develops
later in Leviathan. First, the state of nature is a situation of equality:
if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge between men of
mature age, and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or wit, or
40
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in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger, since there needeth but
little force to the taking away of a man’s life; we may conclude that men
considered in mere nature, ought to admit amongst themselves equality; and that
he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed moderate.41
The equality Hobbes speaks of here is not equality in the contemporary sense of equal
rights; as we will see shortly, there are no rights (in the liberal sense) in the state of nature. The
equality that arises in the state of nature is more akin to an equal ability to kill one-another.
Despite the fact that some individuals will be more powerful, clever and ambitious than others,
the range of power among individuals is relatively small. Human life is somewhat frail, and the
ease with which one individual can kill another puts us in a situation where even the weakest
among us can destroy the strongest.42 Because of this, we are wise to assume equality of ability
when we find ourselves in a state of war.
Another key element of Hobbes’s state of nature is that it is a “pre-moral” state in which
there is no law and might makes right. That is, when we are competing for scarce resources in a
violent environment where we each have a roughly equal ability to kill one-another, there are no
rules of conduct. There is nothing objectively wrong with killing another individual who is
competing for scarce resources that one wants, and stealing is a perfectly acceptable act because
the concept of property cannot possibly exist. The very idea of theft would be incomprehensible.
Hobbes is trying to show us that, in a situation where there is no sovereign, morality can have no
place, nor can any practice of justice. The implication is that we owe all of our moral conduct
and even the very idea of justice to our covenant with the sovereign, and if the covenant
disappears, morality and justice will disappear with it.
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The situation described by the state of nature seems hopeless. If we are creatures driven
by appetites and fear, using approximately equal abilities to compete for scarce resources in an
environment of all-out war with no rules of conduct, how can we possibly escape this unenviable
situation? Fortunately, Hobbes has an answer: reason. While we humans are primarily driven by
our passions, reason does play an important part in our psychology. Hobbes claims that the
application of reason to the misery of the state of nature will inevitably lead us to recognize that
it is in our own best interest not only to form a covenant in which we exchange liberty for safety,
but also to actually keep the covenants we make. Individuals will covenant with each other to
establish a sovereign in order to ensure the compliance of all parties to the covenant. Our fear of
the state of nature and our selfish desire for our own preservation makes us want to escape, and
our reason will show us the way.
Once he has introduced reason as our ticket out of the state of nature, Hobbes introduces
us to several “laws of nature”, or, general rules of conduct discovered through reason, which
prohibit an individual from doing that which is destructive to his life. These laws will guide us
from our undesirable pre-moral condition to the formation of a state. Before he delves into the
details of the laws of nature, Hobbes posits a single “right of nature” that we all possess, which is
simply to defend oneself by any means necessary:
The Right of Nature…is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he
will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life,
and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.43
This right of nature grants us the freedom to engage in acts that foster our own survival and to
condemn acts that hamper that ability to survive.
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According to Hobbes, the right of nature combined with human reason will guide us to no
fewer than nineteen laws of nature, but the bulk of his theory regarding justice can be found in
the first three laws. The first of these laws of nature is simply stated: seek peace, but if peace
cannot be obtained, seek war. Clearly the state of peace is rationally preferable to the state of
war, and for this reason Hobbes argues that humans will, through fear and rational self-interest,
seek and attain a state of peace. However, reason also dictates that the state of peace is desirable
only under certain conditions, and Hobbes describes these conditions in the second law of nature.
The second law of nature is similar to the contemporary conception of the Golden Rule.
Since an individual forfeits a certain degree of liberty when she agrees to make peace with
others, this state of peace is rationally acceptable only under conditions of reciprocity. As he
states in his definition of the second law of nature:
that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as peace and defence
of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himself.44
In other words, Hobbes believes that our rational self-interest will lead us to enter into an
agreement in which we exchange some of our liberty for protection. This agreement is in the
form of a contract, and it is the basis for Hobbes’s notion of moral obligation. However, we will
only enter this contract if it is in keeping with the right of nature. If we lay down our own rights
but others refuse to do so as well, we are violating the right of nature by placing our very lives in
danger. Thus, reason dictates that we will only relinquish our liberty under conditions where we
can reasonably expect reciprocity from others.

44

Leviathan, ch. 14, p. 80

41

The third law of nature is where Hobbes’s concept of justice first appears. This law states
that it is not enough simply to make contracts; we are also obligated to keep the contracts we
make. The third law states:
that men perform their covenants made, without which covenants are in vain, and
but empty words, and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in
the condition of war…And in this law of nature consisteth the fountain and
original of JUSTICE.45
While these laws of nature and their corresponding definition of justice are quite simple
on the surface, in the context of Hobbes’s larger theory of human nature and commonwealth,
they give rise to several implications which merit further consideration. First, justice is a direct
result of the first two laws of nature. In order to seek peace, we must transfer rights via the use of
contracts and we must be able to reasonably expect that others will transfer rights as well and
comply with the contracts they make. Justice is therefore an inevitable product of our natural
desire to exit the state of nature; without justice we would be unable to attain peace and,
according to the first law of nature, we would then be obliged to seek war. Justice is simply a
matter of observing contracts after they are made,46 and the expectation of justice is a
prerequisite to an escape from the rapacious state of nature.
Second, if the formation of a commonwealth via covenant is a rational and self-interested
act, as Hobbes argues it is, then we must conclude that acting in a just manner is in our rational
self-interest as well. That is, Hobbes is explicitly demonstrating how and why justice is a
rational strategy for a self-interested individual. He has shown that, without contracts, we will
find ourselves in an undesirable state of war, and that without justice (some assurance that others
will observe these contracts), we have no reason to enter into the contracts in the first place.
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Since we fear the horrors of the state of nature, it is in our rational self-interest to make these
contracts, we have an obligation to observe these contracts, and (for Hobbes at least) we need a
sovereign to assure that the contracts will be kept.
It is important to note here that the fact that Hobbes makes reference to appetites,
aversions, passions and fear should not discourage us from analyzing his argument from the
standpoint of rational choice. As Hoekstra indicates, rational choice can be driven by purely
instrumental considerations based upon our desire to satisfy our passions. Our goals may be
formed by a quest for power or an aversion to fear, but as long as our actions succeed in allowing
us to achieve those goals, those actions can be considered rational.47 In other words, justice
places a rational constraint on some of our passions in order to allow us to satisfy more important
passions.
A third important implication of Hobbes’s laws of nature is the emphasis that they place
on the importance of reciprocity. As indicated above, the idea of reciprocity first appears briefly
in the second law of nature, but it plays a role of central importance in the remainder of his
theory of justice. The need for reciprocity is obvious. Since we find ourselves in an initial
situation of unbridled aggression, when we decide to lay down our right to violence we need to
have some assurance that other individuals will reciprocate by also laying down their own right
to violence, lest we become easy prey to their violent whims. To lay down one’s own arms
unilaterally without assurance of the same from the other side is simply irrational.
Many later commentators48 on Hobbes have characterized the problem of reciprocity
within the game-theoretic framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (hereafter known as the PD).49
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The application of the PD to the reciprocity problem in Hobbes’s second law of nature is
straightforward. Suppose we have two individuals, Ashley and Brittany, who find themselves in
Hobbes’s state of nature. They are each driven by fear of violent aggression from the other, so
they would each prefer to enter into a contract of mutual non-aggression rather than remain in the
current state of war. The problem is that each of them stands to gain if they themselves fail to
uphold the contract while the other party does uphold it. That is, if Ashley defects on the contract
and Brittany upholds it, Ashley is better-off than if there were no contract at all. On the other
hand, if Brittany defects on the contract and Ashley upholds it, Brittany is better-off than if there
were no contract at all. Regardless of what the other party does, both Ashley and Brittany are
better-off if they defect. If we operate under the assumption that Ashley and Brittany are rational
actors, we can only conclude that, without some assurance of mutual compliance to contracts,
both parties will defect and a state of peace will never emerge from the state of nature.
This is where the need for a sovereign enters Hobbes’s moral theory. In order to assure
reciprocity through mutual compliance with contracts made, a sovereign power must be
instituted. The transferring of individual rights to this sovereign is in the best interests of all
covenanters because, stated in the framework of the PD, the possibility of punishment at the
hand of the sovereign significantly reduces the potential rewards of defecting on one’s contracts.
With the sovereign in place, Ashley and Brittany are no longer tempted to defect and they can
each have a high level of assurance that the other party will perform, so they are very likely to be
willing to exit the state of nature and enter a state of peaceful cooperation.
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However, Hobbes has to recognize that, even in a situation where the threat of
punishment by the sovereign or ostracism by one’s fellows should deter any individual from
defecting on her contracts, there will still be some individuals who will attempt to get away with
defection. Thus, where Socrates has his Thrasymachus, Hobbes has his Fool:
The fool hath said in his heart: ‘There is no such thing as justice’; and sometimes
also with his tongue, seriously alleging that: ‘every man’s conservation and
contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every
man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to make
or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason, when it
conduced to one’s benefit.’50
The Fool argues that if humans by nature act in their own rational self interest, there is no such
thing as the justice that Hobbes describes. According to the Fool, an individual’s decision
whether to keep or break a specific covenant should depend upon whether or not the breaking of
the covenant will provide a benefit to that individual. Essentially, the Fool says that if it is to the
benefit of an individual to break a covenant and he can get away with it, it is in his rational selfinterest to do so, and therefore justice as defined by Hobbes can often be contrary to rational selfinterest.
Hobbes, however, clearly does believe that justice is rational and beneficial to the
individual, as he indicates in his response to the Fool’s argument. The crux of his response is
based not upon the idea that breaking covenants is “wrong” or “bad,” but on the fact that a
person who regularly breaks covenants cannot avoid the repercussions forever.51 Hobbes argues
that the very reason for forming a commonwealth is to enjoy the benefits of the safety provided
by the commonwealth. If an individual seeks to break covenants whenever it serves him well to
50

Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 90
Again, we can see that this aspect of Hobbes’ concept of justice is Epicurean: “It is impossible for the person who
secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has
already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected.” See
Epicurus, Principal Doctrines, #35.

51

45

do so, that individual will almost certainly be discovered eventually, since getting away with
such transgressions can only be achieved via the ignorance and errors of others, which are
random and unpredictable. In other words, a defection strategy will not work in the long-term,
and even if it does work in the short-term, it is due to luck rather than ability, and the defection
strategy was therefore not reasonably followed. Once (inevitably) discovered, the individual who
has broken the covenant will almost certainly either be banished from the commonwealth and
returned to the state of nature, or he will be punished within the commonwealth for the injustice
that he has practiced. These are both undesirable outcomes which result in a loss of the safety
and comfort provided by the commonwealth, and this course of action is therefore irrational and
against the individual’s own self-interest.
Hobbes’s initial reply to the Fool is brief and incomplete, and it fails to address many
potential rebuttals. The core of his argument against the Fool is simply that the downside of
breaking covenants is huge and success is uncertain. While he is certainly on the right track,
Hobbes fails to consider situations in which the perceived utility of cheating is high and the
perceived probability of being detected is low. I will therefore present a thorough analysis of the
Fool’s argument and offer a neo-Hobbsean contractarian reply to the argument in Chapter 4 of
this essay. Before turning to that, however, I will examine a competing theory of the rationality
of justice proposed by David Hume. Hume approaches justice from a very different perspective
than Hobbes, so his ideas will serve as an effective contrast to the Hobbesean tradition.
Although Hobbes’s contractarian account will provide a more firm foundation for my argument
in favor of the instrumental rationality of justice, Hume does have an influence on many
contemporary contractarian philosophers and his philosophy will be useful when we return to
questions regarding the intrinsic value of justice in Chapter 5.
46

Hume: Justice as Convention
Hume’s theory of justice is written in response to other early modern British moral
philosophers who want to find the nature of justice in actions or who, like Hobbes, want to
characterize justice as a part of natural law. Hume is also rejecting ethical rationalism; he wants
to deny that moral facts are discovered by reason and that reason is in accord with moral
goodness.52 Hume instead gives an experience-based account of human nature and morality in
which he links morality to a feeling of sympathy that we have with the motive behind a
particular act. He is attempting a virtue-ethical rebuttal to the law-based morality of his recent
predecessors.
Like Hobbes before him, Hume is not a proponent of reason as the driving force behind
human psychology. He believes that moral distinctions arise from our passions and not from the
faculty of reason and that reason cannot motivate the will. When we see another individual
performing an act that we consider to be virtuous or vicious, our moral evaluation of that act
stems not from rational contemplation of the act, but instead from a moral sentiment of approval
or disapproval that we feel.
This Humean idea of reason as subordinate to the passions is skillfully explained in
contemporary terms by Haidt.53 He uses evolutionary psychology to describe how reason
evolved after intuition (intuition being Haidt’s substitute for Hume’s passions), not because
reason was a replacement for intuition, but because reason served a useful purpose for intuition.
In Haidt’s analogy, reason is to intuition as the rider is to the elephant; the rider came into being
in order to help the elephant reach its goals and explain its actions, but the elephant still holds the
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power. Haidt’s experiments support Hume’s claim that people make moral judgments based on
intuition and emotion, and that “moral reasoning was mostly just a post-hoc search for reasons to
justify the judgments people had already made.54 55
In addition to rejecting the supremacy of reason, Hume also rejects the notion that any
action can be intrinsically right or wrong in itself. Instead, he claims that the morality of an
action is determined by the motive behind that action, and the motive itself is often driven by a
particular character trait. These motives and the character traits that drive them do have an
intrinsic morality, but the actions they produce do not:
’Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that
produc’d them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain
principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit.56
Virtues and vices are character traits that are possessed by an individual who performs an action,
and our moral evaluation of that action is driven by sympathetic feelings that we have
concerning the character traits that gave rise to the motive behind the action.
It is important to note that Hume believes that these feelings of sympathy57 are a social
phenomenon and the moral judgments derived from them are made without regard to selfinterest. That is, our feelings of sympathy are sympathetic with the public utility and general
societal welfare that is created when virtuous acts are performed. We consider actions moral or
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immoral only with respect to how they affect others, not with respect to how they affect
ourselves, and correct moral judgments can only be made from “some common point of view.”58
Hume’s account of human psychology has a profound influence on his description of
humankind’s natural state. He claims to reject Hobbes’s state of nature as “a mere fiction,”59 but
his own account of humankind prior to the recognition of justice probably has more in common
with Hobbes than he would like to admit.60 Hume’s state of nature is characterized by a mean
between the extremes of superabundance and superscarcity. That is, Hume claims that in order
for a moral system to have any relevance, it must be assumed that there is not a superabundance
of goods (because in such a situation there would be no conflicts among possessions) nor is there
a superscarcity of goods (because in such a situation the rules of morality would be suspended
and we would likely descend into a Hobbesean state of war). Hume also finds it necessary to
assume that humans are self-interested in their natural state. He bears some similarity to Hobbes
in this respect; Hume’s human is selfish and aggressive by nature and in his initial situation of
limited scarcity he is incented to act in his own interest by taking what he needs by the use of
force. It should be noted that Hume is somewhat more charitable than Hobbes in his claim that
some moral virtues such as benevolence do exist in humankind’s natural state, but he is explicit
in his assertion that justice will not be found there.
While Hobbes spends considerable effort in giving a detailed description of life in the
state of nature, Hume is less concerned with describing humankind’s natural state and far more
concerned with providing details on how we managed to remove ourselves from it. For Hume,
this transition from the state of nature to moral society is where reason and self-interest make
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their most important contribution to humanity’s well-being. In the state of nature, an individual
is motivated to act in her own self-interest and to use force to take what she needs. We move out
of this state by a sequential process: First, via the use of reason we discover practices that foster
economic cooperation and coordination. Second, we become aware that these cooperative
activities are value-creating and that our own self-interest is served by observing these practices
because they are not part of a zero-sum game (whereas using force to take what we want is a
zero-sum game). Third, adherence to these rules becomes regarded as moralized conduct via our
sympathy with the public good that is served when people follow the rules. Rather than using an
explicit purposeful contract with a sovereign power to escape the state of nature in an instant,
Hume’s natural individual, through a sort of “spontaneous order” gradually adopts certain
conventions that allow him to escape the state of nature over time.
Hume’s notion of the conventional origins of justice can be understood as analogous to
the conventional origins of language. Justice, like language, develops over time without design
or intention. In the case of language, we have a need to communicate, so our linguistic practices
emerge over time to fulfill that need. In the case of justice, we have a need for social interaction
and commerce, so the practice and principles of justice emerge over time in order to facilitate
this interaction. In both cases, a useful and eventually indispensible practice evolves, but no
explicit agreement among individuals is required.61
Thus, Hume characterizes many of our moral virtues, and the virtue of justice in
particular, as “artificial” virtues.62 Rather than being a naturally-occurring part of the natural
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state of humankind, justice is a matter of “honesty with respect to property”;63 it is a product of
reason and self-interest which develops as a convention as humanity moves from its primitive
state into a state of moral society. The rules of justice are initially adopted only in the context of
a mutual self-interest to maintain property rights, but as they develop into conventional norms,
these rules become vested with a sense of morality due to the sympathy that we mutually feel
upon contemplating their benefits for public utility:
we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice, as having two
different foundations, viz. that of self-interest, when men observe, that ‘tis
impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and
that of morality, when this interest is once observ’d to be common to all mankind,
and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of
society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. ‘Tis the voluntary
convention and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place; and
therefore those laws of justice are so far to be consider’d as artificial. After that
interest is once establish’d and acknowledg’d, the sense of morality in the
observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself…64
As alluded to earlier, Hume distinguishes between artificial virtues, such as justice, and
natural virtues such as benevolence. He claims that we can distinguish between the natural and
artificial virtues by examining the good that arises from each of them. Whereas the good that
arises from natural virtues such as benevolence is evident in every act that is motivated by them,
the good that arises from artificial virtues such as justice arises only from their continued
practice and is not necessarily immediately obvious:
The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the
good, which results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object
of some natural passion: Whereas a single act of justice, consider’d in itself, may
often be contrary to the public good; and ‘tis only the concurrence of mankind, in
a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous.65
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Acts which are motivated by natural virtues such as benevolence give rise to
unambiguous sentiments of approval every time we observe them. Acts motivated by artificial
virtues such as justice can at times give rise to sentiments that are not so clear. For example, if I
see someone help a stranger change a flat tire, this act of benevolence causes me to feel a
sentiment of approval that is immediate, direct and obvious because this act is unambiguously
beneficial to overall public utility. However, if I see someone being issued a speeding ticket, my
sentiments regarding the justice of this act may be delayed, indirect and obscure. Having been
on the receiving end of traffic tickets in the past, I will likely sympathize with the financial loss
incurred by the offender. I may inwardly protest that the offender’s act was benign, that she is
probably a decent person and she was not placing any other individuals in danger, and therefore
the act of issuing her a ticket is not virtuous. It is only when I contemplate the fact that the
enforcement of safe driving rules are beneficial to the long term utility of society that I can
sympathize with the justice inherent in the act of writing a traffic ticket and recognize that
goodness does arise from it. Hume would likely agree that the recognition of the good arising
from this particular act of justice requires effort and the use of reason because justice is not a
natural virtue.
In summary, Hume provides us with a characterization of justice that emphasizes
sympathy with public utility while still allowing a place for reason and self-interest. In Hume’s
framework, moral judgments are made without reason and self-interest, but reason and selfinterest do come into play when they lead us to adopt conventions in order to escape the state of
nature and enter moral society. Self-interest is necessary for the practice of justice to originate,
but justice matures from there, eventually becoming a conventional sympathy with public utility.
While Hume does think justice is artificial in that it is a product of reason and not a part of
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humankind in its primitive state, he does not think that the fact that we arrive at the convention
of justice is at all arbitrary. Through a mechanism of spontaneous order, we will necessarily
arrive at a convention of justice without the need for an explicit social contract. Justice is
therefore a necessary result of rational self-interested behavior and it is inseparable from the
human species.
Hume’s account of justice draws markedly different conclusions than that of Hobbes, but
their starting point is quite similar. Like Hobbes, Hume bases his account of justice on a
corresponding account of humankind’s state of nature. Hume is in general agreement with
Hobbes in that they both envision humankind’s natural state as one of rapaciousness and selfinterest where justice exists neither in concept nor in practice (although Hobbes is more graphic
and radical in his portrayal of this beastly nature). In both accounts, the world in which we
humans initially find ourselves is unpleasant and inefficient, we have a self-interested incentive
to escape this situation, and we will allow our reason to show us the way.
While Hobbes and Hume mostly agree on the state of nature and the need to escape it,
they differ significantly in their description of the means that we use to make our escape. For
Hobbes, we make our escape via an explicit and purposeful agreement with a sovereign power.
Human society (and therefore justice) is the direct result of this covenant with the sovereign, and
without this explicit purposeful agreement, humankind is forever doomed to remain in the state
of nature and no concept or practice of any moral virtue (including justice) can arise. Hume
needs no such purposeful agreement; for him, our escape from the state of nature is the inevitable
result of a mutually beneficial accident. While the natural virtues, such as benevolence, are
already present in Hume’s state of nature, the artificial virtues, such as justice, arise via
spontaneous convention. Hume recognizes no explicit agreement among individuals or action on
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the part of a central authority that saves us from the state of nature and drives us to the
recognition of property rights and justice.

Instead, justice is the inevitable result of a

spontaneous order that develops over time via an iterative process of reason. We find that the
observance of justice is useful to us, and we therefore agree amongst ourselves to observe its
tenets.66
While this idea of unplanned convention or spontaneous order is in sharp contrast to
Hobbes’s explicit social covenant, it is quite similar to Adam Smith’s famous idea of the
“Invisible Hand” from Wealth of Nations. Smith describes how hundreds or thousands of
independent actors motivated by their own economic self-interest unintentionally work together
to bring a product or service to the end user.67 For example, in order for me to drive to work
today, I had to buy a car at some point, I had to put fuel in that car and I have to have faith that if
my car breaks down, I can depend upon a reliable repair service to get my car running again. We
take for granted that all of these things will be available to us whenever we need them, but it is
no small miracle that all of these necessities come together through the independent work of
complete strangers without explicit planning on the part of a central authority or sovereign.
Hume believes that the convention of justice arrives via a similar mechanism. We find that other
individuals, whether they are family members or complete strangers to us, will agree that it is in
everyone’s best interest to respect the property of others provided others agree to respect theirs.

66

It should be noted that Hobbes’ account of justice can also be characterized as conventional in the sense that
justice is chosen by us rather than imposed upon us by human nature or the natural world around us. The key
difference between Hobbes and Hume on this point is that in Hobbes’ account the convention is the result of an
explicit agreement among individuals, whereas Hume sees the convention arising without any such agreement. See
Rescorla, Michael. "Convention." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Spring
2011 Edition), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/convention/.
67
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations, edited by Edwin Cannan. New York: Modern Library, 2000

54

That is, we have all come to a common understanding through a mutually beneficial accident
without the assistance of an explicit agreement.
Despite the differences in their respective accounts of humankind’s escape from the
amoral state of nature, Hume and Hobbes do concur on one critical point: The escape is
facilitated by the recognition of the rules of justice (whether by explicit covenant or spontaneous
convention) on the part of rational self-interested actors. Hume does believe that human action is
driven by passions that rule over our reason, however, it is reason that allows us to re-channel
our passions and to recognize the benefits of coordinated behavior. Postema characterizes this as
a “paradox of avidity.” Individuals seek to survive and to acquire status and security through the
competitive acquisition of possessions, but the more passionate this contest becomes the more
dangerous and destructive it is to the participants. Reason allows us to establish the conventions
of justice in order to redirect these potentially dangerous passions from socially destructive to
socially beneficial uses, while continuing to act in our own self-interest.68 Reason will never be
completely in charge of the passions, but reason does guide humanity out of its undesirable
natural state and into a state of peace and cooperation with others where justice can be found.
Thus for Hume, as for Hobbes, justice is a rational strategy for exiting the state of nature.

A Fork in the Road
In their respective accounts of justice, Hobbes and Hume each succeed in advancing
some of the most important themes introduced by Socrates. They each offer an account of
human nature and psychology that is more scientifically sound than Socrates’, which allows
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them to base their accounts of justice on a more firm foundation. They also advance Socrates
concept of the value-added nature of justice by explicitly recognizing that justice is not a zerosum game and that a general adherence to the rules of justice makes all participating individuals
better-off than they would be in the absence of justice. And, while Hume underemphasizes and
Hobbes completely ignores the possibility that justice has intrinsic value, they are both able to
make a coherent argument in favor of justice as a rational strategy by referencing the
instrumental benefits alone.
However, we have now reached a fork in the road. Despite some similarities, the two
accounts of justice proposed by Hobbes and Hume are irreconcilable. In order to move forward it
is necessary to decide which of them will provide a better framework within which to assess the
rationality of just behavior. Although Hume will be of assistance at several points along the way,
I believe that Hobbes gives us a better launching pad for an analysis of justice for several
reasons. First, while Hume’s account of human psychology is far superior to that of Socrates, and
is probably more accurate than Hobbes’s account in light of our contemporary notions, it still
poses several problems for his account of justice. For example, Hume claims that our sympathy
with justice arises because we recognize the utility that justice has for the public good. While this
claim fits nicely within his larger theory of morals, it is not consistent with the facts as we find
them in everyday life. Most people simply do not consider the greater good of society as they go
about their daily activities, and when we applaud acts of justice or condemn acts of injustice, we
seldom have utility in mind. Adam Smith was among the first to comment on this shortcoming
of Hume’s: “But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society,

56

how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be.”69 Another contemporary of Hume’s,
Thomas Reid, rebuts Hume’s utility argument in a very simple way; he merely uses a
formulation of the Golden Rule to remind us that utility or “public good” is not a necessary
consideration in our understanding of the virtue of justice:
The simple rule, Don’t do to your neighbor what you would think wrong to be
done to yourself would lead him to the knowledge of every branch of justice,
without any thoughts about public good or laws and statutes made to promote it.
So it isn’t true that public usefulness is the only standard of justice, and that the
rules of justice can be derived only from their public usefulness.70
In addition to these obvious flaws raised by Smith and Reid, Hume’s claims regarding
sympathy for public utility create a more subtle problem for him. If sympathy with the public
good is the driving force behind an individual’s motive for justice, it is difficult to argue that the
individual is viewing the situation from a self-interested perspective; such a motive is more aptly
characterized as disinterested, and possibly even altruistic. Also, if the benefit of justice is to be
found at the societal level, it remains to be proven that justice is a rational strategy on an
individual level as Hume claims it is.71 That is, while the value of justice for public utility makes
justice a rational strategy for society as a whole, this does nothing to discourage a rational
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individual from behaving in an unjust way if doing so can be seen as beneficial to her without
damaging the societal institution of justice.72
Hobbes’s account is far more satisfying in this regard. For Hobbes, the motivation for
justice can be described in purely self-interested terms, his account explicitly claims that justice
is beneficial on an individual as well as on a group level, and his conversation with the Fool
denounces the perceived advantages of unjust behavior by self-interested individuals. Hobbes
has no need to make reference to sympathy with the public good because in his view individuals
acting in their own self-interest in a coordinated way leads to an unintended, but welcome,
increase in the overall public good as a by-product. Any mention of sympathy would be
superfluous.
Hume’s account of human nature is also flawed in that he insists on maintaining the
distinction between natural virtues such as benevolence and artificial virtues such as justice. He
views justice and the other artificial virtues as less reliable and somehow subordinate to the
natural virtues. Smith argues, in contrast to Hume, that justice is the core foundational virtue and
that it is subordinate to none:
Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the pleasing
consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and
enforce the practice of it by the terrors of merited punishment in case it should go
neglected. It is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which
supports the building…Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the
whole edifice.73
Hume’s peculiar insistence on addressing justice only as it applies to property is
particularly damaging. Reid and other contemporaries of Hume recognized six types of injustices
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that an individual can suffer: injuries in our persons, our families, our liberty, our reputation, our
goods and our contracts. The fact that Hume’s characterization of justice applies only to the last
two of these categories of justice is a serious problem for his argument and a source of disbelief
for Reid.74
As Woozley75 and many others have recognized, Hume’s preoccupation with property
prevents him from seeing that there are obvious natural motives for justice. He emphasizes
property rights because he believes that external goods are the only goods that can be taken from
us.76 However, this is clearly a misrepresentation of the various ways in which one individual
can harm another. When we witness others being injured in their persons, in their reputations or
in other naturally occurring goods, we clearly have a natural reason to feel sympathy with them
and to feel sympathy with the utility of any system of justice that prevents these injuries from
occurring.
Not only does Hobbes offer a more internally consistent account of human nature than
Hume, Hobbes’s reliance on laws of nature and moral acts as opposed to virtues provides a better
context in which to analyze the game-theoretic aspects of justice. The idea that justice is a nonzero-sum game is merely the most basic concept in the argument for the rationality of justice. As
the challenges to the argument become more sophisticated, we will need to respond in a more
sophisticated manner by analyzing the rationality of justice in the context of game theory and
prospect theory. Hobbes’s reply to the Fool and the characterization of this reply as a version of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma give us the best starting point from which to launch a more sophisticated
defense. While Hume also demonstrates some understanding of reciprocity and justice as non-
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zero-sum, his virtue-ethical approach does not permit analysis of the problem from a gametheoretic angle. Hobbes’s account allows us to see in more objective and supportable terms why
justice is instrumentally rational for a self-interested actor.
In addition, Hobbes’s act-based version of the justice story is more suitable for our
purposes because it is purely instrumental, whereas Hume employs both instrumental and
intrinsic aspects of justice in his virtue-ethical argument. When confronted by the Fool (or with
another skeptic in the tradition of Thrasymachus), Hobbes can remain consistent and make his
reply on purely instrumental grounds, but Hume, when replying to the sensible knave, is forced
to change tactics and attempt a reply from the intrinsic angle. The game-theoretic argument that
I will make in favor of the rationality of justice must remain consistent throughout and draw only
on the instrumental value that justice provides. I will initially show that the instrumental benefits
alone are sufficient to entice a rational actor to behave in a just fashion, but at the end of this
paper, Hume’s virtue-ethical approach will reappear as I consider the possibility that there is an
intrinsic value to justice that serves as an added benefit to an already sufficiently rational choice.
In the meantime, our argument is best levied in a purely instrumental context, and Hobbes’s
instrumental approach provides a better vehicle for this project.

A Brief Note on Adam Smith
Thus far, I have mentioned Adam Smith only as a critic of Hume’s account of justice and
as the source of the concept of the invisible hand. However, Smith was an accomplished moral
theorist in his own right, and, while his own theory of justice is reminiscent of Hume’s, the
argument that Smith makes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is an improvement on Hume in
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several respects. For example, Smith believes that justice is part of the basic human constitution
and not a result of artifice and convention. He recognizes the innate sense of fairness as a
motivating force for human behavior and he firmly believes that this sense leads to the desire for
justice and is part of our primal nature.77 He disagrees with Hume’s contention that sympathy
with the public good is behind our motive for justice partly because he recognizes that sympathy
is erratic and unpredictable, while the concern for justice and fairness is constant.
It is also worth noting that Adam Smith can be considered a proto-behavioral
economist.78 Behavioral economics is a field of study that combines economic theory with
behavioral psychology. It has grown in popularity over the past two decades due to its ability to
explain decision making under uncertainty, and its recent contributions to our understanding of
financial markets and investor behavior are immense. However, as I will explain in more detail
in Chapter 4, behavioral economics will also be useful in analyzing decision making as it relates
to the rationality of justice and the keeping of covenants. For now, it will suffice to acknowledge
that some of the most important concepts in current behavioral economics were alluded to by
Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. For example, Smith was aware of the problem of
intertemporal choice, or the irrational tendency of individuals to have a preference for utility
today over utility at some future date:
The pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence, interests us so little in
comparison with that which we may enjoy today, the passion which the first
excites, is naturally so weak in comparison with that violent emotion which the
second is apt to give occasion to, that the one could never be any balance to the
other, unless it was supported by the sense of propriety…79
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Another central tenet of behavioral economics is the human tendency to be
overconfident. As I will explain in detail in Chapter 4, most individuals believe their abilities and
their luck to be better than average. Smith was aware of this fact centuries before it was the
subject of formal academic study: “The chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued,
and the chance of loss is by most men under-valued…”80 This tendency leads to poor decisions
in cases of uncertainty, and, as we will see, it leads Hobbes’s Fool to believe his chances of
evasion are better than they actually are.
For reasons given earlier, from this point forward it is preferable to pursue Hobbes’s line
of argument rather than Hume’s, and since Smith’s theory of morality and justice is far more
reminiscent of Hume than of Hobbes, I will be leaving Smith aside for now. However, I will
return to him in later chapters where his early contributions to behavioral finance theory will be
of assistance in making the case against free riders and Hobbsean Fools.

Conclusion
So far I have conducted a rather broad historical enquiry into the topic of justice from
which several important common themes have emerged. In particular, Socrates, Hobbes and
Hume are in agreement that concepts of justice are dependent upon human nature, that justice is
not a zero-sum game and that the instrumental benefits alone are sufficient to demonstrate that
justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor.
From here the focus will become much narrower as I emphasize the nuances of the
contractarian version of the argument. Hobbes’s account of human nature and psychology may
not be entirely accurate from a scientific standpoint, but it provides us with an adequate
80
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launching pad for a more sophisticated examination of the rationality of justice. In the next
chapter, using Hobbes’s description of human nature and justice as a starting point, I will
examine how the neo-Hobbsean contractarians use concepts from the fields of game theory and
financial economics to offer a more sophisticated argument in favor of the rationality of justice.
Then, in Chapter Four I will use a contractarian argument to refute the claims made by Hobbes’s
Fool and other free-riders.
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CHAPTER 3: GAME THEORY, DISPOSITIONS AND THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE
OF JUSTICE
Chapter 2 examined the Hobbesean and Humean accounts of justice and concluded that
Hobbes’s contractarian version provides a better framework for a more detailed enquiry into the
topic. This chapter will present the contractarian philosophy of David Gauthier as a more refined
version of Hobbes’s theory. I will begin the chapter with a detailed discussion of Gauthier’s
most influential work, Morals by Agreement,81 placing special emphasis on his use of game
theory and competitive market theory to advance a novel argument in favor of the rationality of
justice. I will then present an analysis and critique of Gauthier’s claims, drawing on several of
the contractarian commentators who have responded to Gauthier’s compelling argument, as well
as modifications to the original argument made by Gauthier himself in his more recent work. I
conclude that Gauthier makes a valuable contribution to the advancement of contractarianism,
most notably with his introduction of the concepts of competitive markets and game theory to the
issue of justice and his recognition of decision-making at the level of metachoice. Gauthier will
show us that, when choosing a deliberative procedure, an individual is actually making a rational
choice about how to make choices.
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Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement
Overview
The remainder of this essay will lean heavily on several of the ideas introduced in Morals
by Agreement (hereafter MbA), so I will dedicate considerable effort to a careful description and
analysis of Gauthier’s argument in MbA and his modification of these ideas in subsequent works.
In the preface to MbA, Gauthier proposes to address three core problems related to morality,
advantage and justice. The first of these is the principle of rational cooperation. Stated in
Hobbesean terms, he wants to demonstrate that it is rational for an individual to agree to
principles of morality by accepting constraints on her own liberty. Gauthier wants to make a
formal break with Hume in this regard, and he wants to argue that agreeing to accept moral
constraints is not based on sympathy, but on reason: “If moral appeals are entitled to some
practical effect, some influence on our behavior, it is not because they whisper invitingly to our
desires, but because they convince our intellect.”82
Second, Gauthier will argue that it is not only rational to agree to constrain one’s
behavior, but that it is also rational for an individual to comply with the agreement, or, as Hobbes
would say, to “perform their covenants made.”83 It is important to note that Gauthier does not
deny Glaucon’s claim that “Someone who has the power to do (injustice), however, and is a true
man, wouldn’t make an agreement with anyone…”84 Gauthier recognizes that any individual
would prefer to avoid the constraints that justice requires, but he is arguing (again, in the
Hobbsean tradition) that our own limitations, that is, our own inability to consistently and
reliably get away with cheating on our agreement to constraint, makes compliance a rational
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strategy. His rational choice approach “allows us to state…why rational persons would agree ex
ante to constraining principles…and why rational persons would comply ex post with the agreed
constraints.”85
Third, as a response to Rawls, he wants to introduce a basic concept of rights from which
to propose an initial bargaining position for the formation of a social contract. This chapter and
the next will focus on the first two of these core problems.86 Gauthier will claim, and I will
agree, that, “To choose rationally, one must choose morally.”87 Justice will initially be described
by Gauthier as a disposition not to take advantage of others as long as others can reasonably be
expected to be similarly disposed.
As noted in the prior two chapters, ancient and early modern theories of justice involved
several consistent themes, including the idea that justice is not a zero-sum game, the need to
understand underlying human nature and psychology, and the distinction between the intrinsic
and instrumental value of justice. Gauthier employs each of these themes in a new light in MbA,
and he uses each of them to advance his own argument in favor of the rationality of just
behavior.
He employs the concept of free markets to illustrate that cooperation among individuals
is not a zero-sum game. He invokes Smith’s invisible hand (as well as a different and visible
hand, to be explained below) to demonstrate that societal interaction offers individuals more than
mere protection from physical harm. Interactions among humans provide tremendous benefits for
all of the players involved, and justice is a necessary element of this interaction. Because

85

Gauthier (1986), p. 10
Chapters 7 -9 of Morals by Agreement deal with fairness and coercion in the initial bargaining position and justice
with respect to the distribution of the economic benefits of cooperation. This section provides valuable commentary
on the work of John Rawls and would be instrumental in facilitating a comparison of the work of Rawls, Nozik, and
Sen on these topics, but it is beyond the scope of the current project.
87
Gauthier (1986), p. 4
86

66

participation in human interaction is in our rational self-interest, Gauthier will argue that a
disposition to observe the rules of justice, as a prerequisite to this interaction, is in our selfinterest as well.
Gauthier makes extensive use of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) to
advance his argument. He shows that, in the context of an imperfect market, a situation in which
individuals agree to constrain their behavior delivers better results for everyone than does a
situation in which each individual seeks to maximize his own individual utility. This results in a
seemingly paradoxical outcome: constraint dominates individual advantage, yet the acceptance
of this constraint is advantageous to each individual because those who are disposed to constraint
(what Gauthier will call “constrained maximization”) will enjoy opportunities for mutually
beneficial cooperation that an uncooperative “straightforward maximizer” will fail to attain.
The concept of human nature and psychology that Gauthier will advance in MbA is
closely intertwined with the distinction between the instrumental and intrinsic value of justice.
As mentioned above, Gauthier’s argument for the rationality of justice is based on market
interaction among individuals. He therefore initially characterizes human nature in terms of a
caricature that he calls “economic man.” Economic man is willing to place constraints on his
behavior as long as others do so as well, because his reason allows him to realize that it is in his
best interest to do so. The psychology of economic man is such that he recognizes that it is
rational for him to dispose himself to constrained maximization in order to increase his
opportunities to benefit from cooperation.
Gauthier’s economic man contrasts sharply with the Humean concept of humanity
because economic man operates under conditions of mutual unconcern; he takes no interest in
the interests of other individuals and he is not motivated by sympathy. Economic man therefore
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requires individuals to mutually agree to constrain their behavior and to refrain from force and
fraud against one-another. The beauty of Gauthier’s constrained maximization is that it can
convert this mutual unconcern into a mutual benefit through cooperation. The one unfortunate
consequence is that economic man observes justice for instrumental reasons only; the intrinsic
benefits of justice for its own sake are meaningless to him.
Obviously, Gauthier has to acknowledge that economic man is not an accurate
representation of what humankind really is. Actual humans do take interest in one another’s
interests, and this is where the intrinsic value of justice arises. Gauthier claims that humankind’s
natural state is a mean between economic man (who values things only instrumentally) and
utopian man (who values things only intrinsically). The “liberal individual” who is found in the
mean between these extremes values things for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons, and it is
in this context where the intrinsic value of justice must be sought.

Rational Choice
Before he begins the exposition of the central themes in MbA, Gauthier needs to establish
a theory of rational choice. This aspect of Gauthier’s argument will not be of central importance
to this paper, but it is necessary to define it as a foundational concept before moving on to more
pertinent topics. He will claim that reason is not concerned with the content of the preferences
that an individual has; it is only concerned with the interrelations and measurement of particular
preferences. In keeping with Hobbes’s idea of value, Gauthier believes that value is a subjective
and relative measure of individual preference, over which reason holds no sway. Good and evil
are merely a matter of personal preference and no individual can rationally claim that the
preferences of another are objectively wrong. Furthermore, Gauthier explicitly sides with Hume
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with respect to Hume’s claim that it is “not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the
world to the scratching of my finger.”88 While such a preference may be considered insane due
to a defect with the subject’s affections, Gauthier wants us to recognize that to make such a
choice is not irrational (if the subject in question actually has this insane ordering of
preferences), nor is it arbitrary.
While reason is not concerned with the content of preferences, it is concerned with the
measurement of those preferences. Gauthier’s rational choice theory designates utility as the
measure of preference and it states that reason leads a self-interested actor to attempt to
maximize his own personal utility. He wants to be clear that he is distinguishing between a
normative evaluation of preference and a measure of preference: “The theory of rational choice
sets its course between the dogmatism of assuring a standard for preference and the scepticism of
denying a measure of preference.”89 As we shall see, Gauthier makes frequent use of the
concepts of rational choice and utility when constructing the central arguments of MbA. While
his claims are certainly open to debate, I will not attempt to resolve any potential critique
concerning the soundness of Gauthier’s theory of rational choice here; in order to maintain the
focus of the essay, I will accept this aspect of his argument and move on.

Game Theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Gauthier begins the core of his argument with an analysis of strategic rationality, or
rationality in the context of interaction with other actors. His initial goal is to demonstrate that it
is rational for a self-interested actor to agree to moral constraints provided that others agree to
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those constraints as well, and he uses a game-theoretic approach to accomplish this goal. He
creates a theoretical model in which he assumes that certain ideal conditions apply. Specifically,
he assumes that each person’s choice is a rational response to the choices she expects others to
make, that each person expects others’ choices to be rational as well, and that each person
expects her choices and expectations to be reflected in the expectations of others.90 Armed with
these (admittedly very strong) assumptions, he can move on to the heart of his game-theoretic
analysis of the problem.
Gauthier’s game-theoretic argument is based upon the distinction between equilibrium
outcomes and Pareto-optimal outcomes. A (Nash) equilibrium outcome occurs when each of the
players involved in a particular interaction is making the best move that he can for himself given
the actions of the other players. That is, an equilibrium is a set of strategies in which each player
maximizes his own utility given fixed expectations about the strategies of the other players; no
player can do better for himself by unilaterally changing his own strategy. The equilibrium
outcome is contrasted with the (Pareto) optimal outcome. A Pareto-optimal outcome occurs if
and only if there is no other potential outcome affording some person a greater utility and no
person a lesser utility.91
At first glance, optimality and equilibrium appear to be quite similar since they are both
utility-maximizing. However, there are subtle differences between equilibrium and optimal
outcomes that have profound implications for Gauthier’s moral theory. In an equilibrium
outcome, the emphasis is on inputs; the input strategy of each player gives her the maximum
utility given the strategies of the other players. In an optimal outcome, the emphasis is on output
payoffs; each player receives his maximum payoff given that no other payoff is decreased.
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Equilibrium and optimal outcomes are both utility-maximizing, but an equilibrium outcome
maximizes outcomes for each individual whereas an optimal outcome maximizes the group
outcome while ensuring that no individual can be made better-off without making another
individual worse-off.
The distinction between equilibrium and optimality is a focal point for Gauthier’s moral
theory because an optimization strategy is often not utility-maximizing on an individual level.
That is, it may be argued that choosing an optimizing strategy is not strategically rational for a
self-interested actor. Gauthier not only recognizes this distinction, he embraces it as the very
basis for morality: “Moral theory is essentially the theory of optimizing constraints on utilitymaximization.”92 While some theorists will reject the strategic rationality of optimization,
Gauthier will argue that the choice of an optimizing strategy is rational because the actor who
chooses such a strategy is doing so on the level of metachoice. That is, she is making a rational
choice about how to make choices.
The classic example known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) will help to clarify the link
that Gauthier wants to draw between rational choice and optimality. In the situation postulated
by the PD, the equilibrium outcome is mutual confession; regardless of what action his partner
takes, each prisoner maximizes his own utility by confessing. The problem with this situation is
that the equilibrium outcome is not optimal; each prisoner would have an outcome better than the
equilibrium outcome if they both remained silent. Thus, the PD illustrates the conflict that can
arise between optimizing strategies and utility-maximizing strategies.

In the PD, two

strategically rational utility maximizers acting independently will both confess, but this will
result in a worse outcome for both of them than if they had adopted the supposedly irrational
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optimization strategy of mutual silence. That is, the players should rationally prefer the optimal
outcome, but they will attain the equilibrium outcome unless they cooperate.
Gauthier uses international relations to illustrate the point. Sovereign nations are
essentially in a Hobbsean state of nature with one-another. In this state of nature, individual
maximizing behavior (such as violating the terms of a disarmament agreement), which is, by
definition, rational, results in a sub-optimal outcome which is potentially disastrous to all
players.93 In this context, equilibrium strategies can be viewed as short-term oriented and based
on maximization at the individual level, whereas optimal solutions are long-term oriented and
based on maximization at the group level. The main thrust of Gauthier’s project will be to
demonstrate the utility-maximizing rationale for choosing an optimal strategy instead of an
equilibrium strategy. In an ideal world with a perfectly competitive market, equilibrium and
optimization will coincide without any action on the part of the individuals involved. However,
in the real world, where market imperfections exist, cooperation among individuals is necessary
for the promotion of optimization strategies. I will now address the ideal conditions prevailing in
a perfect market before turning to the real world example of market imperfection and
cooperation.

Competitive Markets
The perfectly competitive market is the antithesis of the PD and of Hobbes’s state of
nature. Under a perfectly competitive market model, private goods, free market activity, mutual
unconcern, the absence of externalities and conditions of certainty in production and exchange
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are all assumed.94 The resulting strategic situation is a non-zero-sum game in which value is
created from mutually beneficial exchange without the need for an explicit agreement. Where
the PD places the players in a situation in which equilibrium and optimality are mutually
exclusive, the perfect market guarantees the coincidence of equilibrium and optimality: “Adam
Smith’s invisible hand is thus made visible by the economist’s analysis…each individual,
intending only her own gain, promotes the interest of society, in bringing about a mutually
beneficial optimal outcome, even though this is no part of her intention.”95 That is, when selfinterested individuals operate within the confines of a perfect market, the invisible hand serves,
without the purposeful intent of any of the individual actors, to overcome Hobbes’s state of
nature and to bring equilibrium in-line with optimality. The need for a rational actor to make a
meta-decision between equilibrium strategies and optimization strategies does not arise. It should
be noted that Gauthier does not invoke the concept of cooperation at this point, because the
presence of the invisible hand makes cooperation unnecessary in a perfect market. Cooperation
only arises when some market imperfection makes it necessary for individuals to agree to refrain
from force and fraud.
Gauthier’s model of the perfect market implies that the market is a “morally free zone.”96
Where most advocates of laissez-faire capitalism claim that a perfect market in a state of
equilibrium and optimality is morally right, Gauthier will instead claim that in such a market
morality has no place at all. In a perfect market, choice is neither morally right nor wrong
because the coincidence of equilibrium and optimality removes the need for the constraints that
morality provides. Moral constraints appear only when market imperfections are present and a
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gap emerges between optimal mutual benefit and the rational pursuit of gain on an individual
level. Under an imperfect market scenario morality is needed to in order to keep the optimal
outcome from deteriorating into a less-desirable (on a group level) equilibrium outcome.
Not only is morality not required in Gauthier’s perfect market, the individual actors in the
market are non-tuistic, that is, they mutually exhibit no concern for one-another. It is important
to note here that he is not claiming that actual people have no concern for their fellow humans;
most certainly do. What he wants to show is that this mutual concern need not be present for
optimality and equilibrium to coincide under the conditions of a perfect market. While an
individual does have concern for family and friends, this same level of concern is not extended to
acquaintances or other individuals with whom she may have infrequent contact. The beauty of
the perfect market lies in the fact that the invisible hand renders this mutual unconcern
ineffective in disrupting the coincidence of equilibrium and optimality.
Unfortunately for Gauthier and the rest of us, the real world is not a perfectly competitive
market. As indicated above, one of the assumptions of Gauthier’s perfect market model is the
absence of externalities. A cursory examination of the facts as we find them will reveal that
market externalities certainly do exist, most notably in the form of free-riders and parasites. A
free-rider is an actor who enjoys a benefit without sharing in its cost, such as the guy in your
office who drinks four cups of coffee each day but does not contribute to the coffee fund. A
parasite is an actor who enjoys a benefit while passing-on all or part of the cost of that benefit to
another party who does not enjoy the benefit. Goldman Sachs and other large investment banks
are examples of parasitism. When they make risky wagers with their clients’ capital, they have
the potential to reap significant economic benefits for themselves and only themselves, but some
of the costs they incur, in the form of systemic risk and periodic bailouts, are born by their clients
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and the public. In the presence of free riders, parasites and other market externalities, the market
will fail to align equilibrium and optimality, and this market failure gives rise to the need for
morality as a constraint on action. This is where cooperation and justice emerge.

Cooperation and the Circumstances of Justice
When equilibrium and optimality fail to coincide, rational actors will respond by
cooperating. It is at this point that Gauthier makes the most explicit declaration of his concept of
justice:
Where market interaction, with its pre-established harmony between equilibrium
and optimum, is beyond good and evil, and natural interaction, in the presence of
free riders and parasites, degenerates into force and fraud, cooperative interaction
is the domain of justice. Justice is the disposition not to take advantage of one’s
fellows, not to seek free goods or to impose uncompensated costs, provided that
one supposes others similarly disposed.97
Cooperation is not needed in a perfect market because free riders and parasites do not
exist there. These externalities do exist in the Hobbesean state of nature, but rational cooperative
action eliminates them. The result is justice: the rational disposition to agree to forego the
opportunity for free ridership or parasitism in return for others foregoing the same.
Gauthier is in agreement with Hume and Rawls, who both recognize scarcity and
individual bias as the circumstances of justice. He argues, however, that the presence of market
externalities must be added to this list. A perfectly competitive market will eliminate most of the
need for cooperation, because the invisible hand does most of the work itself. It is the presence
of externalities (an imperfect market) that makes the visible hand of cooperation necessary: “the
fundamental circumstances of justice, those features of the human situation that gave rise to co-
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operation, are awareness of externalities in our environment, and awareness of self bias in our
character.”98 Hume and Rawls failed to appreciate the role of the perfect market in bringing
about an optimal outcome. It is only when the perfect market becomes imperfect that the need
for cooperation, and in turn, the need for justice, arises.
It is important to note here the distinction between cooperation and bargaining.
Bargaining is an individual utility-maximizing strategy in which each person’s behavior is a
response to her expectations of the behavior of others in a zero-sum game. This is not what
Gauthier’s rational actor is engaged in. Cooperation, on the other hand, is a joint strategy in
which each person’s behavior is an attempt to optimize the collective outcome in a non-zero-sum
game.99 This is what the rational agent is striving for. When cooperating, individuals are acting
in agreement with each-other with the joint goal of optimization, where the outcome will be
determined by what Gauthier calls the principle of minimax relative concession.
The principle of minimax relative concession states that given a range of outcomes, each
of which requires concessions by some or all persons, an outcome will be selected only if the
maximum relative concession it requires from a single person is as small as possible.100 This
principle serves as a rational basis for an impartial accord in which each person agrees to restrain
his self-interested maximizing behavior, provided other individuals agree to do likewise. Justice
is merely the self-imposed disposition to abide by this self-imposed restraint once the restraint
has been adopted. In Gauthier’s words: “co-operation is the visible hand restraining persons from
taking advantage of their fellows, but restraining them impartially and in a way beneficial to all.
Such restraint commands rational acceptance; this is the idea underlying morals by
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agreement.”101 As we will now see, the conscious adoption of a disposition to restrain one’s own
behavior is the foundation upon which Gauthier’s theory of justice rests.

The Disposition to Constrained Maximization
In arguing for the minimax principle, Gauthier claims that a rational utility-maximizing
actor is better-off if she agrees to constraints on her behavior (provided that others agree to the
same constraints) than she would be if she refused to accept any constraints at all. She rationally
recognizes the superiority of joint optimal outcomes over individual equilibrium outcomes, and
she chooses, on joint utility-maximizing grounds, not to make future decisions based on
individual utility-maximizing grounds.

This obscure concept is clarified by Gauthier’s

distinction between straightforward maximization (SM) and constrained maximization (CM).
A person practicing SM bases his decisions on the input strategies of others, that is, he
wants to maximize his utility based on the strategies of the other players. He is akin to an
individual in a Hobbsean state of nature. In contrast, an individual practicing CM bases her
decisions on the output payoffs of others; she wants to maximize her utility given the utilities of
the other players.102 Unlike the SM, the CM is willing to take the benefits of the other players
into account in an attempt to increase the utility of everyone, including herself.103 Gauthier uses
this distinction between SMs and CMs to make one of the most important claims in all of MbA.
He states:
In defending constrained maximization we have implicitly re-interpreted the
utility-maximizing conception of practical rationality. The received interpretation,
commonly accepted by economists…identifies rationality with utility101
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maximization at the level of particular choices. A choice is rational if and only if
it maximizes the actor’s expected utility. We identify rationality with utilitymaximization at the level of dispositions to choose. A disposition is rational if and
only if an actor holding it can expect his choices to yield no less utility than the
choices he would make were he to hold any alternative disposition.104
This is a strong claim with profound implications.

Gauthier is arguing that the relevant

difference between SMs and CMs is in their dispositions.

He wants to show that these

differences in dispositions can be observed by others, and that the disposition of a CM is superior
to that of a SM.105
Gauthier’s claim that the disposition of a CM is superior to that of a SM is based simply
on the now-familiar idea that cooperation is not a zero-sum-game. It is true that SMs can, on
occasion, take advantage of CMs. However, as long as there is a sufficient number of CMs, the
CMs will obtain numerous benefits from cooperative interaction with each other that are
unavailable to SMs. That is, the benefits of being a CM are found not in the specific individual
choices that a CM makes, but in the CM’s wider range of opportunities to choose.106
The observability of dispositions is relevant because it will impact the ability of SMs to
take advantage of CMs. That is, if a SM wants to take advantage of the group-regarding
disposition of a CM, her likelihood of success will depend upon her ability to conceal her true
disposition. It is rather obvious that dispositions are at least somewhat observable, but how
exactly does the degree of observability impact the force of Gauthier’s argument?

If the

dispositions of individuals were entirely transparent, deception would be impossible and CMs
would avoid interactions with SMs. If dispositions were entirely opaque, government force
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would be necessary to keep CMs from being taken advantage of by SMs. Gauthier observes that
human dispositions are more aptly described as translucent. While we may not be able to always
ascertain the intentions and dispositions of other actors, we can often approximate intentions and
dispositions with more accuracy than random guessing. In addition, reason will require that a
CM cultivate a talent for detecting the dispositions of others (although it is not obvious how a
CM will accomplish this). The stronger this ability for detection becomes, the more valuable is
the choice to adopt the disposition of a CM.
Gauthier is making three claims here: First, that the dispositions of individuals are
detectable. Second, that most individuals are able to detect the dispositions of others with some
level of accuracy, and third, that if most individuals can accurately detect the dispositions of
others, then everyone has a reason to be a CM.

The first and third claims are mostly

uncontroversial, but the second claim, that most individuals are able to detect the dispositions of
others with some accuracy, is the subject of much debate.107 Various retorts to this aspect of
Gauthier’s argument have been offered for many years, most famously by Hobbes’s Fool, who is
essentially the epitome of Gauthier’s SM. The Fool claims that an individual can maximize his
utility by making a covenant, but that he does not necessarily always maximize his utility in
keeping the covenant because the limited ability of other individuals to detect his true disposition
will allow him to get away with periodic violations.108 That is, the Fool wants to argue that it is
rational to appear just, but to behave unjustly in select situations.
According to Gauthier, Hobbes, in his reply to the Fool, is missing the critical point that
the rationality of keeping one’s agreements is distinct from the rationality of being disposed to
keep one’s agreements. The Fool is condemning reason for a lack of benefit in performance, but
107
108

I owe this characterization of Gauthier’s claims to a personal conversation with Professor Hugh Lafollette.
Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 91

79

he needs to be able to condemn reason for a lack of benefit in disposition to perform. Since the
disposition of a CM provides advantages that the disposition of a SM cannot, and since
dispositions are translucent, Gauthier argues that the Fool’s argument is unsuccessful. A detailed
analysis of The Fool’s argument will occupy most of Chapter 4 of this essay, so I will leave the
finer points of this argument until that time.

Economic Man, Utopian Man and the Liberal Individual
In his discussion of imperfect markets, CM, and dispositions, Gauthier uses an idealized
concept of humankind to make his case. This ideal, which he refers to as “economic man,” is
non-tuistic (he takes no interest in the interests of others), he is constantly seeking to appropriate
more utility for himself and he values justice only for instrumental reasons. For economic man,
Gauthier’s perfectly competitive market is the ideal societal situation.109 Economic man has no
concern for his fellows and he derives no pleasure and no value from interacting with others; for
him, interaction is valuable only as a more efficient means to obtain more of the things he
desires.
The problem with economic man is that he is merely a caricature; his nature is not like
human nature as we actually find it. Real humans do take an interest in each-others’ interests and
they find interacting with one another a pleasurable activity in itself. Real persons have interests
other than appropriating more goods for themselves and they experience diminishing utility as
they appropriate more. Gauthier recognizes these obvious differences between economic man
and actual humans, yet he maintains that morals by agreement are applicable to both of them.
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Economic man is contrasted with utopian man. Where economic man values things only
instrumentally, utopian man values them only intrinsically. Utopian man lives in a world without
scarcity, and, as Hume argues110 and Gauthier agrees, utopian man therefore has no need for
justice. However, utopian man is no more human than economic man is, because utopian man
has no need to seek or strive. Nietzsche recognized that an integral part of human life is the need
to struggle towards higher goals, and Gauthier understands this:
it is scarcity that gives rise to activities with instrumental value. If they are
necessary to human fulfillment, then scarcity is necessary too. The idea of a
human society based not on scarcity but on plentitude is chimerical; to overcome
scarcity would be to overcome the conditions that give human life its point.111
Precisely because he lacks the experience of scarcity and the need to struggle, utopian
man is no more the human ideal than economic man. His plentitude and lack of worry is no
more applicable to the human condition than economic man’s non-tuism and indifference to
human affection. Gauthier believes that humans as we actually find them are located between
these two extremes, and this caricature he calls the liberal individual. The liberal individual
values things both instrumentally and intrinsically; he can engage his intellect in a market
context as well as engage his affections in personal interaction with others. He finds justice in
both contexts.
The liberal individual will play a significant role in the argument regarding the intrinsic
value of justice to be addressed in Chapter 5, so I will not dwell on him here. The relevant point
at this juncture is that the fact that economic man is not like humankind as we actually find it
does not invalidate Gauthier’s argument for morals by agreement. By using economic man as a
caricature, Gauthier is trying to demonstrate that a disposition to justice is instrumentally
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rational, and, as I will argue, he is mostly successful. The remaining question is, when we relax
our assumptions to include a creature such as the liberal individual who is more in-line with
humankind as we actually find it, how does this impact the argument in favor of just
dispositions? That is, can it be demonstrated, in terms familiar to Gauthier, that justice is
intrinsically valuable as well? In Chapter 5 I will address this question in detail.

Gauthier’s Critics
Overview
The contractarian theory of morals and justice presented by Gauthier in MbA is both
provocative and profound, and it demands a reply. The majority of the contractarian philosophers
who have responded to Gauthier’s claims have, for the most part, done so with respect for the
brilliance of Gauthier’s work, and at times even with assistance from Gauthier himself. In this
section I will address some of the relevant points of contention over Gauthier’s claims in MbA,
beginning with some relatively minor quibbles over minimax concession and the assumption of
mutual unconcern, then moving on to a more substantial critique of constrained maximization
and Gauthier’s emphasis of dispositions. I will claim that Gauthier’s recognition of the
importance of making decisions on the level of metachoice represents a major contribution to the
contractarian argument for the rationality of justice, but that his failure to include an element of
reciprocity is a material shortcoming. As mentioned earlier, I will defer my discussion of
Gauthier’s treatment of Hobbes’s Fool until Chapter 4, and Gauthier’s liberal individual will
appear again in Chapter 5.
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Mutual Unconcern and the Minimax
The assumption of mutual unconcern is probably the easiest aspect of Gauthier’s
argument to challenge, simply because it is so obviously and so patently false. As Gauthier
readily acknowledges, real people do take an interest in one-another’s interests, and economic
man is a poor estimate of what humans are actually like. Clearly, the assumption of non-tuism
does not hold empirically, but to what extent does this diminish Gauthier’s larger project?
Vallentyne112 argues that, since people’s actual preferences are not mutually
unconcerned, an agreement that is rational under an assumption of non-tuism is not necessarily
rational when this strong assumption is lifted and the actual preferences of other-regarding
individuals are considered. When postulating a system of rational constraints, he wants to avoid
making any assumptions at all about preferences and simply consider the actual preferences that
individuals would have. Essentially, he believes Gauthier needs to drop the assumption of nontuism if he wants to have a coherent theory of rational interaction.
While the central point of Vallentyne’s critique is true, it does not pose a significant
threat to the strength of Gauthier’s argument. The fact that Gauthier’s rational actors are nontuistic when agreeing to CM does not mean that relaxing the non-tuistic assumption would result
in a rational agreement other than CM. Gauthier uses the non-tuistic assumption, not because it
helps him argue that rational actors would adopt CM, but because it allows him to include reallife situations that are non-tuistic within the confines of CM. Real humans are non-tuistic in
many situations involving justice; outside of our relatively small group of friends and family, we
often take little or no interest in the interests of others when interacting with them, especially
when these interactions are impersonal in nature. When we pay for a transaction with an
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unknown individual over the internet, faithfully pay our taxes, or keep current on the mortgage
that we owe to a parasitic banking institution, we usually do not take an interest in the other
party’s interest. Gauthier would say that we are merely acting on a prior disposition to CM,
without regard for the other party. The assumption of non-tuism merely allows Gauthier to
incorporate these infrequent and less personal interactions under the umbrella of CM.
Furthermore, his characterization of the liberal individual in the final chapter of MbA allows him
to acknowledge and account for the fellow-feelings that we have for others. Gauthier certainly
does recognize that humans are tuistic, but in the context of CM, they do not need to be.
Another element of Gauthier’s project that invites criticism is the principle of minimax
relative concession. As outlined above, the principle of minimax relative concession states that
given a range of outcomes, each of which requires concessions by some or all persons, an
outcome will be selected only if the maximum relative concession it requires from a single
person is as small as possible. The principle serves as a rational basis for an impartial accord in
which each person agrees to constrain his behavior. One might reasonably question whether this
outcome would actually be selected given Gauthier’s assumptions.
Kavka, in his review of MbA,113 claims that the minimax principle would not be chosen
because it rewards tendencies that our common sense intuitions find blameworthy and punishes
tendencies that we would commend. The minimax principle states that each actor will minimize
the relative concession that she has to make. Since some gluttonous individuals have a
psychological tendency to derive a significant amount of utility simply from having more of the
cooperative surplus than others have, in order to reach agreement under the minimax principle,
the relative concession of these individuals will have to be smaller than the relative concession of
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individuals who have a psychological tendency to a more equal distribution. In other words,
greed is rewarded and parity is punished.
Kavka’s critique of the minimax principle is insightful and correct. It is also relevant to
Gauthier’s project as it relates to social justice and the justice of distributive shares, and it is a
critique that Gauthier needs to address.114 However, in this paper I am presenting an argument in
favor of the rationality of justice in the Hobbsean sense of keeping covenants made, and this
particular observation of Kavka’s is not relevant to Gauthier’s argument that forming a
disposition to CM is a rational strategy. The minimax principle could be replaced with any
number of other principles for dividing the cooperative surplus without diminishing the force of
Gauthier’s core argument in this regard.

Dispositions
Although cogent objections can be raised regarding the minimax principle and the
assumption of non-tuism, these objections do little to undermine the force of Gauthier’s theory.
However, his claims regarding the role of dispositions are of central importance to the coherence
of his entire argument in MbA, and any flaws in this portion of his theory must be addressed.
Recall the passage cited above:
We identify rationality with utility-maximization at the level of dispositions to
choose. A disposition is rational if and only if an actor holding it can expect his
choices to yield no less utility than the choices he would make were he to hold
any alternative disposition…She benefits from her disposition, not in the choices
she makes, but in her opportunities to choose.115
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Gauthier is making three claims regarding dispositions. First, he claims that humans have the
ability to choose dispositions in general. Second, assuming that the first claim holds, it is
rational to choose a disposition to CM. Third, once we choose the disposition to CM, it is
rational to comply with that disposition. I will address the first and third claims in this section
and the second claim will be addressed in the section on CM below.
The first claim is really a claim about human psychology. Gauthier seems to simply
assume that we have complete control over our choices and that we can choose to be
automatically disposed to act in a particular way across a wide variety of situations. This is
especially peculiar in light of the fact that he claims to agree with Hume’s contention that reason
is subservient to passion: “Desire, not thought, and volition, not cognition, are the springs of
good and evil.”116 In her commentary on Gauthier,117 Hampton recognizes that the ability to will
ourselves to be in accord with a particular disposition is at odds with Hobbesean psychology, and
possibly at odds with contemporary moral psychology as well.118 Given the importance of the
choice of dispositions to his argument, this challenge needs to be addressed if Gauthier’s theory
is to have any force at all.
In Chapter 1 I emphasized the importance of a dispositional account of justice as
characterized by Aristotle. Aristotle believes that virtue is found, not in particular acts of virtue,
but in a permanent state of character that disposes an individual to act in a virtuous way
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regardless of the benefits it brings in a particular situation. That is, Aristotle and Gauthier both
recognize that decisions regarding justice should be made, not on the level of particular
individual choices, but on a meta-level; a disposition is a choice about how to make choices.
Given this apparent similarity between Aristotle and Gauthier, it is tempting to invoke
Aristotle’s account of dispositions in support of Gauthier’s account, but this attempt will fail.
Gauthier’s account of dispositions is quite different from that of Aristotle in that Gauthier’s
account implies the automatic application of a principle whereas Aristotle’s is based entirely on
sound judgment. Aristotle believes that the ethical situations in which we find ourselves will
vary so greatly that we will never be able to come up with global rules that will apply in every
situation. Instead of rules, Aristotle wants to rely on sound judgment to guide our actions in
particular situations, and he believes this judgment is the result of strong moral education and a
self-reinforcing combination of dispositions and actions over many years of practice. In contrast,
Gauthier’s account is based on the explicit choice of a disposition which will be automatically
applied without further thought in a consistent manner across a wide variety of situations.
Aristotle will be of no help to him in this regard.
Fortunately, in subsequent writings Gauthier has recognized the shortcomings of the
dispositional account given in MbA, and he has replaced the dispositional account with an
account based upon “deliberative procedures.” Deliberative procedures are more like rules for
decision making than dispositions, and they “are rational if and only if the effect of employing
them is maximally conducive to one’s life going as well as possible, where this effect includes,
not only the actions they determine, but also the actions they make possible.”119 Gauthier
originally invoked the concept of dispositions because it allowed him to emphasize the
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importance of making decisions based not upon immediate single outcomes, but upon the larger
universe of outcomes that such decisions make possible. He wants to make a choice about how
to make choices. The notion of deliberative procedures allows him to attain the same goal
without having to make a controversial claim about human psychology and our ability to
program ourselves to act in a certain way. We may not be able to intentionally choose a
permanent disposition to automatically behave in a specific, consistent manner, but we certainly
can choose to adopt a particular deliberative procedure to be applied across a variety of
situations.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the third claim Gauthier makes regarding
dispositions in MbA is that once we choose a disposition to CM, it is rational to comply with that
disposition.

Having abandoned the dispositional account in favor of an account based on

deliberative procedures, he must now show that once we choose a particular deliberative
procedure, it is rational to comply with it. It has been observed by several critics that adopting a
policy of CM (whether via a disposition or a deliberative procedure) may be rational at the same
time that the individual actions the policy proposes are not.120 Again, due to the key role that
dispositions and deliberative procedures play in Gauthier’s philosophy, this challenge must be
addressed.
In “Assure and Threaten,” Gauthier makes an attempt to bridge the gap between the
rationality of choosing a deliberative procedure and the rationality of observing it: “Deliberative
procedures are rational if and only if the effect of employing them is maximally conducive to
one’s life going as well as possible, where this effect includes, not only the actions they
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determine, but also the actions they make possible.”121 He is attempting to show that, if the
general application of a deliberative procedure is rational, then each instance in which that
procedure is employed is also rational, even if, in a particular instance, the employment of the
principle is not conducive to one’s life going as well as possible.
There is definitely a strange connection between the choice to adopt a deliberative
procedure and the choice to comply with that procedure in any one particular instance, but
Gauthier has still failed to demonstrate that the rationality of the former necessarily implies the
rationality of the latter. The problem that the critics cite is the lack of a necessary connection
between the deliberative procedure and the individual acts it demands.
Aristotle recognized this gap and attempted to bridge it via his concept of dispositions.
Aristotle claimed that merely having a disposition implies that you have complied and will
continue to comply with it, because the disposition owes its existence to the sum of the
individual acts. That is, if you decide that the disposition is rational and you make the choice to
adopt the disposition, the particular acts that are in accord with the disposition are necessarily
rational because they are helping to form and reinforce the disposition in a virtuous cycle. For
Aristotle, you cannot have the disposition without a consistent habit of acting in accordance with
it, and, furthermore, if you view compliance with the disposition as being subject to violation on
a case-by-case basis, the lack of performance will lead to the eventual loss of the disposition.
While it may once again be tempting to invoke Aristotle in order to assist Gauthier, as
mentioned above, Aristotle’s concept of dispositions is quite different from Gauthier’s
deliberative procedures. The continued application of a rule across a variety of situations will
not help to reinforce the choice of that rule in the way that Aristotle’s dispositions are self-
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reinforcing. In addition, even in the context of Aristotle’s own account, it is not evident that
every individual act of justice is a necessary element of the formation of a disposition to justice.
It is possible that some individual acts that would be recommended by a disposition to (or a
deliberative procedure of) justice could be omitted without necessarily damaging the disposition
(or weakening the deliberative procedure). What Gauthier needs to show is that there is a
necessary benefit emanating from the performance of each individual act done in accordance
with a given deliberative procedure.
Essentially, Gauthier is faced with a problem of cross-temporal consistency in behavior.
Although the general application of a deliberative procedure may clearly benefit an individual
via access to a wider and superior array of opportunities, the application of the principle in a
specific situation may not, in-and-of itself, lead to the individual’s life going as well as possible.
What Gauthier has overlooked is the possibility that cross-temporal consistency itself is an
element of one’s life going well.122 To engage in actions that are inconsistent with an important
deliberative procedure that one has consciously adopted is “a serious psychological fracture”123
that can have a significant negative impact on one’s self-image and sense of stability in identity.
That is, the agent derives value from the consistency of her behavior, and any deviation from the
adopted procedure can lead to undesirable psychological strife.124
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind the main point behind Gauthier’s account of
dispositions and deliberative procedures: When an individual adopts a deliberative procedure,
she is making a choice about how to make choices. The act of adopting the procedure itself
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implies that the procedure will be applied in all cases; that is, compliance is included in the
rule.125 Thus, any inconsistency in applying the procedure is either a hindrance to a well-ordered
life or evidence that the procedure was not really adopted in the first place. Gauthier’s third
claim is a viable one: Once we adopt a rational deliberative procedure it, is rational to adhere to
it in all relevant situations.

Game Theory and Constrained Maximization
As indicated above, Gauthier makes three claims regarding dispositions in MbA: that
humans have the ability to willingly choose dispositions in general, that it is rational to choose a
disposition to CM, and that once we choose the disposition to CM, it is rational to comply with
that disposition. In the previous section I addressed the first and third claims and offered
rebuttals to the critics.

These two claims remain intact, although in a modified format.

Individuals do have the ability to consciously adopt rational deliberative principles (as opposed
to dispositions), and it is rational for them to adhere to these rational principles in all relevant
situations. Gauthier’s second claim, however, is more problematic than the other two, and the
shortcomings of constrained maximization as a rational principle are far more damaging to
Gauthier’s project.
At this point it is important to clarify the issue at stake. I have already accepted the claim
that it is rational to consistently adhere to a rationally chosen deliberative procedure, but the
question that remains is, “What kind of deliberative procedure is it rational to choose?” When
selecting a deliberative procedure, we are making a choice about how to make choices, but this
125
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leaves open the possibility of choosing a deliberative procedure that advocates violating
covenants when it is advantageous to do so. That is, if an agent behaves unjustly by violating a
covenant, she is not necessarily in violation of her deliberative procedure; her procedure may
actually call for opportunistic violation of covenants. In MbA, Gauthier claims that choosing a
disposition to CM is rational. In his subsequent work, he abandons dispositions in favor of
deliberative procedures, and he rejects CM and replaces it with agreed Pareto-optimization
(hereafter APO).126 Despite these revisions, the problem remains; he still needs to demonstrate
that adopting a deliberative procedure of APO is a rational choice, and this is where his most
significant problem lies.
The controversy surrounding APO is most clearly illustrated by contrasting APO with the
ideas posited by evolutionary game theory (EGT). I will begin with a brief outline of EGT and I
will attempt to reconcile the insights of EGT with the critiques of some of Gauthier’s fellow
contractarians. The conclusion will be that APO is an untenable principle.
The treatment of morality in EGT differs from contractarianism in a number of ways, but
the most obvious is that EGT does not need to assume an explicit or implicit contract. In EGT,
morality is not the result of a bargaining process, but is instead merely a side-effect of repeated
interaction between agents who habitually act in a certain way.127 The foundational example of
EGT in the field of ethics is given by Axelrod.128 His work is based upon a contest in which he
challenged scientists, philosophers and hobbyists to come up with an optimal strategy in a multi-
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round (iterated) PD game. Axelrod insists on using an iterated PD game because he believes that
repeated interaction is necessary for any form of cooperation to take hold; if the individual
players know they will never interact again or if the number of future interactions is known,
mutual defection is an evolutionarily stable strategy and the process will never move past this
point.
The winner of Axelrod’s contest was a simple strategy of cooperation based on
reciprocity known as tit-for-tat (TFT), in which the player begins by cooperating on the first
move, then continuing to cooperate on the second move if the other player cooperates in
response, or defecting on the second move if the other player defects, and so on in subsequent
moves. The story of morality that emerges from this game begins with Axelrod’s observance
that Hobbes’s state of nature is equivalent to a PD game in which mutual defection (ALL D) is
stable. The introduction of cooperation based on reciprocity (due to kinship or clustering) into
this stable state allows the TFT strategy to take hold and become dominant if the probabilities of
repeated interaction and potential retaliation are sufficiently high. Axelrod’s conclusion is that
cooperation can emerge even from an initial position akin to Hobbes’s state of nature as long as
small clusters of cooperators have even a small chance of interacting with one another. The
collective stability of a cooperative strategy is stronger than that of mutual defection strategy,
however, “for a (cooperative) strategy to be stable in the collective sense, it must be provocable.
So, mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control, by starting with
a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity.” (emphasis added)129
On the surface, Axelrod’s conclusions appear to mirror those of Gauthier: both present a
scenario in which mutually beneficial cooperative interaction between individuals allows them to
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escape the Hobbsean state of nature. However, two important differences are present. First, the
link between rationality and justice is far weaker in EGT than in CM or APO. The EGT
approach does not invoke a contract and it makes no assumption of full rationality or
transparency in the way that CM and APO do. That is, in EGT rationality is not providing us
with a reason to be moral or just; morality in this context is just an accidental outcome of
interaction. If we understand justice as the keeping of covenants made, we cannot make an
argument in favor of the rationality of justice under EGT because there is no contract to be kept.
EGT must remain silent on the issue of justice in contractarian terms.
Second, there is a profound difference between CM / APO and EGT regarding the
importance of reciprocity. A CM or APO considers it rational to cooperate even in situations
where defection will not hinder future opportunities to interact and where there is no expectation
of future interaction with the other party. This is in direct opposition to the TFT strategy, which
has reciprocity as one of its main tenets.

In MbA Gauthier specifically addresses this

difference130 and goes to significant effort to distinguish CM from TFT and to deny that CM is in
any way dependent upon reciprocity. He wants to argue that if I dispose myself to cooperating,
others will be aware of my disposition and this awareness by others will provide me with greater
opportunities for future cooperative benefits, regardless of whether the other party cooperates: “It
is rational to act in a mutually advantageous way in PD situations, if one gains more from one’s
own disposition to constraint, than one loses from one’s actual exercise of constraint….It has
nothing to do with mutuality.”131 In his works subsequent to MbA, although he has abandoned
dispositions and CM, he continues to deny the necessity of reciprocity in advocating the choice
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of APO as a deliberative procedure.132 Gauthier insists that reciprocity does not matter for an
individual who chooses CM /APO because her permanent disposition frees her from having to
consider the actions of the other party in any single interaction.
Because the aim of this dissertation is to link rationality and justice, it is tempting to
jettison EGT for its inability to connect the two, and instead support Gauthier’s APO.
Unfortunately, Gauthier’s peculiar aversion to reciprocity makes this an untenable course.
Gauthier is simply (and inexplicably) trying too hard to deny the importance of reciprocity and
mutuality in constructing a strategy of rational interaction, and this denial significantly
diminishes the force of his argument.133 Fortunately, Danielson134 offers a solution that
introduces reciprocity into the mix without significantly altering Gauthier’s theory.
Gauthier claims that reciprocity does not matter because if I dispose myself to CM
instead of SM I do not need to consider the actions of the other party.135 Danielson observes that
Gauthier is oversimplifying when he limits his PD strategies to just CM and SM, and Danielson
rejects the disposition to CM in favor of a disposition that allows an actor to increase her utility
by taking the need for reciprocity into account. He proposes an alternative strategy, reciprocal
cooperation (RC), in which party 1 cooperates only when cooperation is necessary and sufficient
to elicit the cooperation of party 2. RC differs from CM in that RC recognizes that if party 2 is an
unconditional cooperator (he will cooperate no matter what), it is rational for party 1 to defect
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because her cooperation is not necessary to elicit the cooperation of party 2. With this small
change, Danielson is able to include reciprocity within a system of morals by agreement.
To summarize, the indispensable point that Gauthier is missing is this: Reciprocity
matters. He is trying too hard to avoid making his argument dependent upon reciprocity and
repeated interaction, even though inclusion of these elements will not diminish the moral force of
his argument. As I will show in Chapter 4, the fusion of justice and rationality does need to be
based on repeated interactions and the threat of retaliation. Fortunately, Danielson’s contribution
will allow us to continue in this regard. Danielson agrees with Gauthier’s claim that it is both
rational and possible to adopt a deliberative procedure of cooperation. He only disagrees with
Gauthier’s narrow definition of the conditions that make such a procedure rational. And, unlike
Axelrod, Danielson does posit a contract and he does aim to give us a reason to be just. It is
therefore possible to use Danielson’s modification of Gauthier’s philosophy to advance the
argument that justice is instrumentally valuable to a rational actor.

Conclusion
Despite its flaws, Gauthier’s work makes a considerable contribution to the argument in
favor of the instrumental rationality of justice. In Morals by Agreement and his other works,
Gauthier advances the contractarian theories of Hobbes by including competitive markets and
game theory to explicitly demonstrate that rational cooperation is not a zero-sum game, and by
including the idea of deliberative procedures in his account of justice. His emphasis on the
distinction between optimality and equilibrium leads to his most important contribution to the
argument; that an individual who chooses to adopt an optimizing strategy is making a decision
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on the level of metachoice. That is, when choosing a deliberative strategy, an individual is
making a rational choice about how to make choices.
Recall that Gauthier is now making three claims regarding deliberative procedures. First,
humans have the ability to willingly choose deliberative procedures in general. Second, assuming
that the first claim holds, it is rational to choose a deliberative procedure in accordance with
APO. Third, once we choose the deliberative procedure in accordance with APO, it is rational to
comply with that procedure in all instances. The first and third claims are sound, but this is
insufficient to prove his point. If an individual decides that a deliberative procedure is rational
(irrespective of whether it is a deliberative procedure in accordance with APO) and she makes
the decision to adopt the procedure, the particular acts that are in accord with the procedure are
also rational because the act of adopting the procedure itself implies that the procedure will be
applied in all cases, and because any inconsistency in applying the procedure is a potential
source of psychological strife and a hindrance to a well-ordered life.
The real question that contractarian philosophy needs to address is not whether it is
rational to adhere to a deliberative procedure once you have chosen it; I have shown that
adherence to a rational deliberative procedure is rational. The question that must be addressed is,
“what kind of deliberative procedure is it rational to choose?”

As Gauthier emphasizes

repeatedly, this is a choice about how to make choices. When deciding on which deliberative
procedure to choose, it must be acknowledged that reciprocity matters, as does repeated
interaction. Both Danielson (explicitly) and Axelrod (implicitly) agree with Gauthier that it is
rational to choose a deliberative procedure, but they disagree with him in that they both claim
(correctly) that reciprocity is a necessary element of a rational choice of deliberative procedure.
CM /APO will fail in this regard, and they must be replaced by a deliberative procedure that
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includes reciprocity. But the question remains: Is it rational to choose a procedure that advocates
adherence to covenants or is it rational to choose a procedure of violating covenants when it is
advantageous to do so? Hobbes’s Fool will argue in favor of opportunistic violation, and the
response to the Fool’s argument will be the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE HOBBESEAN FOOL
Chapter 3 began with an exegesis of Gauthier’s contractarian philosophy and ended with
the conclusion that adherence to a rationally chosen deliberative procedure is rational and
necessary. However, adhering to a deliberative procedure is not the same as adhering to a
covenant. We still need to address the claim that it is rational to choose and to adhere to a
deliberative procedure which dictates that one should violate covenants when it is advantageous
to do so.

That is, we need to compare the rationality of a deliberative procedure which

recommends that we observe the covenants we make versus that of a deliberative procedure
which recommends that we break covenants when it is convenient. Gauthier showed that
choosing a deliberative procedure is a choice about how to make choices. This chapter will be
dedicated to answering the question, “What type of deliberative procedure is it rational to
choose?”
Hobbes’s Fool will argue that it is indeed rational to choose a deliberative procedure to
violate covenants when it is advantageous to do so. I will argue that the Fool is mistaken. This
chapter will begin with a statement of the Fool’s claims and a discussion of Hobbes’s reply. Not
only has there been a lack of agreement among scholars regarding whether Hobbes or the Fool
advances the better argument, scholars have not even been able to agree on what exactly Hobbes
and his Fool are claiming. I will therefore attempt to be quite explicit and specific regarding
exactly what the Fool is claiming and what Hobbes is claiming in reply.
Next, I will address the work of several contemporary philosophers who have commented
on Hobbes’s reply to the Fool. Hampton interprets Hobbes as arguing that individuals reason in
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a shortsighted, case-by-case manner, and this gives rise to conflict in the state of nature.
Interpreted in this way, Hobbes will have a difficult time refuting the claims of the Fool.
Hoekstra claims that Hobbes’s argument against the Fool is levied only against the Fool who
denies justice outwardly. He interprets Hobbes as agreeing with the Fool who denies justice only
in his heart.

Sayre-McCord posits the existence of “transopaque egoists” who enjoy an

advantage similar to that of the Ring of Gyges. The Fool argues that it is rational for such
individuals to violate covenants when doing so is to their advantage, and Sayre-McCord believes
that Hobbes is unable to refute this claim. Gauthier argues against the Fool from two distinct
angles. In Moral Dealing136, he claims that Hobbes, in his argument for the second law of nature,
wants to replace the natural reason of self-preservation with a conventional reason of peace. By
re-characterizing the use of reason in the observance of covenants, Gauthier hopes to allow
Hobbes to refute the claims of the Fool. In Morals by Agreement, he argues that the Fool fails to
recognize that acceptance of Hobbes’s second law of nature implies acceptance of the third law
of nature, and the Fool is therefore mistaken.
Each of these accounts of Hobbes’s reply to the Fool offers a unique and insightful
perspective, but they are all ultimately unsatisfying. The most convincing argument against the
Fool, by far, is levied by Kavka. He claims, and I agree, that the reply to the Fool should be
based upon the presence of uncertainty and error in human reasoning. The Fool argues that we
should violate covenants when we have a reasonable expectation of doing so without being
detected. The core problem with this argument lies in the human inability to subjectively
determine the expectation of success. When we humans attempt to calculate the probability of
an outcome under uncertainty, we typically reason in a flawed manner.
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complex and unpredictable, and uncertainty and error are so widespread that an individual cannot
reliably determine when breaking a covenant will be beneficial.137
I will apply several insights from the field of behavioral economics to show how human
psychology makes us ill-suited to the task of judgment under uncertainty. We humans tend to be
overconfident138 in our ability to perform tasks and to calculate probability and we tend to be
overly-optimistic in our assessment of possible outcomes. We envision ourselves as having more
control over our environment than we actually have. We favor immediate benefits with limited
utility over future benefits that have much higher utility, and, most important, we significantly
underestimate the role that randomness plays in our lives. I will argue that a rational individual
will choose a deliberative procedure of behaving in a just fashion and keeping the covenants she
makes. She will recognize that due to these flaws in human psychology she is unable to properly
assess the probability of successful violation on a case-by-case basis and that, given a
sufficiently long time period, all covenant-breakers will eventually be discovered. In other
words, the rational individual will recognize that “time wounds all heels.”139

The Fool’s Claim and Hobbes’s Reply
The Fool makes his claim in Chapter XV of Leviathan. Hobbes states:
The fool hath said in his heart: ‘there is no such thing as justice’; and sometimes
also with his tongue, seriously alleging that: ‘every man’s conservation and
contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every
man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to make
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or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason, when it
conduced to one’s benefit.’140
The Fool argues that if humans by nature act in their own rational self interest, an individual’s
decision whether to keep or break a specific covenant should depend upon whether or not the
breaking of the covenant will provide a benefit to that individual. The Fool is simply claiming
that a rational individual will take advantage of situations in which the violation of a covenant
will bring more reward than the keeping of the covenant.
Gauthier emphasizes the fact that the Fool is not arguing against Hobbes’s second law of
nature; he is arguing against the third.141 That is, the Fool wants to show that, while it is in one’s
rational self-interest to maximize utility by entering into a covenant, it does not necessarily
follow that one maximizes one’s utility by keeping the covenant. The Fool believes that utility is
maximized by observing the third law of nature only selectively. Like Thrasymachus before
him, the Fool is arguing in the tradition of Antiphon that, “A person would make most advantage
of justice for himself if he treated the laws as important in the presence of witnesses, and treated
the decrees of nature as important when alone and with no witnesses present.”142
Hobbes’s reply to the Fool is immediate and direct:
This specious reasoning is nevertheless false. For the question is not of promises
mutual where there is no security of performance on either side (as when there is
no civil power erected over the parties promising), for such promises are no
covenants, but either where one of the parties has performed already, or where
there is a power to make him perform, there is the question whether it be against
reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform or not. And I say it is not
against reason.143
Hobbes qualifies his remarks by reminding us that there are no covenants in the state of nature.
He is concerned with situations in which a mechanism of punishment for the non-performance of
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covenants already exists, and he will argue that when such a mechanism is present it is not in
one’s best interest to violate an existing covenant because:
there is no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from
destruction without the help of confederates…He, therefore, that breaketh his
covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so,
cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence
but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it
without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably
reckon upon as the means of his security…144
Hobbes’s response is rather straightforward: since the Fool is dependent upon the errors of others
for his success in violating covenants, his odds of consistent success in violation are potentially
low and definitely uncertain. Since the downside of being caught is often much larger than the
potential upside of undetected violation, the Fool is well-advised to adhere to the covenants he
makes. Hobbes’s argument here is reminiscent of Pascal’s Wager in its implicit use of the
conjunction of probability and utility.145 Although an individual may be successful in her
attempt to violate a covenant, success is uncertain and both the probability and the magnitude of
the downside are difficult to forecast. Even if there is merely a miniscule chance of being
detected, if the downside of being detected is huge it is still rational to adhere to the covenant.146
Note that Hobbes is not making the strong claim that violation is irrational even if it is
beneficial; he is merely claiming that violating is irrational because it cannot reliably be expected
to be beneficial. According to Hobbes, even if violating a covenant turns out to be successful, it
is probably due to good luck, which is unreliable, and the choice to violate was not a rational
144
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strategy despite the successful outcome.147 In addition, even if violation was successful on one
occasion, it may give an individual a bad reputation and prohibit him from entering into future
cooperative ventures, which is obviously against his own self-interest. At first glance violation
may appear to be a good idea, but proper reflection will reveal that it is not rational.
Kavka observes that the interpretation of the Fool’s argument hinges on how we interpret
the phrase “conduced to one’s benefit.”148 If the phrase refers to an expected beneficial outcome,
the issue between the Fool and Hobbes is that Hobbes believes that the uncertainty of the
outcome and the unreliability of luck make violating justice against our best interest. If the
phrase refers to actual or certain outcomes, there is no substantive disagreement between Hobbes
and the Fool. That is, if an individual is certain that she can violate a covenant without being
caught, Hobbes would agree with the Fool that she should do so. Hobbes is merely arguing that,
unlike the Lydian Shepherd in possession of the Ring of Gyges, humans in the real world never
find themselves in a situation of such certainty.
At this point, an obvious objection to Hobbes’s argument arises. While Hobbes may be
correct in his assertion that the Fool can never be one hundred percent certain that he can get
away with the violation of a covenant, it does not necessarily follow that the Fool should
therefore adhere to his covenants in every situation. Hobbes’s recommendation to adhere to
covenants may be viable in many, or even most, situations, but certainly there will be situations
in which the odds of detection appear to be quite low and the potential payoffs from successful
violation are quite high. Surely, the skeptic will claim, in such a situation it is in the Fool’s best
interest to violate the covenant since the conjunction of probability and utility suggest that the
Fool can expect to reap significant benefits. I will address this objection in detail in the sections
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on Kavka and behavioral economics below, but for now it will have to suffice merely to suggest
that the problem with the skeptic’s argument is that the Fool, like the rest of us, is probably a
poor judge of his own odds of success.
Before moving on to my analysis of contemporary commentators on Hobbes’s reply to
the Fool, it will be helpful to re-cast the Fool’s argument in the context of the conclusions drawn
at the end of Chapter 3.

Recall that Gauthier makes three claims regarding deliberative

procedures: He claims first that humans have the ability to willingly choose deliberative
procedures in general, second, that it is rational to choose a deliberative procedure in accordance
with APO, and third, that once we choose a deliberative procedure in accordance with APO, it is
rational to comply with that deliberative procedure in all instances. At first glance it may appear
that the dispute between Hobbes and the Fool is being waged over the third claim, but this is not
the case; compliance with a covenant (the subject of the dispute with the Fool) is not the same as
compliance with a deliberative procedure. The dispute is being waged over Gauthier’s second
claim regarding what type of deliberative procedure it is rational to choose; they are arguing over
a choice about how to make choices. The Fool is proposing a strategy similar to Gauthier’s SM,
in which he will violate covenants when it is advantageous to do so. Hobbes, on the other hand,
while certainly not endorsing Gauthier’s APO, is arguing in favor of a strategy that involves
keeping the covenants that one makes. Unlike Gauthier, Hobbes emphasizes the importance of
reciprocity and repeated interaction, and unlike the Fool he understands that uncertainty plays a
major role in deciding on a rational course of action with respect to the keeping of covenants.
These particular aspects of Hobbes’s reply to the Fool will figure prominently in the various
accounts of contemporary Hobbes scholars, to which I will now turn.
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Contemporary Commentary on Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool
Kinch Hoekstra
Hoekstra reads Hobbes as believing (in agreement with the Fool) that adherence to
covenants can at times conflict with self-interest. His interpretation of Hobbes is unique in that
he views Hobbes as addressing two distinct kinds of Fools: Explicit Fools who deny justice
outwardly through word or overt deeds, and Silent Fools “who deny justice only in their
hearts.”149 According to Hoekstra, Hobbes’s reply to the Fool is directed against the Explicit
Fool only, as Hobbes wants to silence those who intend to publicly endorse disobedience to the
law and the sovereign. Under this interpretation, to argue against the Silent Fool would be
ludicrous, as the Silent Fool is making the relatively innocuous claim that violating a covenant is
not always advantageous, but that it certainly is on some occasions. The Silent Fool believes,
and Hobbes agrees, that it is reasonable to act unjustly if the rewards are great, punishment is
light and the likelihood of detection is low.
Using the distinction between Silent and Explicit Fools, Hoekstra wants to demonstrate
that in Hobbes’s system the role of the sovereign is to change the probability payoff in such a
way that the Silent Fool is hesitant to cheat. That is, Hobbes thinks the sovereign should
establish a system of punishment that is strict enough so that when an individual calculates the
pros and cons of breaking a covenant, the “payoff scale” encourages the covenant to be kept.150
This is where Hoekstra, most likely unintentionally, makes his most important contribution to the
argument against the Fool: “The Silent Foole may sometimes reasonably expect a net benefit
from injustice (it is likely that he will profit), but generally would not be reasonable to act on or
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rely on this expectation (though profit is probable, the risk is too great).”151 This idea, which is
once again reminiscent of Pascal’s Wager, is known as “weighted average probability.” An
individual who violates a covenant may have a high expectation of succeeding, but if the
downside of being caught is far greater than the upside of success, it may be reasonable for that
person to refrain from the violation. The point is that it is necessary to calculate not only the
probability of success, but the corresponding values of success and failure because the expected
utility of the attempted violation can be negative even if the violation is expected to succeed.
An example will help to clarify this point. Suppose Bob has an exam today in his finance
class for which he is insufficiently prepared, and he is tempted to cheat. Suppose further that he
correctly assesses his odds of success at 90% and that a good result on the exam as the result of
cheating will increase his utility by 50 units. Suppose further that if he is caught (an outcome
with a 10% probability), he will surely be expelled from school which will result in a decrease in
his utility of 1,000 units. His expected return looks like this:
Expected return if successful = .9 x 50 = 45
Expected return if caught = .1 x -1,000 = -100
Expected return from the act of cheating = 45 + -100 = -55
Under this scenario, Bob expects to be successful, but his expected utility (the product of his
expectation of success versus failure and the relative payoffs of each) is negative. So, he would
be foolish to cheat even though he expects to get away with it.
To complicate the matter further, psychological analysis has shown that humans are poor
predictors of the probability of outcomes. This flaw in human reasoning adds further risk to the
attempted violation due to the uncertainty of the utility calculation, and it makes the case in favor
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of violation even more unconvincing. While Hoekstra’s attribution to Hobbes of a distinction
between Explicit and Silent Fools is dubious and difficult to support, his acknowledgment of the
relevance of weighted average probability to the Fool’s argument is an important contribution.
As we will see later in the chapter, the field of behavioral economics has a great deal to say on
this point.

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
In his commentary on Gauthier, Sayre-McCord does not directly address Hobbes’s reply
to the Fool, but it requires no great stretch of the imagination to apply his argument to the
dispute.152 His main point of contention with Gauthier relates to Gauthier’s assumption of the
translucency of dispositions.153

Recall from Chapter 3 that Gauthier assumes that human

dispositions are best-described as a midpoint between transparency and opaqueness; while we
may not be able to always ascertain the intentions and dispositions of other actors, we can often
approximate intentions and dispositions with more accuracy than random guessing. This he
refers to as translucency. Sayre-McCord will argue that, in the real world, the dispositions of
some individuals are opaque enough that deception is often to the individual’s advantage.
He employs probability equations to make the argument that, “The choice of a moral
character is rational, then, only if one has a reason to think one is a (sufficiently) translucent
member of a community of (sufficiently) translucent moral people.”154 If Jane finds that her
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dispositions are sufficiently opaque, she can reasonably decide that it is in her self-interest to
adopt a disposition to violate covenants when it is advantageous to do so. While she may not
possess all of the powers of the Lydian Shepherd, her opacity does afford her the opportunity to
appear just while behaving in an unjust manner.
To see the problem with this argument, we need only refer back to my commentary on
Hoekstra. Sayre-McCord employs probabilistic reasoning to make his case, but he fails to
recognize that humans are notoriously inept at applying probability to situations of
uncertainty.155 He claims that a “transopaque” egoist (a creature similar to Hoekstra’s Silent
Fool) can expect to obtain the benefits of having a moral disposition without having to pay the
costs of constraint, but he ignores the distinct possibility that the transopaque egoist’s calculation
of expected benefit will be biased by overconfidence and an inability to properly employ
probability calculations. Sayre-McCord argues, as a rebuttal to a potential critique, that the
victims of the transopaque egoist will not be able to sufficiently punish her because the victims
are ignorant and irrational.156 This point is a valid one, but it also serves to strengthen the
argument against Sayre-McCord himself.

Individuals are indeed ignorant and irrational as

Sayre-McCord claims, but these facts are not reserved only for the victims of the transopaque
egoist; they also apply to the transopaque egoist herself. Being human, it is likely that the
transopaque egoist, when presented with an opportunity to violate a covenant, will reason in a
flawed way and overestimate her odds of success. Thus the Fool, in the guise of the transopaque
egoist, still lacks a convincing rational argument in favor of deception.
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Jean Hampton
Hampton also recognizes that humans often reason in a flawed manner, and she treats the
issue in a more explicit way than Hoekstra or Sayre-McCord. Her interpretation of Hobbes’s
characterization of conflict in the state of nature provides some useful insight into how the
human mind addresses cooperation and conflict, and she introduces us to the problem of intertemporal choice.157 Hampton describes three possible interpretations of Hobbes’s account of
conflict in the state of nature. In the first account, which she refers to as the “rationality
account”, she interprets Hobbes as arguing that the source of conflict is simply a result of
prisoner’s dilemma reasoning by creatures whose dominant passion is that of self-preservation.
Humans are rational actors and they recognize that their best self-preservation strategy in the
state of nature is to refuse to cooperate no matter what the other party does, so they will find
themselves trapped in a situation of eternal conflict. The problems with the rationality account
are twofold: First, it makes the very strong claim that conflict is always the best strategy, which
is entirely implausible as evidenced by our prior analysis of iterated PD games. Second, if the
rationality account holds, it is unclear how we could ever agree to the institution of a sovereign.
That is, under a strict interpretation of the rationality account we would never be able to escape
the state of nature.
The second interpretation of Hobbes proposed by Hampton is the “passions account”.
This account asks, if the laws of nature direct individuals so seek peace, why do self-interested
individuals not follow the direction of these laws?158 The answer is that individuals do not
behave rationally; passions such as fear, greed and, most importantly, glory, drive them to
behave in a manner that is inconsistent with reason. Hampton cites two problems with this
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account as well. First, the passions account seems to be inconsistent with total warfare in the
state of nature.

Individuals will reason that cooperation is in their best interest, frequent

cooperation will occur in the state of nature, and the need for a sovereign will thus be called into
doubt. However, if the passions account does generate sufficient conflict in the state of nature to
necessitate the institution of a sovereign, it is no longer possible to accept Hobbes’s own version
of human psychology.
After rejecting the rationality and passions accounts, Hampton advocates a third
interpretation of conflict which she refers to as the “shortsightedness account.” According to this
account, individuals are driven by reason, and cooperation in the state of nature is a rational
choice, but cooperation does not take hold because individuals fail to reason in the proper way.
Specifically, some individuals will fall victim to the desire for immediate gratification and give
undue weight to the short-term benefits of conflict over the long-term benefits of cooperation.
Hampton suggests that individuals may be shortsighted in this way because they consider the
future benefits of cooperation to be too vague, uncertain or remote to warrant cooperative
behavior in the short-term, or it may simply be that the average individual in a given society is
not aware that he is involved in a multi-period iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with every other
individual with which he interacts (this lack of awareness may seem shocking to some game
theorists, but it is entirely plausible nonetheless). Other individuals, perceiving this
shortsightedness in those with whom they are interacting, will anticipate the conflict-oriented
reasoning of their counterparts and will therefore decide not to cooperate themselves despite the
fact that they understand the long-term benefits of cooperation.159 Still other individuals will be
influenced by a desire for glory and will tend towards conflict because they are overconfident
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and have overestimated their chances of winning and underestimated the abilities of their
adversaries.160
Hampton’s shortsightedness account is a superior interpretation of Hobbes because it can
explain the presence of conflict in the state of nature without sacrificing Hobbes’s version of
human psychology. Under the shortsightedness account, conflict is driven not by “disruptive
passions” but by “fallacious reasoning”, and this is entirely consistent with Hobbes’s psychology
because overconfidence and a preference for immediate over future gratification is a mistake that
rational beings whose primary motivation is self-preservation will naturally make.161
By recognizing the importance of shortsightedness, Hampton gives us our first glimpse of
the idea that will be the focal point of the final section of this chapter, namely, that when dealing
with situations of uncertainty, human beings reason in a flawed manner. The only problem with
Hampton’s argument here is that she does not take it far enough. She cites the tendency to
discount future benefits and the tendency to be (abnormally) risk averse as “congenital
deformities” and she says that, “Hobbes could not plausibly argue that they are powerful or
widespread in the population.”162 As demonstrated in the section on behavioral economics
below, these and other tendencies to flawed reasoning are not only widespread in the population,
they are actually quite normal (despite being flawed) aspects of human behavior.

To find

evidence of shortsightedness and individuals’ inability to accurately assess future values, we
need look no further than the behavior of the typical American consumer with respect to credit
card debt. Agreeing to pay 17% interest in order to buy an upgraded iPhone today rather than six
months from now provides strong evidence in favor of the existence of flawed reasoning in

160

Hampton (1986), p. 86-87
Hampton (1986), p. 85
162
Hampton (1986), p. 84
161

112

situations of inter-temporal choice. These tendencies may be quite valuable in a pre-societal
environment where overconfidence, immediate gratification and risk aversion promote survival
of the species, but they are potentially harmful as we move towards a better life via the formation
of a social contract, and they are definitely harmful in a competitive market environment, as my
discussion of behavioral economics will clearly demonstrate. These flaws in our reasoning give
rise to conflict in the state of nature, but we can overcome them if we recognize their existence
and adjust our reasoning and our expectations accordingly.
Hampton’s shortsightedness account is helpful to our analysis of Hobbes’s response to
the Fool because it demonstrates how flawed reasoning might lead the Fool to believe that
violation of a covenant is in his self-interest when it actually is not. Kavka163 recognizes that
Hampton sees Hobbes as agreeing with the Fool’s claim that we should violate a moral rule or
law of nature when, on a case-by-case basis, it is to our own advantage to do so. Kavka agrees
with this interpretation of Hobbes, but he contends that Hobbes also wants to claim that if we
reason properly, we will see that compliance with the covenants one makes brings a higher
expected benefit than violation. In this way, Kavka is hinting at the notion of deliberative
procedures, and he wants to replace Hampton’s case-by-case reasoning (which can often lead to
a utility-destroying choice to violate) with a rule-based reasoning which will lead to the utilitymaximizing choice of compliance.

David Gauthier
Gauthier addresses Hobbes’s Fool in several places within his published works. He is
consistent in his conclusion that the Fool is mistaken, but the particulars of his argument vary
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widely. He uses two principal strains of argument against the Fool, which I will refer to as the
“conventional reason approach” and the “deliberative procedures approach.” Gauthier advances
the conventional reason approach in his book Moral Dealing164 and in the article “Thomas
Hobbes: Moral Theorist.”165 Where the Fool says that any restriction of the pursuit of selfinterest is against reason, Gauthier replies that one must not only restrict self-interest when
adhering to the second law of nature, one must restrict reason as well.166 That is, Gauthier claims
that the second law of nature requires us to give up some of our natural right and some of our
natural reason and, “In place of natural reason, one must accept the conventional reason of the
law, which directs one to adhere to one’s covenants.”167 Furthermore, Gauthier claims that the
Fool is missing the point that once we enter a covenant, self-preservation is no longer the
standard of reason; peace becomes the standard of reason.168 In this context, Gauthier is viewing
Hobbes’s moral theory as “…a dual conventionalism, in which a conventional reason,
superseding natural reason, justifies a conventional morality, constraining natural behavior.”169
It is difficult to see why Gauthier believes this notion to be correct, and even more
difficult to understand how he attributes such a notion to Hobbes. Adherence to Hobbes’s
second law of nature does not require that an individual restrict his own self-interest; it requires
him to restrict his own liberty and to “be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he
would allow other men against himself.”170 For Hobbes, this restriction of liberty is very much
in keeping with one’s own self-interest, as it allows an individual to expand her opportunity set
and to escape the suffocating fear of the state of nature. Fortunately for Gauthier and for my
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own argument in this dissertation, he offers a more satisfying and apparently unrelated reply to
the Fool in Morals by Agreement, which I refer to as the deliberative procedures approach.171
According to the deliberative procedures approach, the Fool is guilty of error on two levels, both
of which relate to ideas I addressed in Chapter 3. First, the Fool fails to recognize that real
acceptance of the second law of nature is possible only among those who have adopted the third
law of nature as well. In other words, an individual is worthy of consideration as a partner in
mutually beneficial interaction only if that individual has adopted a deliberative procedure which
demands consistent compliance with all of the covenants she makes. According to Gauthier, in
his reply to the Fool Hobbes does not go far enough in distinguishing the rationality of keeping
one’s agreements from the rationality of adopting a deliberative procedure of keeping one’s
agreements.172 The Fool is relating reason directly to the benefits of performance in a single
instance rather than to the longer-term benefits of a deliberative procedure of performance,173
and he rejects the claim that the third law of nature necessarily follows from the second. That is,
the Fool rejects the third of Gauthier’s three claims that I addressed in Chapter 3; the claim that it
is always rational to comply with a deliberative procedure if it is rational to adopt it.174 In
Chapter 3 I argued extensively that Gauthier is correct in this claim, so I will not revisit the
argument here. At this point it is only necessary to recognize that the rejection of this claim can
be attributed to the Fool.
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The second error that the Fool makes under Gauthier’s deliberative procedures approach
is his failure to realize that individuals who adopt a deliberative procedure of adherence to the
covenants they make will tend to have better future outcomes than those who have adopted no
such procedure because those who have adopted such a procedure will enjoy the benefits of
cooperative interaction in a non-zero-sum game.175 The Fool believes that it is rational to
maximize his utility on an individual level in each instance of cooperation, but by maintaining
this belief he is completely missing the point of cooperative interaction. The Fool fails to
recognize the benefits of substituting an optimal joint strategy for an equilibrium individual
strategy. He is operating under the assumption that human interaction is a zero-sum game and he
is ignoring the mutual benefits of cooperation. Because he does not adopt a deliberative
procedure in accordance with justice, the Fool will not be admitted into many of the beneficial
arrangements that cooperative interaction provides; that is, his future opportunity set will be
limited.
While Gauthier’s conventional reason approach to the Fool is highly implausible, his
deliberative procedures approach is helpful in constructing an adequate reply to a portion of the
Fool’s claims. The Fool rejects Gauthier’s claim that it is always rational to comply with a
deliberative procedure that we have chosen, and Gauthier does a good job of refuting him.
However, the Fool also rejects Gauthier’s second claim, namely, that it is rational to choose a
deliberative procedure of APO, and, as mentioned in Ch 3, Gauthier’s support for this claim is
unsuccessful. The question, “What type of deliberative procedure is it rational to choose?” still
lacks a satisfactory answer, and the Fool remains defiant in his implicit support of SM. While
Gauthier is unable to respond to the Fool on this point, Kavka is able to refine Gauthier’s account
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of dispositions and deliberative procedures, and by adding some insights of his own he is able to
provide an adequate defense of Gauthier’s third claim and a sophisticated rejection of the Fool’s
support of SM as a rational strategy. Kavka will argue that it is indeed rational to adopt a
deliberative procedure (what he refers to as a policy or set of rules) of adherence to covenants,
and as we will see in the next section, he will advance a powerful argument that shows why the
Fool is mistaken in his claim that opportunistic violation is a rational strategy.

Kavka’s Argument from Uncertainty
Gauthier goes part of the way towards refuting the Fool by demonstrating the importance
of deliberative procedures and the value of cooperative interaction. Hampton provides some
significant assistance by showing that humans often reason in a flawed manner, and Hoekstra’s
use of weighted average probability applies a useful statistical technique to the argument.
However, none of these writers is successful alone in convincingly refuting the Fool. It is Kavka
who combines the best elements of these arguments in a novel way and thus sets the Fool up for
the fatal blow to his claims.
Kavka’s interpretation of Hobbes rests on four core ideas, all of which are relevant to
Hobbes’s response to the Fool. First, practical reasoning is always forward-looking. Second, real
choices regarding adherence to covenants are made under uncertainty. Third, risk aversion is
rational. Fourth, rules-based reasoning (precommitment) is rational because attempting to
calculate risks on a case-by-case basis subjects an individual to errors and biases.176 I will
address each of these in turn.
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According to Kavka, Hobbes must believe that practical reasoning is always forwardlooking because this is how Hobbes justifies the formation of covenants in the first place. For
Hobbes (and for Kavka), honoring a covenant is rational because it gives an individual access to
the benefits of future cooperative ventures. If an individual chooses not to honor the covenants
he makes, he can expect retaliation from those whom he has wronged and he will be excluded
from the benefits of future cooperation. This emphasis of forward-looking reasoning places
Kavka’s interpretation of Hobbes and his subsequent argument against the Fool in direct conflict
with Gauthier’s CM, to Kavka’s credit. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Gauthier’s refusal to include
repeated interaction and reciprocity as elements of CM was a major failure, and Kavka’s
inclusion of them gives his reply to the Fool more force.
Kavka’s claim that practical reason must always be forward-looking has a critical
implication for his later claim that adherence to a covenant is rational. In order to properly
understand this implication, it is necessary to re-visit some of the game theory that was
introduced in Chapter 3. Recall that Axelrod insists on using an iterated PD game because
repeated interaction is necessary for any form of cooperation to take hold among rational players;
if the individual players know they will never interact again or if the number of future
interactions is known, mutual defection is an evolutionarily stable strategy and the process will
never move past this point. The reasoning behind Axelrod’s contention is this: If there are two
players, A and B, in an iterated PD game, and they each know that the number of interactions, n,
is fixed, then the player who has agreed to comply in round n (assume it is player B) will defect
in round n because he knows that he will not have to face reciprocal consequences in a
subsequent round of the game. However, if player A is rational, he will conclude that player B
will defect on round n, and player A will therefore defect on round n-1. Player B, being rational
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as well, will conclude that A will defect on round n-1, leading player B to defect on round n-2.
This backward induction reasoning will continue until the players conclude in round 1 that it is
irrational to comply, and cooperation will never take hold. Furthermore, Kavka points out that it
is not even necessary to assume that the players know exactly how many rounds there will be.
All that is required is mutual knowledge that the number of interactions is finite and the way the
players play the game will have no impact on the number of rounds.177
This argument, while logically valid and certainly interesting from a game-theoretic
perspective, is unsound. As Kavka later observes,178 the argument assumes that each individual
is perfectly rational and that each individual is aware that all other individuals are perfectly
rational.

We need only consider the reasoning ability of our friends, fellow citizens and

ourselves to see that this is a very strong and entirely implausible assumption. Many, if not
most, individuals are completely befuddled by simple mathematical calculations, so it would be
quite a stretch of the imagination to attribute to such individuals a necessary recognition that all
of their cooperative interactions are separate rounds of an iterated PD that must account for
backward induction. In other words, the backward induction argument does not correspond to
the rationality that we find in real individuals.179 In the real world, human rationality is far from
perfect, and this fact will allow Kavka to maintain his claim that practical reasoning is forwardlooking without having to sacrifice his contention that adherence to covenants is rational.
Recall that Kavka’s interpretation of Hobbes is based on four core ideas. The first, the
idea that that practical reasoning is always forward-looking, leads Kavka to an initial recognition
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of the fact that the human ability to reason is flawed. The remaining three ideas will naturally
follow from this observation about human reasoning. The second concept that Kavka attributes
to Hobbes is that choices regarding adherence to covenants are made under uncertainty. This
idea is related to the “Cheater Bob” example that was addressed in the discussion on Hoekstra. In
the Cheater Bob example, it was demonstrated that an individual may be rationally justified in
keeping a covenant even if he expects to get away with violation, due to the possibility of a very
negative outcome. Kavka points out that real-world choices of this type are further complicated
by the uncertainty surrounding the probabilities of the outcomes and the utilities of the various
payoffs. That is, Cheater Bob calculates that his odds of being caught are 10% and the utility of
this outcome is -1,000, but can he be confident of these numbers? Surely the numbers he is
using for probability and utility are merely estimates; to attribute any more reliability to these
numbers would be to assume a level of predictability that our world does not have.
The third idea Kavka attributes to Hobbes is the rationality of playing it safe. In keeping
with the Cheater Bob example, Hobbes recognizes the need to account for the small possibility
of a devastating outcome, and he contends that the rational actor will forego the potential benefit
of violation in order to insure against the potential of a huge loss.180 In order to support his reply
to the Fool, Hobbes does not need to claim that individuals have an irrational aversion to risk
(even though they may have such an aversion); he merely needs to show that a rational choice
under uncertainty will account for the weighted average probability of the downside to any
gamble.
The fourth core tenet of Kavka’s interpretation of Hobbes is where all of the elements of
the argument against the Fool come together. Kavka states:
180
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precommitment (or rigid rule-following) is rational in the following sense: one is
likely to do better overall by rigidly following the core moral rules than by
calculating acceptable risks on particular occasions, because errors and biases in
such calculations will tend toward leading you to take excessive risks in particular
cases.181
Practical reasoning is forward-looking, so we must consider our choices in a long-term context.
The choices we make are conducted in situations of uncertainty, so complex calculations will be
necessary. The downside from an unfavorable outcome can be severe, so we need to be aware of
the risks, and, the human ability to reason is flawed by psychological biases, so we are betterserved by establishing and following a rational set of rules rather than attempting to conduct
complex calculations under situations of uncertainty on a case-by-case basis.
In short, Kavka is claiming the following: Our ability to reason in complex situations of
uncertainty is so limited that it is very difficult to determine ahead of time when a potential rule
violation is definitely in our self-interest. We will therefore have better outcomes over time if
we adopt a less-risky deliberative procedure that assumes that adherence to covenants is in our
best interest at all times.182 The validity of this strong claim rests primarily on the assumption
that our ability to reason is deeply flawed. If it can be shown that this assumption is true, the
Fool will be in an untenable position. Kavka believes the plausibility of his interpretation can be
seen simply by considering the savings of decision costs and the avoidance of errors due to
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cognitive biases such as the short-sightedness that Hampton addresses and our own selfdeception.183 I will argue that not only is Kavka correct in this belief, it is far more important
and forceful than he likely imagines. Behavioral biases cause humans to reason in a deeply
flawed way, and this fact will deal a fatal blow to the argument of the Fool. We will now take
Kavka’s argument one step further by examining some of the most important insights from
behavioral economics.

Behavioral Economics and Flawed Reasoning
Kavka’s case against the Fool rests on his claim that the human ability to reason on a
case-by-case basis is flawed and unreliable. This argument is not new: Recall from Chapter 2
that Adam Smith recognized overconfidence and a preference for short-term over long-term
utility as pervasive tendencies of human psychology. Over 200 years later, contemporary
behavioral economists have shown through extensive experimentation that overconfidence, intertemporal choice preferences, the illusion of control, and an underestimation of the impact of
randomness all have a huge impact on our ability to make rational choices in situations of
uncertainty. I will argue, in keeping with Kavka, that these flaws in our capacity to reason make
it impossible for us to reliably estimate the potential costs and benefits of covenant violation on a
case-by-case basis, and it is therefore in our best interest to reason on a rule-oriented basis and to
resolve to always keep the covenants we make. It must be noted that this account of human
psychology is far different from the account given by Hobbes, so we cannot use these insights to
claim that Hobbes wins his argument with the Fool. We can, however, use them to declare
victory in our own argument against the claims of the Fool.
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Overconfidence184
“Overconfidence is almost certainly the most important bias in behavioral
finance. But most people still think I’m not talking about them.”
- Ken French, Dartmouth College
Most of us go about our daily lives with an overall sense of confidence. We generally
believe that we will survive until the end of the day and we are not incapacitated by concerns
over terrorist attacks or the possibility of our home burning down. This sense of confidence
helps us to cope with setbacks and plan for the future, but it often reaches too far, leading us to
be overconfident in our own abilities.
Numerous studies have demonstrated evidence of “illusory superiority” among
individuals; we tend to overestimate our positive qualities and underestimate our negative
qualities relative to others. In one study,185 a group of American drivers was asked whether their
driving skills were better than average. If the study participants were accurately describing their
own driving skills, we would expect that just about 50 percent of the respondents would claim to
have better than average skills and 50 percent would claim to be worse than average. In fact, 93
percent of the participants claimed to be better than average drivers. Lichtenstein, et. al. found
that overconfidence is pervasive in average tasks and severe when dealing with difficult tasks.186
When subjects were asked to give a response to a question with a 99.9% chance of being correct
(a 1-in-1000 chance of being wrong), they were actually correct only 81% to 88% of the time.
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When asked to give a response with a 99.9999% chance of being correct (a 1-in-1,000,000
chance of being wrong), they were actually correct only 90% to 96% of the time.
Severe overconfidence is also present in an individual’s ability to predict future events.
This tendency leads to optimism and a phenomenon known as the planning fallacy. When
forecasting the outcomes of risky projects, people are overly-optimistic, overestimating benefits
and underestimating costs. They emphasize scenarios for success and overlook the potential for
mistakes and miscalculation. For example, the chance that a new business in the U.S. will
survive for five years is 35%. However, 81% of new entrepreneurs estimated that their business
has at least a 70% chance of success, and 33% said the odds of failure were zero.187 We tend to
make forecasts that are unrealistically close to the best-case scenario and which could be
improved merely by considering the outcome of similar cases. We need look no further than our
own homes for an example: The average kitchen remodel in the U.S. was budgeted at $19,000;
the average final cost was $39,000.188
Not only do we tend to be overconfident in our own abilities, we also tend to remember
our successes and mistakes in a way that reinforces our belief in ourselves. We attribute our
successes to our own talents and insights, while we attribute our failures to things that we cannot
control such as bad luck or unforeseeable circumstances. This leads us to the belief that if we
just tweak our strategy a little bit, it will work flawlessly the next time. This collision of pride
and memory was recognized by Nietzsche: “‘I did that,’ says my memory. ‘I could not have done
that,’ says my pride, and remains adamant. Eventually – the memory yields.”189 When our
rational mind yields to our pride, we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.
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The convergence of overconfidence, optimism and the planning fallacy casts a great deal
of doubt on an individual’s ability to calculate the odds of success in an uncertain scenario. We
must consider also that estimation errors will compound in situations where there are multiple
independent steps. If Cheater Bob must take several discrete steps in order to successfully copy a
neighbor’s exam answers and he is overconfident at each step, the impact of his overconfidence
is compounded. For example, suppose that in order to successfully cheat Cheater Bob needs to
select a well-prepared student, arrange to sit next to that student during the exam, and view that
student’s exam without being detected.

Suppose further that Bob, failing to consider the

independent nature of each step, continues to estimate the probability of success of the overall
project to be 90%. If he is overconfident, as most people are in situations of uncertainty, and his
actual odds of success at each step are only 70%, his odds of being successful at the project as a
whole is only .7 x .7 x .7 = 34.3%.190 Bob is starting to look like, for lack of a better term, a fool.

Inter-temporal Choice
“But much more frequently he is seduced from his great and important, but
distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very frivolous
temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.”
- David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary
The tendency to prefer present gain over future gain has been noted by psychologists,
economists and philosophers alike. In the 18th century Hume and Smith recognized that present
benefits play upon our emotions while future benefits play upon our reason, and Shefrin
addresses the same phenomenon in the 21st century:
190

It should be noted that, although Cheater Bob’s odds of success are now only 34.3%, this does not reduce the
expected utility of his efforts from -55 in the prior example to -640 (.343 x 50 + .657 x -1000) under this scenario.
This is due to the fact that, if Bob fails at the first or second step of the three-step process, he will probably not
realize the -1000 utility outcome because he will fail the exam but he will not be caught cheating and expelled. If
we assign a utility of -50 to failing the exam, Bob’s expected utility is now -155.4 (.7 x .7 x .7 x 50 + .7 x .7 x .3 x 1000 + .7 x .3 x -50 + .3 x -50)

125

The needs of the present make themselves felt through emotion. Those needs have
a strong voice and clamor for immediate attention. In contrast, the needs of the
future have a much weaker voice, expressing themselves through thought. Most
people feel the urge to satisfy their immediate needs, but they only think about
satisfying their future needs.191
What psychologists refer to as inter-temporal choice is merely what Hampton refers to as
shortsightedness. Humans are hard-wired to prefer present gain to future gain because when we
are presented with an inter-temporal choice our emotions override our reason and opt for the
former. Shefrin shows that this bias is evident in the failure of many Americans to save for
retirement, opting instead for sports cars, vacations and ever-larger digital TV sets.192 As
Hampton notes, this bias is also evident in the failure to give sufficient weight to the future
benefits of cooperative interaction versus the short-term benefits of cheating. Where the Fool
claims that violating covenants is “not against reason,” he should consider the very real
possibility that it is not reason, but emotion that is exerting its influence on his decision and
driving him to focus on the short-term only. Reason would lead him to more carefully consider
the long-term benefits of adherence.

Illusion of Control
“Wall Street’s favorite scam is pretending luck is skill.”
- Ron Ross, The Unbeatable Market (2002)
Human beings are motivated to control their environment, and the more difficult a
particular task is, the stronger is the resulting feeling of satisfaction if one is able to control it.193
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We have a psychological bias to believe that we have more control over our environment than
we actually do, and if we perceive that the ability to control a situation is to our benefit, we will
tend to attribute control where little or none exists.
Throughout my career as a professional investor I have had numerous opportunities to
observe the illusion of control in practice. Wall Street was built on the lie that it is possible to
exert a significant amount of control over investment outcomes, and given the extremely high
rewards that can be reaped by convincing others of one’s ability to exert such control, the
motivation to believe in one’s own control abilities is very strong. The truth is, however, that the
evidence of a lack of control on Wall Street is overwhelming. Leaving the events of the global
financial crisis of 2008 aside, numerous studies194 have shown that fund managers usually
underperform the market over the long term (that is, they cannot control their investment
outcomes), and when they do outperform they attribute their performance to skill rather than
luck.195 These individuals, who are assumed to be familiar with statistical quantitative methods,
apparently ignore the irrefutable fact that random chance dictates that some managers must
outperform over any given time period due purely to luck. The fact that their outperformance
does not persist provides strong evidence that outperformance is due to luck rather than skill; an
inconvenient truth that Wall Street unsurprisingly chooses to ignore.
When the Fool constructs a strategy to violate a covenant, he naturally believes that he
can control the outcome of his plan. However, just like the Wall Street fund managers, it is
likely that the Fool has overestimated the amount of influence that he can exert on his
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environment, and he has almost certainly underestimated the amount of influence that random
and uncontrollable events will exert on him. The failure to recognize the impact of random
events in our lives is the most powerful of all of the behavioral biases under consideration, and it
is the central theme of a brilliant book by Taleb,196 whose ideas will further undermine the Fool’s
argument.

Randomness, Predictability and Probability Neglect
“Any time you try a decent crime, you got 50 ways you can (mess) up. (If) you
think of 25 of them, you’re a genius. And you ain’t no genius.”
- Mickey Rourke as Teddy Lewis in Body Heat197
We humans have a strong motivation to control our environment, and in many situations
we can succeed in doing so. In situations where we cannot control our environment, our mind
attempts to compensate for this inadequacy and we suffer from the illusion of control. We also
have a strong motivation to understand our environment, but this is often a far more difficult
task. Because the world around us is highly complex, we have evolved mental “shortcuts” to
allow us to attempt to make sense of our environment in a quick and efficient manner. These
shortcuts are useful in survival situations where rapid decisions must be made, but they can be
harmful in many of the more complex situations that modern society places us in. They lead us
to misunderstand probability and to underestimate the impact of randomness on our lives, which
in turn leads us to believe that the world is far more predictable than it actually is.
Sunstein198 coined the term “probability neglect” to describe the inability of the human
mind to deal with small risks. We tend to grossly overestimate the likelihood of recent, dramatic
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and sensational events and underestimate the likelihood of unspectacular events or events that
have never occurred. For instance, Slovik, et. al.199 found that earthquake insurance purchases
spike shortly after an earthquake occurs as the dramatic event is at the forefront of people’s
minds, then steadily decline as the memory recedes despite the fact that the risk of future
earthquake remains constant. Furthermore, Taleb200 shows that individuals tend to give too much
weight to the most likely outcome and ignore the impact of abstract or unlikely outcomes.
Ignoring unlikely but potentially disastrous outcomes is yet another example of how an
individual can fail to properly calculate the weighted average probability of the utility of an
expected outcome. When calculating his odds of successful violation, the Fool will account for
the ways he has seen others get caught in the past, and he will probably imagine some
spectacular ways that he could get caught this time, but he will be unable to properly account for
the plethora of mundane or just plain silly events that could cause him to fail in his attempt at
deception. The human mind is simply not designed to imagine all of the possible outcomes and
then properly assign probability and corresponding utility to each of them. Furthermore, even if
he was able to properly apply the techniques of weighted average probability, his failure to fully
appreciate the role of randomness in his life would still hinder the Fool’s attempts at deception.
The impact of randomness is the central theme of Taleb’s work201, and its profound implications
reach far beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes it will suffice to summarize a few of
the major points.
Psychologists use the term “hindsight bias” to describe the tendency to misapply current
hindsight to past foresight. Events that have occurred appear to have been more predictable in
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hindsight than they actually were before they occurred. This bias runs absolutely rampant on
both Wall Street and Main Street as the human mind constructs narratives to explain how easily
an event could have been foreseen. Consider how many times we have seen the news media
report a sensational event such as a stock market crash, a terrorist attack or an upset in a sporting
event and thought, “I knew that was going to happen!” After having such thoughts, we often
create stories to explain the “obvious” causal nexus that led to this outcome and we can convince
ourselves that these causes and the resulting outcome were evident from the beginning and that
we knew it was going to happen all along. Yet we seldom pause to consider whether we were
thinking in the same way before we knew how the event transpired.
College football provides us with a robust example of hindsight bias in action. In the first
week of the season, most of the major programs schedule a “tune-up” game with a far inferior
opponent in order to build confidence and prepare for games against better teams later in the
season. However, each year, much to the dismay of the fan base, one or more of these major
programs experiences the embarrassment of losing its tune-up game. After the loss, fans and the
sports media invariably concoct narratives to make the loss seem like it was inevitable from the
start; the quarterback has always been overrated, the coach was too easy on the players in
practice, and the opposing team is far better than an average tune-up game opponent. Anyone
could have seen that the loss was inevitable. What the fans fail to consider is that a similar
narrative could also be constructed for all of the major programs that won their games that day.
Their hindsight bias makes the loss that did occur seem obvious, but they fail to consider the
dozens of losses that did not occur despite their being a fit for the same narrative. Our mind’s
insatiable desire to make sense of a complex world often fools us into believing that we have the
ability to predict the future, but the world will continue to confound us.
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Taleb also emphasizes the detrimental effects of incomplete information, a phenomenon
Kahneman refers to as “WYSIATI”, or, What You See Is All There Is.202 WYSIATI is really a
form of cognitive laziness. Humans are constantly in a situation of incomplete information, yet
we fail to actively seek new information, we tend to make decisions using only information that
we already have, and we discount the importance of information that we do not have. We
suppress doubt and ambiguity, and we construct narratives to convince ourselves that we have all
of the information necessary to make an informed decision. When consulting past experience,
we assume that if something did happen, it had to happen; we do not consider alternative
possible states of affairs. That is, we convince ourselves that we cannot be impacted by the
effects of information that we do not have or random events that we did not (and could not
possibly) consider. Once again, our minds are attempting to construct a coherent understanding
of the world around us, but the task is far beyond our current capacities.203
It is not by accident that Taleb’s book has the word “fool” in the title. The book is about a
fortunate (but not necessarily Hobbesean) fool who imagines himself to be successful due to skill
or some other determinate factor, but who is actually successful due to luck.204 Ironically, this
fool may actually benefit from being a fool because he takes tremendous risks without
recognizing the scale of the risks he is taking. He is overconfident in his abilities. He fails to
properly calculate probability. He thinks he has more control over his life’s outcomes than he
actually does and he ignores the distant future.
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randomness allows him to enter a risky situation without fear, and if it he obtains a favorable
result he has benefitted from his own stupidity. Examples of such behavior can be found in
every stock market bubble since the beginning of time. Stock Market Fool takes excessive
financial risks she does not understand, overconfident of her ability to predict the unpredictable.
If she is lucky enough to get out before the bubble bursts, she constructs a narrative. She claims,
“I bought internet stocks before anyone was talking about them,” even though she got the idea
from reading an article on internet stocks in Business Week, “and I got out because I saw the end
was near,” even though she actually sold because she needed the money to pay a massive credit
card bill. The problem is, Stock Market Fool has increased her level of overconfidence and her
belief in the predictability of the market, and she is setting herself up for an even higher
likelihood of a disastrous outcome the next time.
That which is true of Stock Market Fool is true of Hobbes’s Fool as well. If he has
enjoyed prior success in covenant-breaking he will likely underemphasize the risks he took in the
past and become overconfident in his ability to succeed in the future. However, risk only exists
in the future and time is the enemy of the Fool. His past success is likely due to luck rather than
skill, and as the number of his attempts at violation increases, so do the odds of his luck running
out.

Conclusion
Taleb and the other behavioral economists provide strong support for Kavka’s reply to
the Fool. The Fool challenges Hobbes by arguing that it is wise to adhere to covenants in
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general, but to violate when profitable “golden opportunities” present themselves. Kavka205
recognizes that the Fool’s reply would be impossible to overcome if it were possible to
definitively identify ahead of time which opportunities are truly golden and which are merely
“Fool’s gold.” However, behavioral economics provides a wealth of evidence that it is very
likely that overconfidence and an underestimation of randomness will lead the Fool to commit a
large number of “false positive” errors, and he will see golden opportunities where none actually
exist. Cognitive biases and ignorance of uncertainty are so pervasive and influential in our
psychological constitution that we cannot rely on our own judgment to ascertain when an
opportunity has a positive expected return. The world is highly complex and unpredictable, and
given a sufficiently large amount of trials, every unjust person will eventually realize some
amount of downside by being discovered. The fact that we can cite examples of people who have
managed to get away with violations of justice over long time periods does not reduce the force
of this argument. As long as the odds of successful violation are greater than zero, chance
dictates that we will observe some individuals who manage to get away with deception over and
over again, but it is impossible to identify ahead of time which individuals will succeed, because
their success is attributable to luck rather than skill.206 As their luck continues, their
overconfidence will grow, their sense of control will strengthen, they will attribute their success
to skill rather than chance, and they will engage in more reckless behavior. If they do not die or
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reform before their luck runs out, they will eventually be discovered. As Kavka says, “Time
wounds all heels.”207
A potential critique of this conclusion is offered by Rainbolt.208 He claims that in order
for an argument of this kind to work, it must be assumed that we all have an approximately equal
ability to detect and conceal dispositions,209 and he correctly observes that Gauthier does
implicitly make this assumption. However, Rainbolt takes exception to this assumption. He
claims that the assumption of equality in the ability to detect and conceal a disposition to
injustice is implausible, and that in the case where someone (Snidely) is exceptionally good at
concealing his own disposition and detecting those of others, SM is his rational strategy.210
The problem with this argument is that it is plausible in a world inhabited by beings who
reason in a perfect manner, but it fails to account for any of the flaws in reasoning that were
addressed by the behavioral economists above. Rainbolt does not claim that Snidely is seen to
have this ability by an impartial observer with perfect information; he claims that Snidely is
making a self-assessment. This claim is implausible due to the now-familiar human tendency to
be overconfident and ignore randomness. That is, it is necessary to differentiate between Snidely
believing that he has an ability to detect and conceal dispositions and Snidely actually having
this ability. It is likely that Snidely thinks he is better than most at detection and concealment of
dispositions, but he is probably about average. Although he or someone like him may have
gotten away with an SM strategy in the past, this is not necessarily evidence of a talent for
detection and concealment; it is probably the result of luck.
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Rainbolt claims, “to assume equality of ability to detect and conceal dispositions …robs
Gauthier’s argument of its interest,”211 but he is mistaken. Gauthier’s implicit assumption may
not be true, but it does not damage his larger argument. It is certainly the case that individuals
possess differing abilities for detection and concealment, but an individual’s lack of ability to
objectively assess her own abilities, combined with the negative consequences of an overlyoptimistic assessment, are evidence in favor of the adoption of a deliberative procedure (now
used by Gauthier in place of dispositions) of observing covenants at all times versus adopting the
SM strategy. As Pascal might say, we probably do not all have equal or even nearly-equal
abilities at deception and concealment, but we are well-advised to act as if we do.
The Fool wants to convince us of the benefits of opportunistic violation of covenants, but
the insights provided by behavioral economics demonstrate that he is definitely overconfident
and probably bad at math. We are now left to re-examine Gauthier’s three claims from Chapter
3 in light of the commentary from the current chapter. First, Gauthier claims that humans have
the ability to willingly choose deliberative procedures. Kavka agrees, and he supports this notion
under the heading of rules-based reasoning. Second, Gauthier claims that it is rational to choose
a deliberative procedure in accordance with APO. We have seen that APO has its flaws, but
Kavka provides a modified version that accounts for the importance of reciprocity and repeated
interaction. Kavka has demonstrated that making a precommitment to observe covenants in all
cases is rational because attempting to calculate risks on a case-by-case basis subjects an
individual to errors and biases.

Third, Gauthier claims that it is rational to adhere to a

deliberative procedure once the procedure has been chosen. In Chapter 3 I assert that this claim
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is valid because cross-temporal consistency of behavior is psychologically beneficial, and this
claim goes unchallenged by the philosophers we have examined in this chapter.
We now have what I believe to be a convincing argument that acting in accordance with
justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor. The human ability to reason is flawed, but
this does not mean that we cannot act rationally in deciding to adopt a deliberative procedure to
act in a just manner. When we reason on a case-by-case basis, we are subject to a wide variety
of cognitive biases which hinder our ability to make rational decisions. However, we have a
much higher chance of performing truly rational actions if we adhere to a pre-determined rational
rule. A permanent deliberative procedure in accordance with justice is a rational choice in a
world of imperfectly rational humans.
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CHAPTER 5: OUTSIDE THE SIMULATOR, INSIDE OURSELVES
Chapter 4 argued that adherence to a deliberative procedure in accordance with justice is
a rational choice in a world of imperfectly rational humans. Given our overconfidence, our
failure to recognize the impact of randomness in our lives, and our inability to accurately assess
the odds of cheating successfully, we are well-advised to behave in a just manner, for, if we do,
we can enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation now and in the days and years to come. Yet this
characterization of the benefits of justice is lacking in some respect. Our ordinary notions of just
behavior lead us to believe that there are reasons for behaving in a just manner other than the fact
that we probably cannot get away with acting otherwise; there seems to be more to justice than
the market-based benefits addressed in the contractarian argument.
In this chapter, I will examine whether there are benefits to justice other than the marketbased benefits addressed so far. My contractarian argument in favor of a deliberative procedure
in accordance with justice from Chapter 4, which I will now refer to as the “imperfect reason
argument,” is dependent upon the notion that one should not cheat on covenants because it is
impossible to be certain about one’s ability to avoid detection. The search for additional benefits
to justice will begin with a thought experiment that temporarily suspends this notion and asks the
question, “What if I was 100% certain that I could not get caught?”

I will attempt to

demonstrate that there are indeed benefits to justice other than the market-based benefits, and I
will examine whether there is intrinsic value in these additional benefits or in justice itself.
Furthermore, I will consider the possibility that justice is more than a source of instrumental or
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intrinsic value for us; I will claim that justice is a necessary and essential aspect of what it means
to be a human being.

The Ring of Gyges
One of the core premises of my imperfect reason argument from Chapter 4 is that a
cheater’s luck will eventually run out.

It may therefore be useful to conduct a thought

experiment involving justice under which this premise is suspended. That is, we should ask,
“How can we view the benefits (or lack thereof) of justice in a situation in which an individual
could not possibly be caught violating a covenant?”

The classic version of this thought

experiment is found in the Ring of Gyges example from The Republic. In Book II, Glaucon tells
the story of the Lydian Shepherd who finds a magic ring that bestows upon him the ability to
become invisible at will. The Lydian shepherd uses the power of the ring to kill the Lydian king,
seduce his wife and usurp his power over the kingdom. Clearly, the Lydian Shepherd has
abandoned the observance of the rules of justice, and what Glaucon wants to know is, what
reason could the Lydian Shepherd possibly have to do otherwise? That is, if an individual could
behave in an unjust fashion without having any chance of being caught and subjected to the
consequences, why should that individual behave justly?
Indeed, every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than
justice. And any exponent of this argument will say he’s right, for someone who
didn’t want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who didn’t touch
other people’s property would be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware
of the situation...212
The reason for re-engaging the Lydian Shepherd at this point is not to revisit Socrates’
response to Glaucon; this has already been addressed in Chapter 1, and I will not repeat it here.
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The Lydian Shepherd thought experiment is invoked merely as a tool in order to properly frame
the inquiry into the value of justice. The Lydian Shepherd will show us that the benefits of
justice are specific to the human condition as we actually find it, and not applicable to certain
idealized situations where justice does not apply.
For example, Hume recognized that certain aspects of the environment in which we
humans find ourselves are absolutely essential to our account of justice.213 Our situation of
limited scarcity, in which we are neither the victims of material distress nor the beneficiaries of
superabundance, is one example. Hume explicitly states that if we were to find ourselves in a
state of “extreme misery” such as famine, the conventions of property and justice that we have
adopted would no longer be useful and would therefore not apply. Similarly, if we were to find
ourselves in a state of superabundance, where every individual had everything she wanted and
needed, we would have no need for justice, and our feelings of sympathetic approval for acts that
are currently considered just would disappear. In other words, justice is only considered to be a
virtue because it is useful to us in our current state.
The Lydian Shepherd, after obtaining the Ring, does not find himself in Hume’s state of
limited scarcity; his is a situation of superabundance.

He can obtain whatever he wants,

whenever he wants, so he has no need to enjoin the cooperation of others. The benefits of
justice, in fostering a non-zero-sum game are useless to him. He is operating outside the
circumstances of justice.
In addition to his abundance, the Lydian Shepherd also enjoys an imbalance of power
which places him even further outside the circumstances of justice. One of Hobbes’s primary
assumptions in arguing for the value of justice was that no single human had sufficient power to
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dominate all others. It is a fact of the human condition that even the weakest among us has the
ability to kill the strongest with little difficulty, and this lack of self-sufficiency makes entering
into a covenant a worthwhile undertaking. Hume also recognized that there would likely be no
justice in situations of significantly unequal power:
Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational,
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were
incapable of all resistance…the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should
be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but
should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to
them…214
Due to the extreme power that he has over others, the Lydian Shepherd’s relationship to normal
humans is similar to that of normal humans with Hume’s hypothetical inferior creatures. His
power is such that he need not fear reprisals, so reciprocity is not relevant to him. He may
choose to treat us gently, but such a choice would be that of a benevolent but all-powerful
dictator, not that of a human being observing the rules of justice.
Thus, the Lydian Shepherd finds himself outside the circumstances of justice. Justice has
ceased to be useful to him, so he has chosen to abandon its rules. Within the framework of the
imperfect reason argument that I developed in Chapter 4, the Lydian Shepherd has made a
rational choice. That is, for him, the benefits of justice no longer exceed the costs, so he would
be ill-advised to continue to constrain himself according to its precepts. He can obtain whatever
he wants and he need not account for the needs or reprisals of others. He has placed himself
above the normal circumstances of human life, and he would view justice as a relic of his prior
life which has no relevance to his current one.215
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It is of crucial importance to note, however, that Glaucon’s argument in favor of the
actions of the Lydian Shepherd is far different from the one posed by Hobbes’s Fool. Recall that
the Fool is advancing the claim that we should selectively violate our covenants when it appears
to be in our own self-interest to do so. Glaucon is not claiming that the Lydian Shepherd should
violate covenants when it is to his advantage; he is claiming that the Lydian Shepherd has no
reason to enter into a covenant in the first place. That is, the Lydian Shepherd should choose a
deliberative procedure that recommends he avoid covenants and take whatever he needs to in
order to fulfill his wants. He has no need to deceive those with whom he has made covenants;
the situation he finds himself in allows him to act with impunity and it eliminates the need for
covenants of any kind.
While the story of the Ring of Gyges is an interesting thought experiment, its use is
limited simply because the situation of the Lydian Shepherd is not the situation in which we
humans actually find ourselves. It is fair to say that the Lydian Shepherd would be foolish (at
least from the standpoint of the imperfect reason argument) to obey the rules of justice, but this is
not relevant to our inquiry. The Lydian Shepherd is operating outside the circumstances of
justice, and this thought experiment will not apply to humans because we will never find
ourselves in such a circumstance. The benefits of justice apply only in the actual circumstances
of human life, and to ask justice to do more than this would be to ask for too much.

The Simulated Value of Justice
The Ring of Gyges example does not directly apply to our inquiry into the benefits of
justice because it lies outside the circumstances of justice. This thought experiment does,
however, lead us to consider one possible shortcoming of the imperfect reason argument.
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Glaucon contends that the Lydian Shepherd is well-advised to abandon the rules of justice and
take whatever he needs, regardless of whether he has to use force and fraud to do so. In the
context of my imperfect reason argument, I would have to agree with Glaucon on this point,
simply because the Lydian Shepherd seems to derive no material benefit from engaging in
cooperation with other individuals. Yet, if we make this recommendation to the Lydian
Shepherd, there is obviously something missing. It seems somewhat odd to argue that we should
behave in a just way only because a weighted average probability statistical analysis
demonstrates that it is in our best interest to do so, and that, if the statistics were to favor
cheating, we would be well-advised to dismiss justice entirely. Although the statistical argument
is valid, it is obviously failing to capture the entire essence of justice as we typically understand
it.
Socrates and many others after him have argued that there are benefits to justice over and
above the avoidance of the consequences of being caught behaving in an unjust fashion. In this
section, I will address what those benefits are and what impact they may have on the efficacy of
the imperfect reason argument. Socrates claims that behaving in a just way allows one to lead a
life of fulfillment, self-confidence, social acceptance, and freedom from fear. Hume views just
behavior as a route to peace of mind, integrity, and ultimately, happiness. Gauthier recognizes
the value of participation in social activities, and he sees a deliberative procedure in accordance
with justice as a necessary means to this end. None of these benefits were required for the
formulation of the contractarian arguments of Chapters 3 and 4, but they are benefits
nonetheless.
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In order to properly understand this facet of the inquiry, it will be helpful to revisit a
distinction made by Reeve216 that was addressed in Chapter 1. Recall that Reeve claims that
Glaucon is making an argument, not about justice, but about reputed justice. That is, all of the
benefits of justice that Glaucon is interested in are “simulator accessible;” they can be attained
via just behavior as well as via a simulation of just behavior. With Reeve in mind, it is fair to
characterize the benefits of both Gauthier’s contractarian argument of Chapter 3 and my
imperfect reason argument of Chapter 4 as simulator accessible as well. That is, the prior
arguments in favor of justice do not require an individual to act from any tuistic feelings or moral
motivation to justice; the benefits necessary to validate just behavior under these models will be
enjoyed by an individual who is merely going through the motions in a purely self-interested
way as much as they will be enjoyed by someone who is genuinely engaged with the interests of
others. The argument I will be making in this section is that, in addition to the simulator
accessible (hereafter “SA”) benefits of justice that are necessarily attained in the prior
contractarian accounts of justice, there are non-simulator accessible (hereafter “NSA”) benefits
that may be attained as well.
Before moving on to the central claims of this section, however, two important aspects of
NSA benefits must be clarified. First, it is important to note that NSA benefits are not the same
as intrinsic benefits. Socrates attempts to demonstrate that justice is intrinsically valuable, and he
largely fails. However, he is able to make a reasonable argument that justice is instrumentally
valuable for NSA reasons. I do not intend to make the same mistake that Socrates does by
claiming that justice is intrinsically valuable. The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental
value can be quite difficult to draw, and it is not a necessary element of the argument. I do
216
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intend to draw a distinction between SA and NSA benefits, demonstrate that NSA benefits of
justice do exist, and show that, although some NSA benefits do have intrinsic value, justice itself
is an instrumental means to these intrinsic benefits and does not have intrinsic value of its own.
Second, it is important to recognize that justice will not bring NSA benefits to everyone.
Thrasymachus, Hume’s Sensible Knave and other antagonists do not put any value on such
loftier goods. They value power, immediate gratification and material goods over friendship,
happiness and integrity. However, this does not invalidate the claims that will be made in this
section. Recall that Chapter 4 reached its conclusion (that justice is a rational strategy for a selfinterested actor) without making any reference to these loftier benefits of justice. The arguments
of Thrasymachus and other immoral interlocutors do nothing to weaken the force of this
conclusion; it applies to them as well as to those who engage in justice for tuistic reasons. What
I will attempt to demonstrate here is that, while everyone who behaves in a just way enjoys the
SA benefits of justice, for many individuals there is a “bonus” in the form of NSA benefits as
well.

The Martian Interpretation of Glaucon
Recall from Chapter 1 that Glaucon challenges Socrates to demonstrate that actually
being just is superior to appearing to be just but acting unjustly. The reply that Socrates provides
is quite simple; he merely points out that true justice is superior to feigned justice because the
just person is the happier person. When Glaucon advocates the advantages of injustice such as
power and wealth, he is using an incomplete notion of human good and ignoring some of the best
things in life. The unjust tyrant lives in isolation from others and in constant fear of retaliation,
and the unjust deceiver lives in constant fear of detection. The just person not only enjoys the
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material benefits of justice that the unjust deceiver attains, she also enjoys freedom from fear and
a genuine connection with other people, which allows her to attain a happiness that the unjust
person will never know.
As noted by Reeve, Glaucon claims that the sole motivation to just behavior is the
reputational benefit that is attained when one is perceived by others to be acting in a just manner.
Glaucon believes that the best course of action for a self-interested individual is to appear to be
just but to act in an unjust manner when it is to one’s own benefit. In this way, Glaucon is
advocating a course of action very similar to the one advocated by Hobbes’s Fool. Glaucon is
arguing, in Reeves’ terminology, that all of the benefits of justice can be obtained by a mere
simulation of justice.
However, Glaucon is mistaken on two levels. First, as demonstrated in my prior
imperfect reason argument, a strategy of “apparent justice” is not a rational course of action
because the probability of success is sometimes small and always uncertain, and the downside of
being caught is potentially devastating. Second, even if an individual was able to get away with
a mere appearance of justice with certainty (as the Lydian Shepherd could), this would still not
be an advisable course of action because there are many benefits of justice that cannot be
attained by the mere appearance of justice. That is, the class of benefits of actual justice is larger
than the class of SA benefits. An individual who acts in a truly just manner will enjoy all of the
benefits of simulated justice as well as many other NSA benefits that the pretender can never
enjoy.
What exactly are these NSA benefits? The SA benefits of justice were addressed in the
prior contractarian arguments and they are easy to see and to describe. Free market commerce,
protection from physical harm, and confidence in the possession of one’s property are all
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benefits of cooperation in a non-zero-sum game, and they are all available to a truly just person
as well as to one who is merely simulating justice. The NSA benefits of justice, on the other
hand, tend to be based upon an individual’s internal state of affairs and are therefore less obvious
and more difficult to categorize. Fortunately, an analogy employed by Philippa Foot will help to
shed some light on precisely what it is that simulated justice cannot provide.
Foot directly addresses the arguments of Thrasymachus and Glaucon regarding justice
with an analogy about friendship in which she imagines what Martians would think if they
viewed human acts of friendship from an unfamiliar third-person perspective. These Martians
may imagine that it is better to pretend to be a friend and to enjoy the benefits of friendship
without reciprocating, but to view friendship in this way is to miss the point:
These Martians would see friendship very much as Plato’s immoralists see justice.
In itself acting as a friend is, the Martians suppose, disagreeable, like gymnastic
exercise or medical treatment. For the run of humans it is, however, worthwhile
for its rewards. Were it possible to get these rewards by gaining the reputation of
being a friend without really accepting its duties, that is what any human would
seek. The point of my analogy lies, of course, in the fact that these Martians
would be failing to understand what friendship actually is in human life…A
Thrasymachean view of friendship would instantly be recognized as wrong.217
Foot recognizes that there are benefits to friendship that are not simulator accessible.
Merely going through the motions may give an individual some of the benefits of friendship, but
the greatest benefits of friendship can be enjoyed only from the inside,218 out of the view of
Martians but within the empathetic understanding of other humans, and these benefits are
available only to those who are truly friends and not just faking it. Likewise, to obtain a
reputation for justice without actually being just will deprive an individual of justice’s most
profound and lasting benefits. Singpurwalla very effectively captures the essence of what the
217
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Martians are missing when she characterizes the NSA benefits of justice as a fulfillment of our
need to be connected w/ others:
Socrates thinks that we have a reason to behave justly because behaving justly is
necessary for fulfilling a deeply important need that we all as social creatures
have, namely, the need to be connected or unified with other people.219
The basic human need to be unified with others is something that we all intuitively
recognize, but it is an aspect of justice and friendship that cannot always be seen from the
outside. Socrates clearly recognizes this need, and he emphasizes the unhappy life of the tyrant
to illustrate that even though an individual might be able to attain many types of goods without
adhering to the requirements of justice, an unjust individual will be lacking the personal
connections and unity with others that lead to the greatest kind of happiness.

The Sensible Knave
Where Socrates has Glaucon and Thrasymachus, and Hobbes has his Fool, Hume has the
Sensible Knave. Like the other antagonists, the Knave advances an argument against justice
which demands a reply. He claims:
That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule; but is liable to many
exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be thought, conducts himself with most
wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the
exceptions.220
The Lydian Shepherd has no use for covenants because his power allows him to take what he
wants with impunity. The Knave, like the Fool, has no such power. Like the Fool, the Knave is
arguing that his lack of overwhelming power makes it rational for him to enter into a covenant
and to violate the covenant when it is highly certain that he can get away with it. Yet, despite the
219
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fact that the reasons for the Knave’s claims are different from those of the Lydian Shepherd, the
argument that Hume levies against the Knave includes elements of Socrates’ reply to the
Shepherd as well as Hobbes’s reply to the Fool:
Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our
own conduct; these are circumstances very requisite to happiness, and will be
cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them.
Such a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, with all their
pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they
purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature
is frail, and they give in to the snare; whence they can never extricate themselves,
without a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and
confidence with mankind.
But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has any tincture
of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, will discover that they
themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have sacrificed the invaluable
enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless
toys and gewgaws221
The Knave is making the same mistake as Hobbes’s Fool, as he fails to recognize his own
overconfidence and the role that randomness plays in his ability to successfully deceive.
However, Hume takes the argument against his interlocutor further than Hobbes does. Hume
shows us that, not only does the Knave have a high likelihood of being caught; even if his
deception is successful, the Knave will miss out on the higher goods that Socrates emphasizes,
such as character and integrity.222 That is, in his response to the Knave, Hume emphasizes the
Knave’s loss of both SA and NSA benefits.
Some scholars have argued that Hume dismisses the Knave too quickly.223 The fact that
the Knave is willing to sacrifice long-term integrity for the immediate gratification of his lower-
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level desires signifies that his “toys and gewgaws” have more value for him than having an
admirable character, and this is not necessarily irrational. Hume himself says it is, “not contrary
to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”224 It would
therefore be arbitrary for us to argue that the Knave is irrational in preferring material wealth to
the loftier desires espoused by Socrates, and it is quite likely that the Knave would be
unconvinced by any value-based argument we could throw at him.
While it is probably true that the Knave will not be convinced by Hume’s argument, this
fact does nothing to undermine the core of the argument itself. Hume’s intention is not to
convince the Knave of the error of his ways; the Knave is probably beyond convincing. By
denying the value of integrity, the Knave demonstrates that he does not understand what justice
is. Like Thrasymachus, he does not value being connected with others. Like Foot’s Martians, he
cannot see the difference between actually being a just person and simply faking it. Hume is
merely trying to augment an already strong argument in favor of justice by appealing to those of
us who do see value in the “enjoyment of a character.”225 While it is true that justice has only
SA value for the Knave, it does not follow from this that it has only SA benefits for everyone. In
fact, justice does have NSA benefits for most people who are not invisible shepherds, arrogant
fools, ignorant knaves or Martians. Those of us who do appreciate the NSA benefits of justice
are the proper audience for Hume’s argument against the Knave.
Furthermore, it should be noted that even though the Knave does not value the NSA
benefits of justice such as integrity and character over SA benefits such as toys and gewgaws, it
is still rational for him to adopt a deliberative procedure of adherence to covenants for the
reasons given in the imperfect reason argument of Chapter 4. The Knave will benefit from
224
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adherence to his covenants because he will enjoy the SA value of justice without having to fear
the consequences of being discovered. For those of us who do value character and integrity, we
can enjoy these NSA benefits as well as the SA benefits that accrue to the Knave. In some way,
we may be able to think of the NSA benefits of justice as a “bonus” that is available to some of
us in addition to the SA benefits that are available to everyone.

Gauthier and the Liberal Individual
The distinction between SA and NSA benefits is a consistent theme that runs from
Socrates to Hume and beyond. Gauthier explicitly recognizes this distinction and he illustrates it
brilliantly via his comparison of economic man and the liberal individual. Recall that, in making
his main argument for the rationality of justice in Morals by Agreement, Gauthier assumes that
humankind is self-interested and non-tuistic. He refers to this caricature of humanity as
“economic man.” Economic man is similar to Glaucon’s concept of the just individual; he
understands the need to accept constraints, but his emotions and affections are not engaged by
these constraints.226 He is not truly a just individual because he is motivated by considerations
other than justice itself. He views his lack of overwhelming power and self-sufficiency as an
evil because he derives no value from interaction with other humans and he would therefore
prefer to be able to act unilaterally in the fulfillment of his needs and desires. Participation in
social activities serves as a reminder of this weakness and of his dependence on others. He only
derives instrumental value from interaction, and this limits the benefits of his participation in
cooperative activities to SA benefits alone. As Gauthier states:
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Morals by agreement may indeed be the only morality that economic man can
understand, but their value to him is lessened by his indifference to many of the
activities that they help to make possible.227
Gauthier recognizes that economic man is clearly not an accurate representation of an
actual human, so he contrasts economic man with another, more realistic caricature known as the
“liberal individual.” The liberal individual is tuistic and she has an emotional, affective capacity;
like actual humans she takes an interest in the interests of other individuals and she derives
pleasure from social interaction. In Gauthier’s terms, she values participation. Where economic
man views constraints on his actions and his dependence on others negatively, the liberal
individual places a positive value on the participation that she has with others, both
instrumentally and intrinsically, and she also values the constraints of justice that make this
participation not only possible, but necessary.228 In Moral Dealing, Gauthier writes:
Rather than chafe unwillingly under the constraints of justice, the liberal
individual recognizes that an essentially just society provides the conditions
necessary to realize her own good through free participation in fair cooperation
with her fellows. To the liberal individual, human relationships in a just society
are not exclusively or even primarily contractual, but they offer the respect for
each individual’s good, the assured mutuality of benefit, and the freedom from
exploitation that voluntary, rational agreement would guarantee.229
The liberal individual enjoys the same contractual benefits of society that are enjoyed by the
rational capacity of economic man, with the added benefit of having her emotional capacity
engaged by the process of interaction itself.
Gauthier’s discussion of the liberal individual has several implications for the
continuation of our own discussion of NSA benefits and of justice in general. First, it is
important to understand Gauthier’s distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. What
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the liberal individual shows us is that contractarianism does not necessarily require that justice
lead only to instrumental benefits. In fact, the instrumental rational foundation of justice is a
necessary condition for the formation of the affective hold that it has on us; if justice was
irrational we would not be able to link it to an intrinsically valuable concern for others.
Gauthier believes that participating in cooperative interaction and taking an interest in the
interests of others are intrinsically valuable activities, however, he stops short of making a firm
claim that justice itself is intrinsically valuable. He makes a vague claim that justice may be
intrinsically valuable,230 but offers no real proof of the distinction, and his more important point
is that justice is an instrumental catalyst that provides us with some additional NSA benefits that
are of intrinsic value. He envisions humankind as a middle ground between economic man, who
values activities only instrumentally, and a “utopian man,” who is free of scarcity and therefore
values activities only intrinsically. Gauthier claims that the liberal individual values activities for
both reasons, and it is in this context where justice can be found. For Gauthier, intrinsic and
instrumental value are inter-dependent, and although many NSA benefits of justice are
intrinsically valuable, justice itself is not.
Second, it should be recognized that Gauthier’s liberal individual is the antithesis of the
Sensible Knave. The Knave is, in a way, a version of Gauthier’s economic man with poor
reasoning ability; he thinks he can get away with violations of covenants, although in actuality he
cannot. If we add proper reason to the Knave, we get economic man, who adheres to his
covenants, but only for the value of SA benefits. If we add a recognition of the value of NSA
benefits to economic man, we arrive at the liberal individual. Where the Knave fails to recognize
the value of tuistic participation, the liberal individual embraces it. The liberal individual is
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therefore able to benefit from justice in all of the same ways as the Knave and economic man,
with the added benefit of deriving value from NSA activities as well.
Third, and most important, Gauthier’s characterization of the liberal individual hints at a
critical element of justice that has not yet been addressed, namely, the idea that justice is an
essential aspect of being human. Gauthier recognizes that economic man is not an accurate
depiction of the way we actually are, but his portrayal of the liberal individual is certainly
reminiscent of humans as we actually find them. By inextricably associating justice, not only
with participation in social activities, but with seeking and striving for intrinsic goods, Gauthier
is suggesting that justice is woven into the very fabric of the human constitution. The liberal
individual necessarily recognizes her need for seeking, striving and social participation, and
justice is a necessary prerequisite for these activities. Gauthier claims that the liberal individual
“does not see a self-sufficient life as fully human,”231 which suggests that, for Gauthier, justice
may be a prerequisite for consideration as a normal human being. This casual afterthought of
Gauthier’s demands further attention, and fortunately receives it in the work of Philippa Foot, for
whom naturalism is the central idea of moral philosophy.

Justice and Natural Normativity232
In Chapter 1, I claimed that an understanding of justice must be based upon an
understanding of human nature. As we will now see, it may even be the case that justice itself is
actually a necessary part of our human nature. Via the liberal individual, Gauthier has argued
that there is something more to justice than merely instrumental SA benefits, and he subtly
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suggests that justice may be even more than that; it may actually be a natural and essential part of
who we are. The controversial claim that justice is natural has been vigorously debated for
centuries. This claim has been denied by Thrasymachus and more recently by his 19th century
counterpart, Nietzsche, and it finds it most ardent advocate in Philippa Foot. By contrasting
Foot’s naturalistic account of justice with the accounts given by Nietzsche and Socrates’
antagonists, I attempt to demonstrate that justice is indeed an essential element of human nature.

Thrasymachus and Nietzsche
Recall from Chapter 1 that Thrasymachus believes that any concept of justice is
temporal; it derives its meaning and validity from the prevailing public opinion of the time and it
is not based upon any underlying facts about human nature. He believes that justice cannot be
viewed as good or bad without qualification; my justice benefits me and damages you, and your
justice benefits you and damages me.233 Individuals who obey the rules of justice purely out of
respect for justice itself are placing an unnatural restraint on themselves, to their own detriment.
As noted by Chappell,234 Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that justice must be justified
by reference to some notion of human flourishing which must either be helped or hindered by an
adherence to justice. Although they would agree that justice is beneficial only if it assists in the
flourishing of the individual, they ultimately disagree on the efficacy of justice due to their
disagreement regarding what it is that constitutes human flourishing.

For Thrasymachus,

flourishing consists in having as much wealth and power over others as possible, and he sees
justice as an obstacle to these goals. Socrates, as noted in Chapter 1, sees a flourishing human
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life as one that involves happiness, philosophical reflection, clear conscience and the respect of
others, and justice is clearly a necessary means to this end. Where Thrasymachus sees justice as
a contribution to the flourishing of others, Socrates sees it as a contribution to the flourishing of
oneself.
The argument posed by Thrasymachus is brief and it is ultimately circumvented by
Socrates. However, the argument is revived and restated in a similar fashion centuries later in
the works of Nietzsche.235 Like Thrasymachus, Nietzsche provides his own definition of justice
as a foil to the idea of justice as it is typically construed:
At the risk of displeasing innocent ears I propose: egoism belongs to the nature of
a noble soul – I mean that unshakable faith that to a being such as “we are” other
beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves. The noble
soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question mark, also without any
feeling that it might contain hardness, constraint or caprice, rather as something
that may be founded in the primordial law of things: if it sought a name for this
fact it would say, ‘it is justice itself.’236
For Nietzsche, as for Thrasymachus, justice (as it is commonly understood) is a
contemptible practice that obstructs human flourishing. He argues that the idea that justice is
absolute and unchanging across time and cultures is absurd. For him, true justice does not mean
equality; it is a way of defending one’s own vantage point and it is an ever-changing standard
that adapts to suit the needs of particular individuals. It means different things to different people
and it recognizes that different people should be treated differently. When we evaluate the justice
or injustice of any action, it is not the action itself that is at the core of the evaluation, but rather
the nature of the person who performs the action.237

235

It must be acknowledged that the work of Nietzsche is subject to various interpretations. However, for the
purpose of illustrating the argument in favor of the “justice is irrational” position, I will interpret Nietzsche from a
literalist viewpoint.
236
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 9:265, p. 405
237
This point is reminiscent of Aristotle’s discussion of distributive justice in Book V of Nichomachean Ethics.

155

When Nietzsche addresses the common understanding of justice (justice as fairness or as
the observance of covenants), he adopts the Thrasymachean view that adherence to this
conventional notion of justice is inconsistent with the flourishing of the best individuals among
us and is therefore foolish. Nietzsche believes that all of the moral virtues, including justice, are
the result of what he refers to as “slave morality,” in which the weak and powerless have turned
nature on its head and imposed a suffocating moral constraint upon the great and powerful and
made those individuals less than they would otherwise be. In Genealogy of Morals238 he ridicules
humble and fearful individuals for promoting their adherence to justice as a virtue and for
attempting to convince themselves that their support for justice is not merely an admission of
impotence. When he describes the way individuals of merit behaved prior to the imposition of
slave morality, Nietzsche sounds remarkably similar to Thrasymachus:
Human beings whose nature was still natural…hurled themselves upon weaker,
more civilized, more peaceful races…239
…the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their predominance did not lie
mainly in physical strength but in strength of the soul - they were more whole
human beings (which also means, at every level, “more whole beasts”).240
At this point Nietzsche takes the argument against justice farther than Thrasymachus was
willing (or permitted) to go. He overtly supports the exploitation of the weak by the strong and
he contends that placing one’s interests on a par with another and refraining from doing what one
wants and is able to do by force and cunning is a denial of flourishing and a move towards death
and decay. He claims that the main purpose of society is to foster the development of a higher
type of individual, or “overman,” and that the practice of justice as it is currently espoused by the
masses is a hindrance to this goal.
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It is important to note that Nietzsche and Thrasymachus are not immoralists. They are
not arguing for a complete abandonment of values; what they seek is a revaluation of values.
Nietzsche clearly values struggle and suffering in the development of the overman. They both
value wealth and power of the will. They have their own set of values that they implicitly and
explicitly support, and they are making a claim about the way in which humans should live in
order to flourish, given these values.241
In summary, Nietzsche strongly believes that adherence to conventional principles of
justice is not a rational practice for all individuals; justice is instead the “silly good nature”242 of
the weak, naive and cowardly. While the weak have an interest in promoting justice in order to
protect themselves from the ravages of the strong, an observance of justice is not in the best
interests of the best individuals among us, and nature dictates that they should instead practice
injustice whenever possible.

Philippa Foot
Foot, like Thrasymachus and Nietzsche, believes that justice is closely tied with a notion
of human flourishing. However, the similarities between her ideas regarding justice and the
ideas of Thrasymachus and Nietzsche largely end there. Foot’s moral theory, as developed in
Natural Goodness, can be characterized as an attempt to base morality in facts, and specifically
in facts about human life. She describes her theory in terms of a response to two questions,
namely:
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1) Can we develop a factual definition of what it means to be a good human
being, and
2) Can we demonstrate that each of us has a reason to act in accordance with this
definition of what it means to be a good human being?243
She begins her response to the first question by saying that she wants to “describe a
particular type of evaluation and to argue that moral evaluation of human action is of this logical
type.”244 The type of evaluation that she wants to describe is one in which facts about a particular
subject matter are outlined, and the argument that she makes is that moral arguments are merely
descriptions of facts about the subject of human life.
Her argument is a response to the non-cognitivist view that moral evaluations are not
grounded in fact, but are instead emotive utterances or expressions of subjective values. Where
the non-cognitivists claim that there is a gap between the values expressed by a moral judgment
and any facts upon which one attempts to ground such a judgment, Foot denies the existence of
such a gap.
Foot argues that human goodness is analogous to the goodness that can be seen in plant
and animal life. Where a good tree is one with deep, strong roots and a good lion is one that is
fast enough to catch sufficient prey to feed itself and its offspring, so a good human is one who
has the ability to think clearly, to recognize patterns, and who recognizes virtues such as
friendship, loyalty, and justice. Clearly, the move from the human ability to recognize patterns
to the recognition of justice as a virtue is a bold one, but Foot describes this move as just part of
the continuum of “natural normativity.” She wants to show that, since we would view a human
with no sense of justice whatsoever as being defective, and since humans need such virtues as
243
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justice in order to survive and flourish, the term “good” as used to describe good moral actions in
humans is no different from the term “good” when it is used to describe the characteristics of a
plant or the actions of an animal. In each instance the term “good” is grounded in facts that are
relevant to the survival and flourishing of a particular organism.
Thus, Foot’s theory is attempting to integrate morality and justice with the survival and
evolution of the human species. “Good” actions for any individual animal are determined by
what will allow that individual to reproduce and to flourish:
‘natural’ goodness, as I define it, which is attributable only to living things
themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and operations, is intrinsic or
‘autonomous’ goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual
to the ‘life form’ of its species.245
In the case of the human animal (an animal which is unique in that it has the ability to act based
upon reasons), the actions that allow it to flourish can be described in factual moral terms.
Having addressed the first question, Foot then attacks the second: Can we demonstrate
that each of us has a reason to act in accordance with this definition of what it means to be a
good human being? She responds to this question with a brief logical progression: That which is
good for human life is moral, those actions which are moral are also rational, and to act
rationally is to act on reasons. In other words, goodness defines practical rationality, and not
vice-versa. We can describe in factual terms what the good action is, and the fact that the action
is good for human beings means that it is rational for a human being to perform the action.
She then anticipates the response of a committed skeptic who may yet ask, “What reason do I
have for acting rationally?” Foot merely claims that this is an incoherent question:
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To ask for a reason for acting rationally is to ask for a reason where reasons must
a priori have come to an end. And if (the skeptic) goes on saying ‘But why should
I?’, we may query the meaning of this ‘should’.246
Foot argues that we can develop a factual definition of what it means to be a good human being,
and we can offer reasons why we should act in accordance with this definition. Stated concisely,
to act well is to act rationally, and to act rationally is to act on reasons. For her, no further
explanation is necessary.

Justice as a Part of Our Nature
It is clear that Foot was influenced by Nietzsche, and it will be helpful to outline some of
the common threads that run through both of their philosophies before turning to the more
important topic of their differences on the issue of justice. First, both Nietzsche and Foot are
proponents of “naturalism” in the sense that humans should be viewed as a part of the continuum
of the animal world. As mentioned before, Foot’s moral theory has an evolutionary (or at least
biological) tilt to it, and it is also possible to characterize Nietzsche as an evolutionist, although
more in the Lamarckian sense as opposed to the Darwinian.
In addition, the recognition of humans as part of the animal kingdom allows both
Nietzsche and Foot to describe moral action in terms of facts about human life and
characteristics that promote the flourishing of the human species. As previously mentioned,
Nietzsche’s entire project is based upon the primary underlying value of a constant struggle
towards a higher type of human. His is a philosophy that praises progress, strength, health, and
general self-creation. Foot’s theory is also explicitly grounded on the progress of the species:

246

Foot (2001), pp. 65

160

The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for
development, self-maintenance, and reproduction: in most species involving
defence, and in some the rearing of the young.247
She sees the goal of morality as being the promotion of a general flourishing of the individual
and the species, and, like Nietzsche, she argues that actions which inhibit the flourishing of the
species are morally wrong.
While these similarities can be informative when tracing the genealogy of Foot’s ideas,
the profound differences between Nietzsche and Foot provide a far more robust basis for
analysis. One obvious point about which Foot and Nietzsche disagree is the role that rationality
has for morality. Foot bases her entire moral theory on the argument that reason and rationality
are a necessary condition of morality. For her, morality and reason both play a part in what it
means to be a member of the human species.
Nietzsche’s position on rationality is entirely different: “there is a realm of truth and
being, but reason is excluded from it!”248 Nietzsche’s critique of the capacity of reason and his
preference for the aesthetic is well known. While he and Foot come to the same conclusion that
the moral act is that act which encourages human flourishing, Nietzsche sees this flourishing not
as a rational process, but as an aesthetic one. This particular aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy
encourages Foot to refer to his evaluation as being aesthetic and not moral:
Thus Nietzsche thinks of value as belonging only to a person who has created his
own character in a pattern that cannot be prescribed for others, and it is here that
his shift from a moral to an aesthetic form of evaluation becomes clear.249
Foot’s claim here, that Nietzsche’s evaluation is not a moral evaluation, is dubious. It is more
accurate to describe Nietzsche’s evaluation as a moral evaluation done in an aesthetic rather than

247

Foot (2001), p. 65
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 3:11, p.554.
249
Foot, Philippa. “Nietzsche’s Immoralism.” in Moral Dillemas, 144-158. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002: 148
248

161

in a rational framework. Regardless of how it is characterized, however, Nietzsche’s aesthetic
perspective is in stark contrast to the purely rational perspective that Foot adopts throughout her
moral theorizing.
Another profound difference between the ideas of Foot and Nietzsche is their respective
positions on egoism.

Early in her argument, Foot explicitly recognizes that some species

necessarily operate in a group context, and the fact that they do so will have profound
implications for the types of actions that will contribute to their flourishing:
In most cases we speak of what each member of the species needs to be and to do
in order that it should flourish. But of course what is needed may be needed in a
group, like cooperation in a pack, or obedience to a leader, and what a member of
the species is or does may advantage others rather than himself.250
Foot argues that, because humans necessarily behave in a cooperative fashion, those individual
humans who do not behave cooperatively can be considered defective. She also emphasizes the
point that things like friendship, loyalty, truthfulness, and especially justice are a necessary part
of the human condition because adherence to these virtues has allowed us to flourish as a
species. In other words, it is rational to observe these virtues in our dealings with others because,
in doing so, it promotes the progress of the human species.
Because she recognizes collective behavior as being a necessary part of the human
condition, Foot has to criticize egoism for failing to account for this fact. She characterizes the
egoist as a free rider, that is, someone who selfishly enjoys the benefits of the group-directed
behavior of others without contributing to the benefit of the group him- or herself. For Foot, the
human who does not contribute to the well being of the human species as a whole (by practicing
virtues such as friendship, loyalty, and justice) is defective in the same way that a wolf that does
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not aid in the hunt is defective. In the context of her moral theory, this defective behavior should
be considered rationally and objectively wrong.251
While Foot explicitly denounces egoistic moral theories, egoism is a crucial part of
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Like Foot, Nietzsche recognizes that humans often operate in a group
environment, but unlike Foot, he sees the “herd” as a hindrance to the development of a better
type of individual because herd behavior leads to a reduction of individual creativity and critical
thought:
“The over-all degeneration of man down to what today appears to the socialist
dolts and flatheads as their ‘man of the future’ – as their ideal – this degeneration
and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal...”252
Nietzsche is the epitome of the rugged individualist. He praises the individual who makes her
own rules and who questions the prevailing cultural and social norms. He rejects the idea that
actions themselves can be characterized as good or bad, instead favoring the view that
individuals are good or bad, and that any action performed should be judged in the context of the
person who performs it. Stated in contemporary terms, he despises those who outsource the
guidance of their behavior to an external authority, whether it be a boss, family member, or
priest, and instead prefers those egoistic individuals for whom moral action is defined as “that
which is right for me, now.” 253
Because he accepts egoism, Nietzsche emphasizes the flourishing of the individual as
opposed to the group, and even at times encourages the flourishing of the individual at the
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expense of the group. His acceptance of self-interest as a virtue in the ascending individual is
quite explicit:
Self-interest is worth as much as the person who has it: it can be worth a great
deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible.254
Faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a fundamental hostility and irony against
‘selflessness’ belong just as definitely to noble morality as does a slight disdain
and caution regarding compassionate feelings and a ‘warm heart.’255
It is evident that Nietzsche stands in stark opposition to Foot with respect to the role that
collective behavior plays in the development of the species. Foot contends that group behavior is
a necessary part of the human condition, while Nietzsche is convinced that it is precisely this
group behavior that is holding us back and preventing humankind from realizing its full
potential.
Given the apparent hopelessness of reconciling these two related but sharply opposed
philosophies, we should instead focus our efforts on deciding which of them presents the better
argument on the nature of justice. Since both Foot and Nietzsche base their ideas of morality
upon facts about human life, the proper question to ask is, “Who has the facts right?”
Nietzsche’s moral philosophy (as characterized above) clearly does not count justice
among its virtues. For Nietzsche, justice is part of slave or herd morality and he sees justice as
being antithetical to the ascendancy of the better type of individual. In a Nietzschean framework,
justice is only favored by the weak because they lack the strength to protect themselves against
the injustice of the strong. While the weak clearly have an interest in favoring justice as a virtue,
according to Nietzsche, the strong have no interest whatsoever in promoting justice; those who
have the power should simply do as they please. In this respect, Nietzsche is in agreement with
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some of the antagonists from Plato’s dialogues who argue that justice is a convenient rule for a
certain type of human rather than a universal prescription.256
Foot, on the other hand, argues not only that justice must be a universal prescription, but
that justice is a necessary part of whom we are, that is, that justice is part of being human. With
the Martian analogy previously mentioned in this chapter, Foot discredits the position of Plato’s
antagonists and Nietzsche, and shows us via this analogy that justice, like friendship, cannot be
evaluated merely in a “cost-benefit” framework in which we view the virtue of justice as a
necessary sacrifice that must be undertaken in order for us to get what we want. Justice means
much more than this to us in the conduct of our day-to-day lives. As social animals we need
justice in order to cooperate with each other and to help each other feed, clothe, house, and
educate ourselves. In other words, we need justice in order to flourish. A certain inherent sense
of the goodness of justice is innate to us as humans; we necessarily place value on justice and we
take pleasure in performing just acts and seeing them performed by others.257 Stated in terms of
Foot’s overall moral theory, a person who does not recognize the inherent value of justice would
most certainly be seen by the rest of us as being defective.
Returning to the question, “Who has the facts right?” it seems clear that Foot has given us
a more accurate characterization of the facts as we experience them from day to day. To deny
that justice is a sentiment that is common to us all is to deny the facts as we find them in
everyday life as humans. In addressing her differences with Nietzsche on this point, she accuses
him of poor psychological analysis: “Nietzsche seems to have fallen into the trap of working a
modicum of psychological observation into an all-embracing theory which threatens to become
256
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cut off from facts that could possibly refute it.”258 One need only imagine a life without justice
to see that such a life would certainly not allow us to flourish or attain ascendancy, and it is
likely that we would not even describe such a life as fitting our definition of what it means to be
human.259 We should instead recognize that a sense of justice is a necessary human capacity akin
to the ability to recognize patterns or to use tools. Foot’s closing statement in Chapter 7 of
Natural Goodness states the central claim of her argument quite explicitly: “My point is that it is
only for a different species that Nietzsche’s most radical revaluation of values could be valid. It
is not valid for us as we are, or are ever likely to be.”260

Conclusion
Gauthier’s economic man is well-advised to adopt a deliberative procedure in accordance
with justice because such a deliberative procedure will allow him to reap the benefits of
cooperation in a non-zero-sum game, and because the expected return of cheating on his
agreements is negative. Yet, the justice of economic man does not capture the entire essence of
what justice means to actual humans. As Socrates, Hume and Gauthier’s liberal individual have
shown, there are NSA benefits to justice other than the benefits that lead economic man to
behave in a just fashion. The benefits enjoyed by economic man make justice a worthwhile
policy for everyone, and the additional benefits enjoyed by the liberal individual provide a bonus
for most of us.
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While it is clear that these NSA benefits do exist, we must be careful not to equate the
presence of NSA benefits with proof that justice itself has intrinsic value. Justice does lead to
happiness, participation and a sense of integrity, and it can be said that all of these things have
intrinsic value. Yet this does not demonstrate that justice itself has intrinsic value. Rather than
continue Socrates’ unsuccessful effort to demonstrate the intrinsic value of justice, we are going
to have to settle for something less: Justice itself will not provide us with intrinsic value, but it is
a short ride from the end of the line. That is, there is nothing standing between justice and
intrinsic value, and justice is a very effective catalyst for the realization of other benefits that do
have intrinsic value. However, to attribute more than this to justice would be to overstate the
case.
Not only does justice provide us with NSA benefits and help us attain goods with
intrinsic value, it also seems to be an essential part of human nature. Foot has made a convincing
argument in favor of this position; any individual who claims to have no sense of justice in her
interaction with others would be viewed as somehow defective in the context of what we
consider to be a normal, thriving human life. In fact, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility
that Nietzsche has got the causal relationship between justice and humankind completely
backwards.

He claims that justice was created by weaker individuals for the purpose of

restraining stronger individuals. In his view, the aristocratic individual of years past lived
without the need for justice, and the justice that is currently imposed on the better individuals
among us is artificial and contrived. However, this line of argument seems to have reversed the
causal relationship that exists between the practice of justice and human beings as we find them.
Nietzsche is arguing that humans created justice when it is more accurate to say that justice is a

167

necessary aspect of the species we currently know as human.261 That is, human beings as we
find them in everyday life, whether they are mediocre or exceptional, owe their existence to
various cooperative group behaviors, including justice. Without justice, we never would have
been able to become the reasoning, aesthetic creature of the will that Nietzsche embraces. To
dismiss justice as a contrivance is, therefore, to completely ignore the fact that justice helped to
make us what we are as a species. The human species as we know it is more a product of justice
than a creator of it.
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CONCLUSION
The motivating goal of this thesis has been to demonstrate that justice, understood as the
consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor,
despite its costs. I want to lend credence to our intuitions about just behavior by showing that
following these intuitions is in our best interests, and that the Madoffs of the world are acting
irrationally when they willingly violate the covenants they have made.
My thesis begins, appropriately, at the origin of western philosophy. In The Republic, we
are introduced to the argument in favor of justice and to the amoral interlocutor via the character
Thrasymachus. The primitive claim made by Thrasymachus and the more sophisticated
subsequent arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus, (as well as Hobbes’s Fool, the Sensible
Knave, Nietzsche and the straightforward maximizer) represent the opposing position against
which I have argued throughout the dissertation.
Although Socrates’ argument in The Republic is unsatisfying in many ways, he does
introduce us to some key concepts that are critical for the formulation of my case in favor of
justice. First, in his refutation of Thrasymachus, Socrates implies that the practice of justice is
not a zero-sum game. All of the amoral interlocutors from Thrasymachus to Nietzsche will
claim, correctly, that the observance of justice comes with certain costs,262 in the form of
restraint from certain behaviors. In order for me to claim that justice is a rational strategy, it is
necessary to show that there are benefits to justice that outweigh these costs.

262

What

These costs can either be “out-of-pocket costs,” which involve the renunciation of goods that one already has, or
“opportunity costs,” which involve the renunciation of goods that one could have had.

169

Thrasymachus fails to understand is the fact that the benefits that one individual enjoys as a
result of the practice of justice do not necessarily lead to costs for some other party. That is,
cooperative practices involve more than the mutually agreeable division of a fixed basket of
goods; the process of cooperation itself actually increases the overall value of the goods to be
divided, so everyone is better-off under the mutual observance of justice than they would have
been if they had all acted independently. Justice, understood as consistent cooperation, provides
more benefits than costs.
Socrates also shows us the distinction between the instrumental value and the intrinsic
value of justice. He dispenses rather quickly with Thrasymachus’ attempt to denounce the
instrumental value of justice, but Socrates finds it far more difficult to overcome the claim of
Glaucon and Adeimantus that justice lacks intrinsic value. As I demonstrate in later chapters, the
instrumental benefits are sufficient to substantiate the argument in favor of justice. However, if
it can be proven that there are intrinsic benefits to justice as well, that will provide an important
bonus to those who choose to act accordingly. I conclude in the final chapter that justice comes
up short in this regard.
Perhaps the most important contribution of The Republic is Socrates’ suggestion that an
understanding of justice and its benefits must be based upon an understanding of the underlying
nature and psychology of human beings. This is an insight that has been embraced by subsequent
philosophers of justice from Aristotle to Gauthier and beyond. Unfortunately for Socrates, this
insight leads to his undoing; because his account of human psychology is deeply flawed, his
account of justice is flawed as well.
In the early modern period, Hobbes and Hume advance many of the same themes of
justice that were introduced by Socrates. They each offer an account of justice that is based upon
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human nature and psychology, and they each recognize that justice is a non-zero-sum game.
They also offer arguments in favor of justice as a rational strategy without having to depend on
any notion of intrinsic value; for both Hobbes and Hume, the instrumental benefits of justice are
sufficient.
The accounts of justice offered by Hobbes and Hume each have their own merits and
drawbacks, but I have chosen to pursue Hobbes’s line of argument over Hume’s because it
provides a much better framework for the project at hand. The goal here is to demonstrate that
justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is a rational strategy
for a self-interested actor. Hume’s account, while somewhat compelling, is dependent upon an
individual’s regard for the greater good. It is an argument leveled more on the societal level than
on the individual level, and it is even altruistic in some respects. Hobbes, in contrast, makes his
argument in purely self-interested terms. He is concerned with convincing us that to “perform
(one’s) covenants made”263 is beneficial on an individual level, and his account is purely
instrumental and more game-theoretic than Hume’s. In addition, Hobbes’s reply to the Fool
provides us with the ideal starting point from which to advance the claim that the benefits of just
behavior outweigh the costs.
Gauthier, Kavka and other contemporary contractarians have used Hobbes as the starting
point for their own forays into the rationality of justice, and Gauthier’s work, in particular,
represents a quantum leap forward in the argument. Gauthier’s goal in Morals by Agreement and
his subsequent modifications of that work is similar to my own: He wants to show that justice, or
“social morality,” is a part of rational choice.264 His work in MbA goes a long way towards
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achieving this goal, and it requires only a few modifications to reach what I believe to be the
finish line.
By recognizing the distinction between equilibrium and optimality, Gauthier forms his
most important insight, namely, that when an individual adopts an optimizing strategy, she is
operating on the level of metachoice. That is, she is making a choice about how to make
choices. Gauthier also introduces the key concept of deliberative procedures, and he makes three
claims with regard to these. First, he claims that humans have the ability to willingly choose
deliberative procedures in general. Second, assuming that the first claim holds, it is rational to
choose a deliberative procedure in accordance with agreed Pareto-optimization (APO). Third,
once we choose the deliberative procedure in accordance with APO, it is rational to comply with
that procedure in all instances. With some minor assistance from other scholars, Gauthier
presents a convincing argument in support of the first and third claims. However, the second
claim falls short, and in order to make a convincing argument in favor of the rationality of
justice, it is necessary to remedy this shortcoming.
The question that remains, then, is, “what kind of deliberative procedure is it rational to
choose?” If it can be demonstrated that it is rational to choose a deliberative procedure that
advocates consistent adherence to covenants, then I have achieved my goal: I have shown that
justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor, despite its costs. If, however, it is rational
to choose a procedure that recommends violating covenants when it is advantageous to do so, I
have failed. Hobbes’s Fool is in favor of opportunistic violation, and the rebuttal of his claim
represents the final phase of my argument.
The Fool recognizes that justice is a non-zero-sum game, and he would agree that it is
rational to adhere to covenants in most situations. However, he believes that when an individual
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is presented with a situation in which the potential benefits of violation are high and the odds of
getting caught are low, it is in the individual’s best interest to violate the covenant. In other
words, the Fool wants to permanently adopt and consistently adhere to a deliberative procedure
that dictates that he violate covenants when it is to his advantage to do so. He claims that my
goal cannot be met: The consistent observance of cooperative agreements is not always in one’s
own best interest.
The problem with the Fool’s claim is that it is very difficult for him to objectively
determine in advance which violations will turn out to be in his own self-interest. Behavioral
economics has shown that overconfidence and ignorance of uncertainty are so pervasive and
influential in our psychological constitution that we cannot rely on our own judgment to
ascertain when an opportunity to violate has a positive expected return. The world is highly
complex and unpredictable, and given a sufficiently large amount of trials, the Fool will
eventually be discovered. Rather than heed the Fool’s advice, an individual is better-served by a
deliberative procedure that recommends consistent adherence to covenants because, as Kavka
puts it, “Time wounds all heels.”
Armed with these ideas from behavioral economics, we can now be more secure in the
claim that it is rational to choose a deliberative procedure that advocates consistent adherence to
covenants. With these new insights, I believe that my originally stated goal has been reached,
yet there is still something missing. Our commonsense notions of justice lead us to believe that
there are reasons for the consistent observance of cooperative agreements other than the fact that
we probably cannot get away with acting otherwise; there seem to be benefits to justice other
than the market-based benefits addressed in my imperfect reason argument.
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While these non-simulator accessible (NSA) benefits do exist, we must be careful not to
equate the existence of NSA benefits with proof that justice itself has intrinsic value. Justice
does provide us with many things that have intrinsic value, such as happiness, a feeling of
integrity, and a sense of participation and kinship with others, and justice may even be an
integral part of what it means to be a normal human being. But this does not demonstrate that
justice itself has intrinsic value.
If it were possible to vindicate Socrates by closing the circle and demonstrating that
justice is valuable in itself, this would be a very tidy ending to this story. Unfortunately, we are
going to have to settle for something less. Justice itself will not provide us with intrinsic value,
but this is not a tragedy and it does not undermine the imperfect reason argument. Justice can
provide everyone with some instrumental benefits, it can provide most of us with a bonus in the
form of NSA instrumental benefits, and it can bring us very close to intrinsic value, even if it
cannot get us all the way there.

Intentional Omissions
Hobbes defines justice as the keeping of covenants made, and this dissertation has
addressed the topic of justice in this narrow contractarian sense. However, outside of the
contractarian framework, the term “justice” often invokes connotations that are very different
from the ones addressed here. It is likely that a reader of this dissertation will object, with
justification, that important aspects of justice have been omitted. As I stated at the outset, I have
omitted these aspects of the wider definition of justice not because they are unimportant, but
because each of them could occupy a separate dissertation in its own right. Now that my claims
regarding the contractarian sense of justice have been made in their entirety, I will very briefly
174

outline some important aspects of justice that have not been addressed, and consider how these
might impact the central claims made above.
One instance of covenant and contract that has not yet been addressed is that in which
one party to the contract is able to impose his will on the other party. Recall that one of the main
assumptions of Hobbes’s state of nature is that all individuals are approximately equal, in the
sense that they all have approximately the same ability to kill one-another.

Within this

Hobbesean framework, when individuals enter into covenants, they do so for their own
protection, of their own accord, and without being coerced by another party that is operating
from a position of superior power. If this assumption of equality does not hold, and one of the
parties to a covenant is in a position of superior power or coercion relative to the other, then my
argument in favor of the consistent observance of covenants will no longer hold.265 That is, if
the more powerful party to a covenant can impose his will on the other party, both parties now
have a reason to consider violation. The more powerful party may want to consider violating the
covenant because he has little reason to fear punishment, reciprocity is no longer a motivation for
compliance, and opportunistic violation is probably a rational strategy. The weaker party, on the
other hand, may want to consider violating the covenant because if he had to be coerced, the
covenant was probably never in his best interest in the first place. While the weaker party does
still fear being caught, if he has been forced to enter a covenant that is worse than no covenant at
all, he is incurring a cost with no corresponding benefit, and he should consider violating.
While situations of coercion do demonstrate that there are instances in which it is in one’s
rational self-interest to violate an agreement, these examples do not invalidate the claims I have
made here because these examples are found outside the scope of justice as I have defined it.
265
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Throughout this dissertation, I have defined justice as the consistent observance of cooperative
agreements, and coercion is certainly not cooperation.266 Granted, situations of coercion and
unequal power certainly do exist, and the inability of my imperfect reason argument to deal with
these situations demonstrates a limitation of the applicability of the argument. However, these
situations are not examples of justice, either in common parlance or under my own definition,
and they do not invalidate the arguments advanced here.
Another element of justice that has been conspicuously absent from the discussion so far
is justice as “the first virtue of social institutions.”267 In this dissertation, I have emphasized the
idea that justice, as I have defined it, involves choices. When we select a deliberative procedure
in accordance with justice, we are making a choice about how to make choices. However,
justice and injustice in the context of social structures often involves no choices at all. For
example, I may argue that I am the beneficiary of an unjust system, as I am a white, welleducated man who happened to be born into a stable middle-class family in the wealthiest
society in the history of humankind. I have done nothing to deserve these advantages, yet I
benefit from them on a daily basis, sometimes (but not always) at the expense of others, without
any act of choice on my part. For me to forsake all of these benefits in the name of justice would
certainly be irrational if considered within the framework of the main arguments of this
dissertation. If I were to choose “justice” in this Rawlsian sense, it would no longer be in my
own self-interest.
It is true that the justice of social structures is a very commonsense notion of what justice
is. It is of central importance in the work of Rawls, and it is directly addressed by Gauthier in the
later chapters of MbA. However, as I have stated previously, the topic under discussion in this
266
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dissertation is not justice in the Rawlsian sense of social institutions. I am specifically concerned
with justice understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements. I am not
positing any veil of ignorance and I am not directly concerned with finding the optimal
distribution of the benefits of cooperative agreements. While this is an appealing topic of great
consequence which I hope can benefit from some of the insights that I have provided here, I will
remain silent on the justice of social institutions, as it is beyond the scope of the current project.

The Impact of Modernity and Apathy
Hobbes’s contractarian ideas were first proposed in 17th century Europe. Most of the
people of this time lived in small villages and sparsely populated areas. Mobility was very
limited; an individual was very likely to live her entire life within a few miles of her place of
birth, and she would interact with the same small group of people repeatedly throughout her
lifetime. In such circumstances, it is easy to see why Hobbes is confident in his reply to the
Fool. In order to benefit from the adoption of a deliberative procedure that recommends
opportunistic violation, an individual in these circumstances would have to deceive the same
people over and over without being detected and punished, or at least without inducing them to
alter their behavior towards him. In such close quarters, it is highly unlikely that this strategy
will be successful. In addition, the costs of being exposed as a heel in a world like Hobbes’s are
quite high. If I have lived my entire life in a small community, and the friends and customs I
have developed in that community are the only ones I know, to be ostracized from that
community would be devastating. The wounds inflicted on a heel in such a situation would be
quite deep.
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Our 21st century world is very different from Hobbes’s Europe in many obvious ways.
We are now very mobile; individuals in developed countries have the ability to move from city
to city and even from country to country with relative ease. Urban life has dramatically increased
the density of populations and led to far more frequent contact among strangers. We now
interact on a daily basis with other individuals whom we will likely never encounter again, and
the internet increases this virtual anonymity exponentially. The claims I have made throughout
this dissertation regarding the rationality of the consistent observance of cooperative agreements
are dependent upon certain circumstances of the human condition, including the transparency of
an individual’s character (Sayre-McCord, 1991), the opportunity for reciprocity (Axelrod, 1981),
and the availability of information (Skyrms, 1998).

It is certainly worth asking whether

modernity pushes us outside these circumstances.
Modernity has probably not changed the transparency of the average person when viewed
in the context of repeated face-to-face interaction; we still have the ability to spot a cheat when
information about the other party is literally right in our face. However, modernity has changed
the nature of the interaction itself in that many of our interactions are neither repeated nor faceto-face. This almost certainly decreases transparency and increases the ability of a deceiver to
conceal her deception. Axelrod recognizes that, “It is easy to maintain the norms of reciprocity
in a stable small town or ethnic neighborhood,”268 but the increased mobility of modern society
clearly impacts reciprocity in that it can provide anonymity and decrease the likelihood of future
interaction. Thus, modernity may provide a defector not only with the opportunity to conceal his
intentions, but also with the ability to violate an agreement without having to fear retaliation. If
he gets caught, the heel can just pick-up and move.
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While modernity has tilted the odds in favor of the heel in some ways, it has made life
more difficult for him in other ways. The flow of information today is better than ever before.
Urban life and impersonal commerce can certainly make anonymity easier to achieve, but with
the recent ubiquity of the internet, the pendulum has swung the other direction with respect to
anonymity. The internet makes reciprocation easier by giving nearly everyone the ability to
damage a heel’s reputation from the convenience of one’s own laptop. The availability of
information regarding the past behavior of counterparties is also more abundant now than ever
before (consider the feedback functions on EBay and the ubiquitous credit report that we all
carry with us into the virtual marketplace). Also, as Kavka suggests,269 surveillance technology,
polygraphs, and DNA testing all assist rule-enforcers, which increases the heel’s likelihood of
detection and possibly the ultimate cost of that detection as well.
It is unclear, therefore, whether the net impact of modernity is a benefit or a hindrance to
the heel. In addition to the considerations listed above, the heel will also need to contemplate
whether the benefits of consistent cooperation are higher now than they were in Hobbes time,
and also whether the benefits of violation are higher. However, one thing that has not changed is
the fact that the heel will need to make his assessment using imperfect machinery. His ability to
reason is clouded by overconfidence and an inability to properly assess probability; this has not
changed since Hobbes’s era, and it continues to offer support for the rationality of just behavior.
Yet despite the inadequacy of the human ability to reason, there may still be some hope
for the heels among us. Recall that the contractarian argument begins with fear. The individual
in Hobbes’s state of nature seeks peace because he fears the predations and reprisals of his
fellows. If he has no such fear, he has no reason to seek peace. Similarly, my argument has
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assumed that a heel fears being detected because the downside of being detected is significant; a
violator of a cooperative agreement will face a harsh punishment if she gets caught. However, if
the heel does not fear retribution even in the event that she does get caught, she likely has no
reason to behave in a just fashion.
This leads to a most troubling thought: Apathy may be the heel’s best friend. It has been
said that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.270 If but
few people care about the appropriate punishment of transgressors, then a heel who places no
value on the enjoyment of character or the esteem of others may be best-served by a policy of
opportunistic violation of cooperative agreements.
It requires no great leap of the imagination to posit that some amount of this harmful
apathy exists in modern western society. During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, we
witnessed Wall Street bankers and irresponsible homebuyers nearly destroy the world economy.
The bankers were incompetent at best and criminally negligent at worst, yet their punishment
will amount to little more than foregoing a portion of the money they improperly appropriated
from their clients, shareholders and the public. The fact that any one of these banks has a single
remaining client is a source of never-ending shock to an informed observer and it provides
evidence of the presence of apathy regarding heels. Furthermore, the banks are not the only
guilty party in this affair. Thousands of American homebuyers committed blatant mortgage
fraud by overstating their financial health in order to obtain mortgages on homes they could not
afford, yet there has been no effort made to prosecute these individuals and no public sense of
outrage on the part of other individuals who spent responsibly or who lost their homes due to
legitimate and unpredictable financial difficulty. Again, a sense of apathy is evident.
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This apathy problem does potentially pose a challenge for my claim that justice is a
rational strategy for a self-interested actor, and it would be an important and intriguing topic of
additional research. However, it should be noted that the mere presence of apathy does not
necessarily invalidate my central claim. The validity of my claim will depend, not upon the mere
presence of apathy, but upon the pervasiveness and reliability of apathy in a given society.
Apathy can be viewed as being analogous to the “errors of other men”271 that Hobbes describes
in his reply to the Fool. Like human error, the apathy of others is unreliable as a means of
security, and the would-be heel is still well-advised to adopt a deliberative procedure of
consistent adherence to his cooperative agreements rather than hope for assistance from the
consistent and pervasive apathy of his peers.

Final Thoughts
Most people do not need to read an entire dissertation in order to be convinced of the
benefits of just behavior. Our moral intuition and our recognition of NSA benefits such as a
sense of connectivity with others and the enjoyment of good character are enough to convince us
that we should behave in a just manner, and our fear of being caught in violation serves as a
deterrent in the event of temptation. For those of us who are already convinced of the benefits of
justice, the essential lesson here is that apathy is the enemy, and we need to be concerned about
the observance of justice by others. We will benefit from justice only to the extent that we are
not taken advantage of by free-riders and parasites. If some members of our community are
permitted to openly ignore the precepts of justice without having to fear any serious
ramifications, this significantly erodes the value of just behavior for the rest of us. We must
271
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understand that not being taken advantage of is an ongoing act of constant vigilance, and a policy
of forgive and forget will not serve us well.
However, this thesis was not intended to address those of us who are already convinced
of the conclusions it draws. It was written to address the bright boy from Queens and others like
him who fail to appreciate the enjoyment of character that accompanies adherence to cooperative
agreements. Whether or not the behavior of these individuals can legitimately be described as
“defective” is a subject of debate and is certainly a matter of degree. Regardless, the point is
clear: Those individuals who believe that a deceptive strategy of opportunistic violation is in
their best interest are only deceiving themselves. They are probably overconfident in their
deceptive skills, their ability to assess the odds of success is deeply flawed, and if they have not
yet been detected in their deceptions, this is likely due to chance rather than their own talent.
Justice is the strategy of self-interest, and time is the enemy of all heels.

182

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Annas, Julia. “Comments on John Doris’ ‘Lack of Character’.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 71, no. 3 (Nov. 2005): 636-642.
Aristotle. “Nichomachean Ethics.” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon,
927-1112. New York: Random House, 1941.
Aristotle. “Politics.” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, 1113-1316.
New York: Random House, 1941.
Armstrong, Frank. The Informed Investor. New York: Amacom, 2002.
Ashraf, Nava, Colin F. Camerer, and George Loewenstein. “Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 131-145.
Ashford, Elizabeth and Tim Mulgan. “Contractualism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
edited by Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2012 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/contractualism/>.
Axelrod, Robert. “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists.” The American Political Science
Review 75, no. 2 (June, 1981): 306-318
Axelrod, Robert, and William Hamilton. “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Science, New Series 211,
no. 4489 (March 27, 1981): 1390-1396
Axelrod, Robert and Douglas Dion. “The Further Evolution of Cooperation.” Science, New Series
242, no. 4884 (Dec. 9, 1988): 1385-1390.
Barney, Rachel. "Callicles and Thrasymachus." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2011 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/callicles-thrasymachus/>.
Barney, Rachel. “Socrates’ Refutation of Thrasymachus.” in The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s
Republic, edited by Gerasimos Santos, 44-62. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
Boxill, Bernard. “How Injustice Pays.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, no. 4 (Summer 1980): 359371.
Bratman, Michael. “The Interplay of Intention and Reason.” Ethics 123, no. 4 (July 2013): 657-672.
183

Brown, Eric. "Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic." The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2011 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/plato-ethics-politics/>.
Chappell, T.D.J. “The Virtues of Thrasymachus.” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 1-17.
Cohon, Rachel. "Hume's Moral Philosophy." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited
by Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2010 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hume-moral/>.
Cooper, John M. “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no.
1 (January, 1984): 3-21.
Cudd, Ann. "Contractarianism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. edited by Edward N.
Zalta (Winter 2013 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/contractarianism/>.
Cuneo, Terence. "Reid's Ethics." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N.
Zalta (Spring 2011 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reid-ethics/>.
Danielson, Peter. “Closing the compliance dilemma: How it’s rational to be moral in a Lamarckian
world.” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by Peter Vallentyne, 291-322. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Doris, John. “Heated Agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good.” Philosophical Studies
148 (2010): 135-146.
Doris, John. “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.” Nous 32, no. 4 (Dec, 1998): 504-530.
Feinberg, Joel. “Psychological Egoism.” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, 2nd ed., edited by Russ
Schafer-Landau, 167-177. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
Finkelstein, Claire. “Pragmatic Rationality and Risk.” Ethics 123, No. 4 (July, 2013): 673-699
Flew, Anthony. “Three Questions about Justice in Hume’s Treatise.” The Philosophical Quarterly
26, no. 102 (Jan. 1976): 1-13.
Foot, Philippa. “Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 59 (1958-1959):
83-104.
Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
184

Foot, Philippa. “Nietzsche’s Immoralism.” in Moral Dilemmas, 144-158. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002.
Foot, Philippa. “Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values.” in Virtues and Vices, 81-95. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2002.
Frede, Dorothea. "Plato's Ethics: An Overview." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2013 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/plato-ethics/>.
Gauthier, David. “Assure and Threaten.” Ethics 104 (July 1994): 690-721.
Gauthier, David. “David Hume, Contractarian.” The Philosophical Review 89, no. 1 (Jan 1979): 338.
Gauthier, David. The Logic of Leviathan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Gauthier, David. Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Gauthier, David. “Rational constraint: Some last words,” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice,
edited by Peter Vallentyne, 323-330. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Gauthier, David. “Rational Cooperation.” Nous 8, no. 1 (March 1974): 53-65.
Gauthier, David. “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist.” The Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 10 (Oct.
1979): 547-559.
Gauthier, David. “Three against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd.”
in Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics and Reason, 129-149. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Gauthier, David. “Twenty-Five On.” Ethics 123, No. 4 (July, 2013): 601-624
Gauthier, David. “Why Contractarianism?” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by
Peter Vallentyne, 15-30. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Goldie, Dan and Gordon Murray. The Investment Answer. New York: Business Plus, 2011.
Hacker-Wright, John. “What Is Natural about Foot’s Ethical Naturalism?” Ratio 22 (Sept. 3, 2009):
309-321.
Haidt, Jonathan. “The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail.” in The Righteous Mind, 27-51. New
York: Pantheon, 2012.
Hamlin, J. Kiley, Karen Wynn, Paul Bloom, and Neha Mahajan. “How Infants and Toddlers React
to Antisocial Others.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 50 (Dec. 13, 2011):
19931-19936.
185

Hampton, Jean. “Equalizing concessions in the pursuit of justice: A discussion of Gauthier’s
bargaining solution.” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by Peter Vallentyne, 149161. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Hampton, Jean. “Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism.” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 333-353
Hampton, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
Hampton, Jean. “The Knavish Humean.” in Rational Commitment and Social Justice, edited by Jules
L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris, 150-167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Hampton, Jean. “Two faces of contractarian thought.” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice,
edited by Peter Vallentyne, 31-55. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Harvey, Martin. “Hobbes and the Value of Justice.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004):
439-452.
Hayes, Peter. “Hobbes’s Silent Fool: A Response to Hoekstra.” Political Theory 27, no. 2 (April
1999): 225-229.
Hobbes, Thomas. Human Nature, edited by J.C.A. Gaskin. New York: Oxford University Press,
1994.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1994.
Hoekstra, Kinch. “Hobbes and the Fool.” Political Theory 25, no. 5 (Oct. 1997): 620-654
Hoekstra, Kinch. “Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind.” in The Cambridge Companion to
Hobbes’s Leviathan, edited by Patricia Springborg, 109-127. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
Hoekstra, Kinch. “Nothing to Declare?: Hobbes and the Advocate of Injustice.” Political Theory 27,
no. 2 (April 1999): 230-235
Home, Henry, Lord Kames. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. Liberty
Fund,
The
Online
Library
of
Liberty.
URL=<http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1352/Home_0995_EBk_v7.0.pdf>.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by J.B. Schneewind.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David F and Mary J Norton. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
186

Irwin, T.H. “Aristotle on Reason, Desire and Virtue.” The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 17
(October 2, 1975): 567-578.
Jennings, Dennis L., Teresa M. Amabile, and Lee Ross. “Informational Covariation
Assessment.” in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, 211-230. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982.
Joseph, H.W.B. “Aristotle’s Definition of Moral Virtue, and Plato’s Account of Justice in the
Soul.” Philosophy 9, no. 34 (April, 1934): 168 – 181.
Kahan, Dan M., Ellen Peters, Erica Dawson, and Paul Slovic. “Motivated Numeracy and
Enlightened Self-Government.” Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper no. 307
(September 3, 2013).
URL=< http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319992 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992>.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, (2011).
Kavka, Gregory. “Hobbes’s War of All against All.” Ethics 93, no. 2 (Jan, 1983): 291-310.
Kavka, Gregory. “Morals by Agreement, by David Gauthier.” Mind, New Series 96, no. 381
(Jan, 1987): 117-121.
Kavka, Gregory. “The Rationality of Rule-Following: Hobbes’ Dispute with the Fool.” Law and
Philosophy 14, no. 1 (Feb. 1995): 5-34.
Krause, Sharon. “Hume and the (False) Luster of Justice.” Political Theory 32, no. 5 (Oct. 2004):
628-655.
Kraut, Richard. "Aristotle's Ethics." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward
N. Zalta (Winter 2012 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/aristotle-ethics/>.
Kuhn, Steven. "Prisoner's Dilemma." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2009 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>.
Lichtenstein, Sarah, Baruch Fischhoff and Lawrence D. Phillips. “Calibration of probabilities:
The state of the art to 1980.” in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, 306-334. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
187

London, Alex J. “Moral Knowledge and the Acquisition of Virtue in Aristotle’s ‘Nichomachean’
and ‘Eudemian Ethics’.” The Review of Metaphysics 54, no. 3 (March 2001): 553-583.
MacLean, Frederick and Tim Slattery. “The Collision of Pride and Memory.” The Light
Magazine, September, 2010.
Martinich, A.P. Hobbes. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Moehler, Michael. “Why Hobbes’ State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game.” Utilitas
21, no. 3 (Sept. 2009): 297-326.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Beyond Good and Evil.” in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, edited by Walter
Kaufmann. New York: The Modern Library, 1992.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On the Genealogy of Morals.” in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, edited by
Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Modern Library, 1992.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Twilight of the Idols.” in The Portable Nietzsche, edited by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Viking Penguin, 1976.
Pack, Spenser J. and Eric Schliesser. “Smith’s Humean Criticism of Hume’s Account of the Origin
of Justice.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 1 (2006): 47-63.
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Plato. “The Republic.” in Plato, Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, translated by G.M.A.
Grube and C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
Postema, Gerald. “Hume’s Reply to the Sensible Knave.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 5, no. 1
(Jan., 1988): 23-40.
Postema, Gerald. “Whence Avidity? Hume’s Psychology and the Origins of Justice.” Synthese 152,
no. 3 (Oct. 2006): 371-391.
Rainbolt, George. “Gauthier on Cooperating in Prisoner’s Dilemmas.” Analysis 49, no. 4 (Oct,
1989): 216-220.
Raphael, D.D. “Hume and Smith on Justice and Utility.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series 73 (1972-1973): 87-103.
Rawls, John. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

188

Reeve, C.D.C. “Glaucon’s Challenge and Thrasymacheanism.” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 34 (May 29, 2008): 69-103.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay V, Chapter V. Early Modern Texts.
URL<http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/rea5.html>.
Rescorla, Michael. "Convention." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N.
Zalta (Spring 2011 Edition),
URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/convention/.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. “Deception and reasons to be moral.” in Contractarianism and Rational
Choice, edited by Peter Vallentyne, 181-195. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Schneewind, J.B. “The Misfortunes of Virtue.” Ethics 101, no. 1 (Oct. 1990): 42-63.
Shefrin, Hersh. Beyond Greed and Fear. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Shields, Christopher. “Plato’s Challenge: the Case against Justice in Republic II.” in The Blackwell
Guide to Plato’s Republic, edited by Gerasimos Santos, 63-81. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
Singpurwalla, Rachel. “Plato’s Defense of Justice in The Republic.” in The Blackwell Guide to
Plato’s Republic, edited by Gerasimos Santos, 263-279. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
Skyrms, Brian. “The Shadow of the Future.” in Rational Commitment and Social Justice, edited by
Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, 12-21. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976.
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations, edited by Edwin Cannan. New York: Modern Library, 2000.
Sorell, Tom. “Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy.” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan,
edited by Patricia Springborg, 128-153. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan. New York: Random House, 2007.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. Fooled by Randomness. New York: Texere, 2004.
Thompson, Michael. “Three Degrees of Natural Goodness (Discussion Note, Iride).”
URL=http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/three.pdf (retrieved August 14, 2012).
Trivers, Robert. “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” The Quarterly Review of Biology 46,
no. 1 (March 1971): 35-57.
Vallentyne, Peter. “Contractarianism and the assumption of mutual unconcern.” in Contractarianism
and Rational Choice, edited by Peter Vallentyne, 71-75. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
189

Vanderschraff, Peter. “Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 28,
no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 325-358.
Vanderschraff, Peter. “The Invisible Foole.” Philosophical Studies 147 (2010): 37-58.
Verbeek, Bruno and Christopher Morris. "Game Theory and Ethics." The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2010 Edition),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/game-ethics/>.
Woozley, A.D. “Hume on Justice.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 33, no. 1 (Jan 1978): 81-99.
Yi, Byeong-Uk. “Rationality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in David Gauthier’s Morals by
Agreement.” The Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 9 (Sept. 1992): 484-495.

190

